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ABSTRACT 
The determinants that affect the financial performance of an insurance 
company are complicated due to the intangible nature of insurance products 
and the lack of transparency in the market.  Consequently, the financial 
performance of insurance companies is important to various stakeholders 
such as policyholders, insurance intermediaries and policymakers.  This 
study aims to investigate the determinants of financial performance of 
insurance companies based on their financial strength rating performance.  
The empirical data are drawn from A.M. Best Insurance Report Online: Non- 
US Database.  The sample consists of 57 insurers in the United Kingdom 
over the period of 2006 to 2010.  The analyses include eight firm-specific 
variables, which are leverage, profitability, liquidity, size, reinsurance, 
growth, type of business and organisational form.  Rating transition matrices 
and regression models are employed in this study.  Rating transition analysis 
demonstrates a significant degree of rating changes, as reflected in the 
rating fluctuations.  Based on the empirical results, this study establishes 
that profitability, liquidity, size and organisational form are statistically 
significant determinants of financial performance of insurance companies in 
the United Kingdom.  This study recommends an alternative to measure the 
size of an insurance company, which is based on the gross premium written.  
In addition, this study provides insights into the effects of the global financial 
crisis on the financial performance of the insurance companies. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
 
Risk and uncertainty exist in all aspects of our lives.  We are susceptible to 
the possibility of loss events that could lead to severe social, human or 
financial consequences such as natural disasters, sickness, accidents, 
disability, death and property damage.  The desire to protect oneself from 
losses and damages is a fundamental concept of human behaviour.  This 
desire then leads to the creation of insurance and the insurance industry 
(Baltensperger and Bodmer 2012). The basis of insurance requires 
individuals or entities (policyholders) to pay a fixed amount of money at 
regular intervals (premium) into a pooled fund (insurance scheme).  This 
money will be used to compensate one or more policyholders who have 
suffered loss in a predefined event or particular circumstances (scope of 
coverage).  The insurance mechanism is an intrinsic part of the society and 
social behaviour.  It includes the organisation and mitigation of risks that 
conform to the principle of shared responsibility between the insurer and 
insured (policyholder).   
 
Insurance plays a significant role in the economy because of its double 
functions – risk transfer and indemnification and financial intermediation (Lee 
et al. 2013).  As a risk transfer and indemnification mechanism, insurance 
protects households and enterprises from risks detrimental to economic 
activities.  Life insurance indemnifies individuals against the loss of life and 
sickness in unexpected events, thus stabilising the financial security of the 
family.  General insurance (or non-life insurance) compensates for the 
damage of property for individuals and enterprises which are beneficial for 
business and facilitate investments.  Insurance helps to improve the 
capability of individuals and businesses to tolerate risks, and this leads to 
the evolvement of economic activities.  In addition, insurance is effective in 
reducing uncertainty and volatility of the economic system.  It also 
contributes to the stabilization of the economic cycle and mitigation of the 
shock and crises at micro and macro levels (Haiss and Sűmegi 2008).   
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On the other hand, insurance companies serve as a financial intermediary 
through their investments.  The insurance premiums which are accumulated 
in advance will be invested in the capital market.  Insurance companies are 
one of the important institutional investors in the capital market.  This 
function improves the allocation efficiency of capital and in turn benefits 
economic growth (Webb et al. 2002).  In addition, the interaction between 
insurance firms and other financial intermediaries could further benefit 
economic activity.  For instance, insurance companies could support bank 
intermediation activity and encourage higher levels of lending by means of 
collaterising credit, which reduces the bank’s credit risk exposures (Zou and 
Adams 2008). 
 
As a provider of financial and social security, insurance also contributes to a 
more stabilised and gradual increase in consumption, which becomes the 
driver of economic growth.  The association between insurance development 
and economic growth has been studied and proven to be positively 
correlated (Enz 2000, Harichandra and Thangavelu 2004, Arena 2006 and 
Grant 2012).  A more developed and efficient insurance market will lead to a 
greater contribution towards economic prosperity (Skipper 2001 and Liedtke 
2007).  The importance of insurance development on economic growth has 
been documented in a vast body of literature (Ward and Zurbruegg 2000, 
Skipper 2001, Arena 2008, Haiss and Sűmegi 2008, Han et al 2010, Grant 
2012 and Lee et al 2013). 
 
Despite all of its significant contributions to the economy, the insurance 
industry has been misunderstood by many.  Wűrmli (2011) points out that 
the insurance community has failed to persuade the public of its importance 
to the society and the regulators have failed to perform regulations properly.  
In this instance, the insurer’s knowledge and expertise are not adequately 
recognised by the society. Unlike the banking institutions, the insurance 
industry is less transparent and less informative in terms of educating the 
public about their mechanism, precise method of operations and 
contributions to the society.  
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The insurance industry is subject to very strict regulations (Malik 2011, Mao 
et al 2014 and Crawford et al 2014).  Supervision starts from the initial 
establishment of the type of risk that can be underwritten by the insurer.  It 
also covers the direct protection of consumers to specific contractual 
agreements such as reinsurance schemes and other risk transfer 
alternatives, the language used in contracts and general and special 
requirements for the capital held.  Traditionally, insurance supervision 
focused on product regulations, terms and prices of individual policy.  
However, as a consequence of the recent financial crisis, the focus has 
shifted towards a comprehensive regulation of solvency.  The solvency 
regulation of financial institutions is set to tighten further.  Under the 
solvency regulation, the primary concern is to protect policyholders from 
losses when an insurer defaults, potentially leaving the policyholder in a 
precarious economic situation (Baltensperger and Bodmer 2012). 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
The insurance industry is one of the key players in the financial service 
sector in almost all developed and developing nations.  It contributes to 
economic growth, efficient resource allocation, reduction of transaction 
costs, creation of liquidity, facilitation of the economies of scale in 
investment, and the spread of financial losses (Skipper 2001, Das et al. 
2003, CEA 2006, Haiss & Sümegi, 2008, Malik 2011, Doumpos et al. 2012 
and Sambasivam and Ayele 2013). As the financial intermediaries and 
suppliers of risk management services, insurance companies (both life and 
general) perform important macroeconomic functions such as risk 
diversification, risk transfer and loss mitigation (Ward and Zurbruegg 2000, 
Skipper 2001, Kugler and Ofoghi 2005 and ABI 2008).  Subsequently, life 
insurers also contribute towards investment by providing the means to 
create personal savings through life and pension contracts (Carter and 
Falush 2009).   
 
The insurance industry worldwide is undergoing changes driven by 
economic growth, liberalised markets, international harmonisation and 
changes within firms in response to adverse developments (Thorburn 2004).  
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Its ability to compete and adapt to changes is imperative to ensure its 
sustainability and stability in the volatile financial markets.  The industry 
faces challenges in ensuring efficient operation in a liberalised business 
atmosphere. Some of the notable challenges include global competitions 
from other established entities, issues of professionalism, demographic 
changes, insurance capacity, aggregators and consolidators and widening 
insurability (Chen and Wong 2004, Carter and Falush 2009 and Ismail 
2013). 
 
Due to its important micro and macroeconomics functions, the performance 
of the insurance industry worldwide has become one of the primary 
concerns in many investigations. Consequently, the financial performance of 
insurance firms is important to various stakeholders, namely the 
policyholders, agents and policy makers (Doumpos et al 2012 and Ismail 
2013).  Thus, it raises issues of how one can measure the financial 
performance of insurance companies and what are the specific determinants 
that influence the financial performance of these firms. 
 
The determinants that affect the financial performance of an insurance 
company are complicated due to the intangible nature of the product and the 
lack of transparency in resource allocation decisions (Berger and Humprey 
1997 and Burca and Batrinca 2014).  Under the corporate governance 
theory, financial performance of a company is determined by its leverage 
(Berger and di Patti 2002).  Adams and Buckle (2003) define financial 
performance as a function of the effectiveness of organizational-specific 
contractual mechanisms to attract, control and retain managerial skills in 
order to maximise shareholders’ wealth.  Nonetheless, Greene and Segal 
(2004) assert that the financial performance of an insurer is defined in terms 
of its net premium earned,  return on investment, return on equity, 
underwriting profit and the annual turnover.  These variables are categorised 
as the profit performance measures and investment performance measures. 
Other studies identify profitability as the key performance indicator, and it is 
best measured using return on asset (ROA) (Hardwick and Adams 1999, 
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Malik 2011 and Sambasivam and Ayele 2013).  However, these variables 
are not the ultimate measures of financial performance. 
 
Financial performance is a frequently-used term in the literature, but to date 
there is no consensus about its universal definition.  The concept of 
“financial performance” has been interchangeably used with other terms 
such as “financial strength”, “financial solvency”, “financial health” and 
“financial stability”. The various terms used are essential measures of 
financial performance and do not imply failure or possible failure of a 
company (Chen and Wong 2004).   
 
Kahane et al (1989) state that the financial strength of insurance companies 
can be defined from several perspectives – actuarial, financial, legal, 
accounting, etc., and he emphasises on the lack of a clear definition.  
Without a standard or universally accepted definition (Allen and Wood 2006, 
Goodhart 2006, Poloz 2006 and Gadanecz and Jayaram 2008), financial 
strength refers to the smooth functioning of the key elements that makes up 
the financial systems (Duisenberg 2001 and Oosterloo and de Haan 2004).  
Stella (2008) relates financial strength with unrestricted financial power.   
Alternatively, the European Central Bank (ECB 2007) defines financial 
stability as a financial system that is capable of withstanding shocks and 
financial imbalances, thus reducing the likelihood of disruptions in the 
financial intermediation process. Thus, the key aspects of defining financial 
performance are the stability of the system and the ability to withstand 
shocks in the operations. 
 
Cases of insurance companies’ failures in recent years and the increasingly 
challenging financial environment have raised further concerns about the 
financial performance of the insurance industry to its stakeholders.  In 
addition, the recent global financial crisis has affected the financial stability 
of the financial service providers such as banks and insurance companies in 
the UK (Boyle 2013).   
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The aim of this study is to identify the determinants of financial performance 
(FP) of insurance companies operating in the United Kingdom (UK) by 
evaluating their rating performance.   This study attempts to investigate 
rating trends and attempts to forecast rating movements through the 
application of rating transition matrices.  It will also identify the determinants 
of the financial strength rating performance and the extent to which each 
factor influences performance.  This study extends previous research by 
providing a comparative analysis of the determinants of the financial 
performance between two different periods – namely the pre-financial crisis 
period and post- financial crisis periods. 
 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The performance of insurance companies does not only contribute to 
improve the market value of individual firms but also towards industrial 
growth. It will ultimately lead towards the overall growth and prosperity of the 
economy.  In addition, the financial performance of insurance companies is 
of utmost importance to various stakeholders such as policy makers, 
insurance intermediaries and policyholders.  This subject has attracted much 
attention, comments and interests from various parties such as the 
regulators, financial experts, researchers, management of business entities 
and the general public (Omondi and Muturi 2013).  Mehari and Aemiro 
(2013) summarise that evaluating the determinants of insurers’ performance 
has become an important research theme in the corporate finance literature.  
Instead of providing risk transfer mechanism, insurers also play a major role 
in channelling funds to support business activities in the economy.   
 
Pottier and Sommer (1999) argue that academic literature on the 
determinants of insurer’s financial performance is limited.  The same 
argument is raised in many other scholars’ researches (Pottier 1998, Burton 
et al 2003, Florez-Lopez 2007 and Burca and Batrinca 2014).  There is 
indeed an ultimate difference between assessing insurance companies as 
compared to other corporations (Buckley 1997, Florez-Lopez 2007 and 
Yakob et al 2013).  The importance and complexity of the insurance industry 
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could affect the financial strength assessment process and thus, they must 
be acknowledged.   
 
In addition, there are various definitions, interpretations and measurements 
of financial performance.  However, there is no ultimate consensus on the 
best way to measure performance and to identify the factors that affect 
financial performance (Liargovas and Skandalis 2008 and Omondi and 
Muturi 2013).  In this study, financial performance is proxied by the rating 
performance of insurance companies in the UK.  The motivations for this 
research are presented as follows: 
 
i. The financial performance of insurance companies could be reflected 
by the changes in the rating grades.  A firm is susceptible to a rating 
upgrade or a rating downgrade, which is a signal to depict the current 
financial condition (Hadad et al 2009). In this instance, we employ the 
Rating Transition Matrices (RTM) to depict rating transitions 
(migration or movement to another rating grade).  RTM or Credit 
Migration Matrices have been used extensively to study rating 
performance on large financial corporations and banks (Bangia et al 
2002, Frydman and Schuermann 2008 and Stefanescu et al 2009), 
corporate bond performance (Kavvathas 2001 and Hadad et al 2009), 
sovereign credit ratings    (Hu et al 2001 and Hill et al 2010) and 
consumer loans (Malik and Thomas 2012). Subsequently, Wang 
(2010) evaluates rating transitions for US insurance companies and 
establishes that insurer rating changes differ across economic and 
industry cycles.  So far, there has been little discussion pertaining to 
the insurer’s rating transition in the UK.  Thus, this study attempts to 
fill the gap by evaluating the rating transitions among UK insurers.  
The analysis will be based on the widely-used Markov theory, but its 
application will be focused on the UK insurance industry. 
 
ii. Insurer ratings are extensively used to evaluate insurers’ financial 
strength and insolvency risk (Wang and Carson 2014).  However, 
previous studies focused mainly on insurers in the United States (US) 
8 
 
(Gaver and Pottier 2005, Wang 2010, Eckles and Pottier 2011, 
Doherty et al 2012, Eckles and Halek 2012, Kartasheva and Park 
2012 and Wang and Carson 2014).  Earlier studies also focus on debt 
rating determinants of financial corporation and banks (Blume et al 
1998, Tabakis and Vinci 2002, Altman and Rijken 2004 and Amato 
and Furfine 2004).   
 
 To the best of author’s knowledge, the most prominent study that 
evaluates UK insurers’ rating performance is the one conducted by 
Adams et al (2003).  Their study compares insurer rating performance 
between two rating agencies and the tendency to be rated by a 
particular rating agency.  This study attempts to extend the works of 
Adams et al (2003) and Gaver and Pottier (2005) by focusing on UK 
insurance companies.  It seeks to identify the key financial 
determinants that affect financial strength ratings by extending the 
time horizons and categories in the dependent variables. 
 
iii. The recent global financial crisis (2007 – 2009) resulted in an uneven 
impact on the insurers.  Some insurers are severely affected by the 
crisis while some others remain steadfast (Eling and Schmeiser 2010 
and Baluch et al 2011). The UK insurance industry is also affected by 
the crisis where the industry suffers decline in terms of their insurance 
density and insurance penetration levels.  This effect is simplified in 
Table 1.2.1. 
 
Insurance density (ID) is an indicator to measure individual spending 
on insurance product.  Insurance penetration (IP) measures the 
importance of insurance activities relative to the size of the economy. 
Higher ID and IP values indicate better quality of insurance business.  
Both measures reflect the level of development of the insurance 
industry.  As can be seen from Table 1.2.1, the industry recorded 
higher ID and IP in 2007 compared to 2014.  There was a sharp 
decline in the ID reported in 2009, which is assumed to be caused by 
the financial crisis.  Consequently, when individual spending 
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decreases, it would also affect insurance penetration levels.  This 
study seeks to highlight the effect of the financial crisis as reflected in 
the rating changes and financial strength rating performance.  It will 
provide a comparative analysis that captures financial performance 
before and after the financial crisis period.  It is within the scope of the 
author’s knowledge that this comparison specific to the insurance 
companies has not been attempted in any other studies. 
 
Table 1.2.1 
Insurance density and insurance penetration in the UK 
For the year of 2007, 2009 and 2013. 
 2007 2009 2013 
Insurance density (ID) $6,587.80 $4,578.8 $4,561.00 
Insurance penetration (IP) 15.7% 12.9% 11.6% 
 Source: Author’s compilation based on Swiss Re. Sigma Reports 
2008 – 2014. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this study is to identify the determinants that influence the 
financial performance (FP) of insurance companies.  It attempts to obtain an 
overall view of the financial performance of insurers, focusing on insurers 
licensed to operate in the UK.  In particular, this study will examine four main 
research objectives: 
i. To investigate the probability of changes in insurers’ financial 
performance, as reflected in the rating transition analysis; 
ii. To compare insurers’ rating performance between both the pre- 
financial crisis and post-financial crisis periods; 
iii. To identify which financial determinants have greater influence on 
financial strength ratings as reflected by the transition analysis; and 
iv. To compare and contrast financial strength rating performance 
between two financial periods, viz. the pre-financial crisis and post-
financial crisis. 
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Subsequently, the research objectives are constructed and aimed to answer 
the following questions: 
i. What is the probability of a rating change? 
ii. Does the rating performance differ between the pre-financial crisis 
and post-financial crisis period? 
iii. Which financial determinants have the greater influence on financial 
strength ratings? 
iv. Does financial strength rating performance differ between the pre-
financial crisis and post-financial crisis periods? 
 
1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study aims to evaluate the financial performance of UK-based 
insurance companies.  Specifically, this study attempts to assess the 
financial performance of UK life and general insurance companies in terms 
of its rating performance.  Insurance rating is a powerful tool for decision-
making since its assessment is based on various qualitative and quantitative 
criteria (Amin and Kamalkhani 2009).  The motivation behind this selection is 
attributed to the nature of the general insurance business, which is known to 
transact short-term businesses.  In doing this, the general insurers are 
exposed to a higher risk and the market itself is highly fluctuated and 
volatile.  Another downside to the general insurers is that they have more 
short-term obligations to fulfill, due to the nature of the general insurance 
short-term contract and this could lead to a higher tendency of experiencing 
financial problems in the short-run. 
 
The general insurance performance has shown a fluctuating trend since 
1996, both in terms of its total net premium and the claims paid (ABI 2009).  
The UK general insurance performance is affected by the financial crisis 
(2007 – 2009), where it reported a 10% decrease in the net written 
premiums in 2009. In 2013, the UK general insurance market was still 
affected by the consequences of the financial crisis by showing a large 
cyclical decline in its premium (Munich Re. 2014).  The decline further 
supports the argument that the general insurance market is exposed to a 
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higher risk, more short-term financial obligations and the tendency to 
experience financial problems. 
 
The major limitation of this study is the sample size and access to the data.  
The success of this research depends on the availability of the insurance 
company financial data and rating reports.  This study does not employ the 
data  made available to public, but the one that is reported to the regulators, 
or the statutory reports.  However, these statutory and rating reports are 
deemed private and confidential, and researcher has to spend tremendous 
effort, time and financial resources in order to gain access to the data 
required.  This lengthy, time-consuming process and the confidentiality issue 
do affect the sample size.  After the screening and cleaning data process, 
what remained was a small sample size which is restricted to companies 
with complete and available data for the period specified. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF  STUDY. 
This study differs significantly from previous studies in two ways.  Firstly, it 
employs the rating transition analysis on UK insurers and secondly; it 
analyses the differences in financial performance, as reflected in the rating 
grades. So far, previous studies have applied the rating transition analysis to 
evaluate large financial corporations, corporate bonds, banking institutions 
and sovereign credit quality.  The focus of previous studies rests mainly on 
insurers in the US.   Hence, this study attempts to extend the previous 
research by analysing the rating transitions for insurance companies 
operating in the UK. 
 
This study aims to investigate the determinants of the financial performance 
of the insurance companies based on their financial strength rating 
performance. The rating transition analysis that is used demonstrates a 
significant degree of rating changes, as reflected in the rating fluctuations.  
The analysis is extended to determine the key financial determinants that 
could affect the rating grades or rating changes.  Based on the empirical 
results, this study establishes that profitability, liquidity, size and 
organisational form are statistically significant determinants of the financial 
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performance of the insurance companies in the UK.  This study recommends 
an alternative to measure the size of an insurance company, which is based 
on the gross premium written.   
 
In addition, this study provides insights into the effects of the global financial 
crisis on the financial performance of the insurance companies.  This is 
achieved by conducting comparative analyses that focus on two crucial 
periods of observation, namely the pre-financial crisis and the post-financial 
crisis periods.  The comparative analysis attempts to provide better insight 
into insurers’ financial performance, which is proxied by its rating 
performance.  To the best of author’s understanding, the comparative 
analysis has not been attempted in any other studies.  Thus, this study 
seeks to fill the gap in the literature and discovers meaningful outcomes that 
could be beneficial to other parties.  
 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This dissertation consists of six chapters.  A brief summary of these chapters 
and their contents is established below: 
 
Chapter One: Background of the Research 
 
This chapter contains the general framework for the thesis.  It introduces and 
defines the chosen field of study which includes the introduction and 
motivation of the research, aims and objectives of the study and the main 
research questions. Subsequently, the scope of the study, its limitations and 
significance of the study will also be explained.   
 
Chapter Two: Overview of the United Kingdom Insurance Industry 
 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the insurance industry in the 
United Kingdom.  The aim of this chapter is to emphasise the importance of 
this industry to the nation’s economy and to enlighten readers about the 
evolution of insurance in the United Kingdom from its inception to its current 
standing.  A brief historical discussion is included as an introduction to the 
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industry.  The discussion is followed by the industry’s contribution to the 
United Kingdom’s economy, players in the industry and the Supervisory 
authorities. Understanding the mechanics of the UK insurance industry is 
imperative to emphasise its importance and to justify the research attempts, 
which opt to evaluate insurers’ performance. 
 
Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical and theoretical papers that have been 
conducted by other scholars.  The chapter starts with the definition of key 
concepts, which are financial performance and financial strength rating. It is 
followed by general discussions on the issue and the basis for the theoretical 
framework that leads to the hypotheses’ developments. The variables that 
have been used in other studies are also discussed.  The justification for the 
proposed research is also included in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Four: Research Design, Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter explains about the research design employed in the study.  The 
fundamental property of the database is explained thoroughly in this section.  
This chapter will also provide clarifications about the sample selection for the 
analyses and the justifications for the financial crisis breakpoint adopted in 
this study.   
 
Subsequently, it also explains the theoretical foundations employed in the 
study.  The discussion will be sub-divided into two parts – the first part will 
address issues related to the rating analysis (rating transition matrices) and 
the second part will discuss the financial strength rating analysis (regression 
analysis). The variables, hypothesis developments, estimation methods and 
models will be  discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter Five: Empirical Analysis and Discussions 
 
This chapter focuses on the rating analysis to measure financial 
performance.  The analysis, results, outcomes, interpretations and the 
discussions are presented in this chapter. There are two main parts of the 
analysis; the first is the rating transition matrices, and the second is the 
regression analysis.  Subsequently, comparative analyses will also be 
included and discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This chapter summarises and concludes the research findings and 
discusses significant contributions, practical implications and limitations of 
the research.  Finally, it recommends an avenue for future research and 
ends with concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the United Kingdom (UK) insurance 
industry.  The purpose of this chapter is to explain the evolution and 
development of the industry.  In particular, this chapter highlights the history 
of the industry and its contributions to the UK economy.  It will also discuss 
the players in the industry and the role of supervisory authorities.  This 
chapter is intended to provide a fundamental understanding of the insurance 
industry, which is the central focus of this study. 
 
2.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDUSTRY 
Historically, the earliest insurance to be written in the UK was marine 
insurance, dated back in the 14th or 15th centuries and was pioneered by the 
Lombards (Hardwick and Gurguis, 2007).  The Lombards were merchants 
from northern Italy, who brought marine insurance into general use by 
making it acceptable to the trading community and introducing proper rules 
and regulations (Martin 2005).  The earliest practice of marine insurance 
was based on the firm basis of legal enactments and international 
regulations.  This becomes the fundamental basis of insurance adopted in 
England.   
 
Subsequent to this development was the introduction of life insurance 
contracts.  The earliest one was written in the late 16th century; assuring the 
life of a merchant sailing with his goods (Hardwick and Gurguis 2007).  Fire 
insurance was introduced in 1680; the first one was written by Phoenix 
Insurance Company (originally named the Fire Office).  The Lloyd’s of 
London was founded in the 17th century. It led to the formation of the 
Register Society in 1764.  It is a register (record) of ships (aimed at both 
underwriters and merchants) to provide information on the condition of the 
vessels insured and chartered. 
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The industry  that has been  in existence since 1680s has now become one 
of the most-developed insurance industries in the world (ABI 2014).  Table 
2.1.1 provides a brief overview of the number of insurers operating in the UK 
insurance market over the last six years.  These figures are compiled from 
annual reports published by the Association of British Insurers (ABI), known 
as the UK Insurance Key Facts. Even though it seems like a vast population, 
many of these insurers are subsidiaries of a large insurance company or 
financial service groups.   
 
Table 2.1.1 
Number of Insurers in the United Kingdom Insurance Market 
Type of insurer/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
General insurers 
(FSA-Authorised) 
(3rdNon Life Dir.) 
762 735 1005 
(411) 
(594) 
1000 
 
976 
(428) 
(548) 
911 
(349) 
(562) 
Life insurers 
(FSA-Authorised) 
(3rd Life Dir.) 
209 193 309 
(129) 
(180) 
300 285 
(109) 
(176) 
387 
(210) 
(177) 
Composite insurers 46 44 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Total 1,017 972 1,314 1,300 1,261 1,298 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the data obtained from Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) Insurance Key Facts 2008 – 2014. 
 
The set of data in Table 2.1.1 shows that there were 1,298 authorised 
insurers in 2013, which is a slight increase compared to that of the previous 
year. From this number, 559 (i.e 349 general insurers and 210 life insurers) 
are UK-based insurers authorised by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
to transact insurance business (general and life insurers altogether) in the 
UK market. The other 739 (total numbers in parentheses, i.e 562 and 177) 
are non UK-based insurers authorised by the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and allowed to operate in the UK under the Third Life/Non-life 
Directives (3rd  Dir.).  These directives introduced a single authorisation 
system.  According to the Directives, an insurer whose head office is in an 
European Union (EU) Member State is allowed to open branches and carry 
on business on a cross-border basis across the EU, under the financial 
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supervision of the Member State in which its head office is established (FCA, 
Lloyds). 
 
The compiled data show a fluctuation in the number of insurers per year.  
The volatility is attributed to the restructuring in the market and among the 
players in the industry itself, mostly due to mergers and acquisitions.  The 
market now becomes more concentrated, but the strength of the industry is 
not affected. 
 
2.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UK ECONOMY 
2.2.1 Performance in the Global Market and Overseas Trade 
Figure 2.2.1.1 
The ten largest insurance markets in 2013 
 
Source: Swiss Re. Sigma No.3/2014. 
 
In 2013, the UK insurance market generated approximately USD330 
million in premium income, making it the third largest insurance 
market in the world and the largest in Europe.  Figure 2.2.1.1 shows 
the ten largest insurance markets in the world.  It is apparent that the 
United States dominates about 27% of the world market, followed by 
Japan and the UK.  Another four European countries and two Asian 
countries are also performing well in the top ten leagues.   
 
The 10 Largest Insurance Market in 2013  
(total premium volume in USD by % of market share) 
United States
Japan
United Kingdom
PR China
France
Germany
Italy
South Korea
Canada
Netherlands
UK 
7.10% 
Japan 
11.45% 
US 
27.13% 
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Narrowing this down by distinguishing between life and non-life 
businesses, the UK life insurance market is still the third largest in the 
world and the largest in Europe.  Nonetheless, the UK general 
insurance market is the fourth largest in the world and the second 
largest in Europe.   
Table 2.2.1.1 
The Ten Largest Insurance Markets in 2013 
Rank Country Total 
Premium 
(in mil. US$) 
Changes 
(in %) 
Share of 
world 
market (%) 
Insurance 
Density 
(US$) 
Insurance 
Penetration 
(%) 
1. United 
States 
1,259,255 -1.06 27.13 3,979 7.5 
2. Japan 531,506 -15.19 11.45 4,207 11.1 
3. United 
Kingdom 
329,643 2.37 7.10 4,561 11.5 
4. PR China 277,965 13.29 5.99 201 3.0 
5. France 254,754 7.22 5.49 3736 9.0 
6. Germany 247,162 6.34 5.33 2,977 6.7 
7. Italy 168,554 17.06 3.63 2,645 7.6 
8. South 
Korea 
145,427 -4.94 3.13 2,895 11.9 
9. Canada 125,344 0.57 2.70 3,563 6.9 
10. Netherlands 101,140 5.51 2.18 6,012 12.6 
Note: Changes (in %) are the differences in total premium volume between 2013 and 2012. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data obtained from Swiss Re. 
Sigma No.3/2014 and OECD.StatExtracts 
 
Table 2.2.1.1 further illustrates the strength of the ten largest 
insurance markets in the world.  The main characteristics such as the 
total premium volume, its percentage of shares in the world market, 
the levels of insurance density and penetrations are highlighted in the 
table.  Data in the table reveal that the United States, Japan and 
South Korea suffer decreases in their total premium volumes.  Japan 
had reported the largest decline in 2013, when they faced a 15.19 % 
decrease in premium volume, thus affecting their share in the world 
market.   
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On the other hand, the United Kingdom and the rest of the countries 
on the list are doing well, each demonstrating a rise in their total 
premium volume.  Based on the data, Italy shows remarkable 
performance with an approximate of 17% increase in its total premium 
volume.  The People Republic (PR) of China also reflects a high 
premium volume increase while Canada has a very slight but positive 
change (0.57%) in its total premium volume over the year. 
 
Another way of comparing the performance of the UK insurance 
industry relative to the others is by explaining two parameters known 
as the insurance density and insurance penetration (Cristea et al 
2013 and Roy 2014).  These two measures signify the level of 
development of the insurance industry of the nation.  Insurance 
density refers to the level of premiums per person or the per capita 
premium.  It is measured as the ratio between the total insurance 
premium (in USD) to the total population (Beck and Webb 2003).  
This ratio reflects the population’s average spending on insurance.  
On the other hand, insurance penetration measures the importance of 
insurance activity relative to the size of the economy.  It is a ratio of 
premium volume to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as reflected 
in local currency.  A higher insurance penetration level signifies higher 
quality of insurance business. 
 
The insurance density (ID) and insurance penetration (IP) in the UK 
are further illustrated in Figure 2.2.1.2.  The charts reflect insurance 
density and penetration according to the type of insurance 
businesses, which are life and general insurance, and also the total of 
both life and general insurances.   From the density data, it is 
apparent that the UK population spends more on life insurance 
products. This is also reflected in the higher insurance penetration 
levels which signify that life insurance activities are more dominant in 
the UK economy.  This might be a good indicator that there is a 
higher level of awareness among the UK population of the importance 
of life insurance, both as protection and financial saving mechanisms. 
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Figure 2.2.1.2 
Insurance Density and Insurance Penetration in the United Kingdom 
From 2007 to 2013 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data obtained from Swiss Re. Sigma 
reports (2008 to 2014) 
 
 
In Figure 2.2.1.2, the levels of density and penetration depict the 
fluctuating trends over the years before it started to rise gradually in 
2013.  There was a sharp fall from 2008 to 2009, which is during the 
global financial crisis (2007 – 2009).  The decline could be associated 
with the impact of the global financial crisis that affects the insurance 
markets worldwide.   Life insurance expenditure shows a larger 
decline that significantly influenced the total figures. Surprisingly, 
general insurance manages better throughout the years.  There are 
fluctuations over the years, but their magnitudes are smaller 
compared to those of the life business. 
 
2.2.2 Contributions towards UK employment 
Another important contribution to the economy is that the industry is a 
major employer, accounting for more than 25% of all financial 
intermediation jobs and about 3.6% out of all UK employment (Maer 
and Broughton 2012).  In 2013, there were 1,169,000 employments in 
21 
 
the financial and insurance services industry, of which 314,000 were 
jobs within the insurance industry itself (ABI 2013).  Out of this 
number, 118,100 were insurance specialist jobs and 196,200 
insurance auxiliary jobs.  Insurance specialist jobs refer to individuals 
who are involved in and working directly in insurance, reinsurance 
and pension funds businesses. On the other hand, insurance auxiliary 
jobs include brokers, loss adjusters and employees in the legal 
professions.  
 
Currently, job opportunities for the insurance auxiliary position are 
increasing yearly (ABI 2014).  This suggests a better recognition of 
the importance of having good personnel, professionals and skilled 
workers to handle the complexities of insurance activities.  However, 
with the rapid development of information technology in the industry, it 
is predicted that the number of employments will decline in the future 
(Stern 2011). 
 
2.2.3 Contributions to the UK savings and investment market 
Two prominent functions of insurance services to the nation’s wealth 
are to promote financial stability and to facilitate and mobilise savings.  
The financial stability provided by insurance services by means of 
insurance compensation is indeed essential.  It encourages 
individuals and organizations to create wealth with the guarantee that 
their resources are protected. 
 
Insurance services help to mobilise savings by channeling it into 
domestic investments. It helps to enhance the efficiency of financial 
systems by reducing the transaction costs by bringing together savers 
and borrowers.  This is done by investing the premiums paid by 
policyholders as loans to businesses or other ventures.  In this 
instance, insurance acts as an intermediary for individual 
policyholders and helps to omit the costly, time-consuming tasks of 
direct lending and investing.  Insurance services also help to create 
liquidity by investing the premium funds in long-term loans and 
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investments.  A policyholder’s right to immediate access to loss 
payments and savings remains intact, and borrowers are given tenure 
for loan payments.  Thereby, it reduces the illiquidity inherent in direct 
lending.  
 
UK insurers play a major role in the UK’s savings and investment 
market.  It facilitates savings that allow individuals to make better and 
more economic choices about the present and future levels of 
consumptions and savings.  For instance, pension is a good savings 
element where people save while being in employment in order to 
create a retirement fund.  This fund would then be used for 
consumption during retirement.  These pension funds are 
accumulated and then invested, therefore promoting economic 
growth. 
 
Evidence of this concept is shown in Figure 2.2.3.1, where the chart 
illustrates the total amount of personal wealth invested in insurance 
products over a decade, starting from 2000 to 2011.  The total 
amount is segregated into four major insurance products -life 
insurance, personal pensions, income protection and general 
insurance.  The “general” category includes any insurer-administered  
funds that are not categorized as life and pension business, income 
protection and life insurance companies’ reserves. 
 
It is apparent in Figure 2.2.3.1 that the major bulk of the investment 
comes from personal pensions.  Insurer-administered personal 
pensions are contract-based pension schemes that can be arranged 
by an individual or by an employer, where the insurer and 
policyholder have a direct contractual relationship.   
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Figure 2.2.3.1 
Amount Invested in Insurance Products in the United Kingdom 
From 2000 to 2011 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on reports published by the 
Association of British Insurers. 
 
Examples of personal pension schemes are individual pensions, 
group personal pensions, stakeholder pensions and pension 
annuities.  As shown in the graph, more than 30% of the total 
investment per year is in terms of personal pensions.  Subsequently, 
consumers also invested in income protection products.  Accordingly, 
these two products have influenced the total amount invested in 
insurance products over the 10-year period.  These funds are 
channeled into investments, providing an important source of funds 
for both UK and overseas businesses and also for the public sector.  
Insurers will focus on profit maximization; thus promoting economic 
growth, more efficient capital allocation and enhance economic 
performance. 
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2.3 THE MAIN PLAYERS IN THE INDUSTRY 
According to Hardwick and Gurguis (2007), the ownership structure of the 
UK insurance companies is complicated.  The industry is dominated by 
several large groups, which are made up of more than one legal entity.  As 
an example, the Royal London Mutual Group consists of Refuge Assurance, 
Scottish Life Assurance and United Friendly Life Assurance.  The ownership 
structure itself varies, where the two most prevalent forms are stock 
(proprietary) and mutual insurers.  The stock insurers are registered and 
governed under the Company Act and are owned by stockholders. These 
companies are similar to any other publicly-traded companies, able to trade 
shares on an exchange and are required to report earnings on a frequent 
basis.  On the other hand, the mutual companies are owned by policyholder 
members.   
 
There are also proprietary companies known as “bancassurers”.  These are 
banking or building society groups that have expanded into the insurance 
business.  Its formation is mainly through joint ventures and acquisitions 
which enable the bank or building society to utilise insurer’s expertise in 
developing their operations.  There are other types of organizations 
authorized to supply insurance in the UK such as captive insurance 
companies, reinsurance companies, the London Insurance Market and 
Lloyds of London. 
 
Table 2.3.1 presents a summary of the UK’s twenty largest insurance 
companies in 2012 and 2013.  The rankings are downloadable and 
published on the Association of British Insurers (ABI) website. The 
assessment is based on the total net premium written (NPW) reported by 
each company. 
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Table 2.3.1 
Top 20 UK General Insurers from 2010 to 2013 
Ranking  Total Net Premium Written (£ m) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 Company Name: 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2 1 1 1 Aviva 4,102 4,429 4,653 4,522 
1 2 2 2 Direct Line Group 4,420 3,447 3,262 3,055 
3 3 3 3 AXA 2,877 2,854 2,937 3,043 
4 4 4 4 RSA Group 2,723 2,851 2,825 2,725 
11 6 7 5 Ageas 867 1,721 1,583 1,946 
6 5 5 6 Allianz 1,564 1,831 1,788 1,880 
5 7 6 7 BUPA 1,626 1,663 1,670 1,678 
7 8 8 8 LV= 1,109 1,365 1,443 1,388 
9 10 9 9 National Farmers Union 
Mutual Insurance 
926 1,089 1,104 1,116 
10 13 12 10 AIG 1,020 1,022 946 1,062 
12 12 10 11 British Gas Insurance 813 1,029 1,057 1,036 
14 14 14 12 QBE Insurance 574 728 798 934 
8 11 11 13 Lloyds Banking Group 1,109 1,031 974 899 
15 9 13 14 Zurich Insurance 549 1,155 889 822 
18 16 16 15 esure 441 483 482 485 
(-) (-) 17 16 Admiral Group (-) (-) 439 411 
16 15 15 17 Cooperative Insurance 547 639 526 410 
(-) (-) 18 18 Simplyhealth (-) (-) 347 393 
(-) 20 (-) 19 Prudential (-) 357 339 364 
(-) (-) (-) 20 Legal & General 
Insurance 
(-) (-) 332 360 
(-) 17 (-) (-) Aspen Insurance (-) 419 (-) (-) 
17 18 (-) (-) Groupama  442 409 (-) (-) 
19 19 (-) (-) Brit Insurance 384 368 (-) (-) 
Source: www.abi.org.uk 
 
Based on Table 2.3.1, the rankings given to general insurers show lesser 
fluctuations between 2012 and 2013.  The top four insurers (Aviva, Direct 
Line, AXA and RSA) remain steadfast at their current rankings.  As of 
experiences, Aviva and RSA have been established for more than 200 years 
(Post Magazine 2013), while several others also have very long-standing 
business operations.  This is indeed a positive indication of their strength 
and survival in the industry with vast experiences over time, which allows 
them to withstand cycles in the industry yet able to be at the top of the 
league.  At the end of the list, there are three insurers that are included in 
the 2010 and 2011 rankings but then excluded in the later years.  The 
exclusion might be due to decline in their NPW, which serve as the basis of 
the ranking process. 
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On the other hand, the top twenty life insurers (Table 2.3.2) show fluctuating 
trends in their ranking.  Standard Life remains at the top of the league with  
an increase in its total net premium in each and every year from 2010 to 
2013.  However, the rest of the companies in the list experienced ranking 
changes. Aviva Plc. reported decreasing total NPW and fell into the third 
place in 2013.   Almost all other insurers that suffer ranking downgrade show 
visible decrease in their NPW.  Phoenix Group Holdings show remarkable 
performance in terms of its NPW, thus the company is included in the 2013’s 
top 20 insurers.   
 
Table 2.3.2 
Top 20 UK Life Insurers from 2010 to 2013 
Ranking  Total Net Premium Written (£m) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 Company Name: 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2  2 1 1 Standard Life 7,610 8,361 9,678 11,703 
3  5 4 2 Lloyds Banking 
Group  
6,407 5,878 7,159 8,398 
1  1 2 3 Aviva plc 9,256 8,697 9,351 8,273 
4  4 5 4 Legal & General 6,201 6,149 6,867 6,939 
5  7 7 5 Aegon NV 5,187 4,558 5,252 6,030 
6  3 3 6 Prudential 4,954 6,592 8,313 5,369 
7  6 6 7 Friends Life  3,431 4,927 6,044 4,571 
10  10 10 8 Royal London 
Mutual 
2,230 2,411 2,997 3,766 
14  11 11 9 Pension Insurance 
Corporation (PIC) 
588 1,359 1,512 3,664 
(-) (-) 13 10 FIL Ltd  (-) (-) 1,337 2,698 
8  8 8 11 Zurich Financial 
Services 
3,296 3,369 4,937 2,692 
9  9 9 12 Old Mutual  2,455 2,983 3,337 2,450 
(-) 17 18 13 Swiss Re  360 537 1,183 1,892 
(-) 15 14 14 Rothesay Life  (-) 968 1,282 1,670 
13  14 20 15 Canada Life  921 1,022 944 1,347 
19  19 17 16 Just Retirement  422 514 1,195 1,344 
12  12 15 17 Liverpool Victoria 
Financial Services 
1,009 1,154 1,230 1,180 
16  16 12 18 Partnership Life  491 913 1,468 1,160 
(-) 18 (-) 19 HSBC Holdings 391 515 847 771 
(-) (-) (-) 20 Phoenix Group 
Holdings 
(-) (-) (-) 672 
18 20 (-) (-) UNUM Group 430 434 (-) (-) 
Source: www.abi.org.uk 
 
Another key indicator of their performance lies in the choice of distribution 
channels, looking at their strategies to penetrate the market. In 1999, most 
insurance transactions were done through brokers/agents and none through 
direct sales. However, the trend changed following the boom of information 
27 
 
technology.  Now, most companies are utilising direct sales as their main 
channel of distribution.  In 2007, a third of insurance sales were generated 
through direct sales, which was at par with sales generated by 
brokers/agents (ABI 2007, ABI 1999).  This is another evidence of the 
effectiveness of direct sales as a distribution channel.  Direct sales refer to  
the use of their own sales force at branch offices or mostly through 
telephone or online contacts.  In direct sales, there are no intermediaries 
involved. By eliminating the use of the insurance intermediary, the process 
to obtain insurance cover becomes quicker, easier and cheaper. 
 
Despite the complexities of the structure, these companies could be 
classified according to their line of businesses; the main two are life and 
health insurances and general insurance, all of which are briefly explained 
as follows: 
 
2.3.1 Life and health insurance market 
The life insurance business in the UK offers a range of varied 
products.  These include life insurance, individual pension products 
and occupational pension products.  It also offers general annuities, 
pensions and income protection policies. A statistical analysis 
conducted by ABI shows that the total net written premium of UK’s life 
insurance market in 2012 was £63,000 million, almost 3% increase 
from the previous year.  Out of this amount, about 57% were 
dominated by the top five life insurers.  The five most dominant 
players in UK’s life insurance market are Standard Life, Lloyds 
Banking Group, Aviva, Legal & General and Aegon NV. 
 
2.3.2 General insurance market 
General insurance or non-life insurance market consists of any 
insurance company that is not determined to be life insurance.  The 
fundamental concept of general insurance coverage is to provide 
payment or compensation based on the occurrence of loss of a 
particular loss (financial) event.  In the US, the general insurance 
companies are known as property and casualty insurance companies.  
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In the UK, the general insurance market is broadly diversified into 
three areas that are the personal lines, commercial lines and London 
market.  Personal lines insurance policies are developed as mass 
productions.  It includes autos (private cars), homeowners 
(households), pets, creditors, travel insurance and others.  
Commercial lines insurance products are usually targeted at small 
legal entities.  The policy covers workers’ compensation (employer’s 
liability), public liability, product liability, commercial fleet and other 
general insurance products suitable for most organisations.  The 
London market insures large commercial risks such as supermarkets, 
football players, and other very specific risks.  It consists of a number 
of insurers, reinsurers, brokers and other companies that are typically 
located in the City of London.  It also participates in personal and 
commercial lines, domestic and foreign through reinsurance. 
 
In the UK, the top 5 general insurers are Aviva, Direct Line Group, 
AXA Insurance, RSA Group and Ageas.  These five insurers 
conquered about 47% of the total net written premium in 2012.  As 
reported in ABI 2013’s database, the most sought after general 
insurance product is the private motor insurance, which signifies its 
product share of about 26%.  A plausible justification for this high 
figure could be related to the fact that motor insurance is compulsory 
to all motorists and vehicle owners in the UK.  On the contrary, 
commercial property insurance recorded 7.4% out of the total net 
premium written for general insurers. 
 
2.3.3 Other Categories of Insurance Companies in the UK 
Captive Insurance Companies 
Captive insurers can be simply defined as wholly-owned insurance 
subsidiaries of a non-insurance organization (the parent company).  A 
captive primary function is to provide cover or to insure some or all 
the risks of its parent.  Captive insurers can be categorized into many 
types such as single-parent captive, diversified captive, association 
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captive, agency captive, rent-a-captive and special purpose captive.  
Captive insurers are mostly established in offshore domiciles, to 
name a few established domiciles such as Bermuda, Cayman Island, 
Guernsey, Isle of Man and Luxemborg.  This market is evolving in 
terms of its numbers and more domiciles like Vermont, British Virgin 
Island, Gibraltar and Dublin (Hardwick and Gurguis, 2007) are now 
available for captive operations. 
 
Reinsurance Companies 
Reinsurance companies act as “the insurers for insurance 
companies”.  These companies assist in eliminating the possibility of 
large losses from any occurrence experienced by insurance 
companies.  It also enables insurers to accept individual risks beyond 
their limit (or, in excess of their limit).  Several big names in the UK 
according to the net written premiums in 2009 are Munich Re 
($18,654 million), Swiss Re ($11,883 million), Lloyds ($8,489 million), 
Hannover Group ($7,495 million) and Allianz SE Reinsurance ($5,107 
million). 
London Insurance Market 
Herve-Bazin (1994) conducted a survey to establish a list of 
requirements for a successful international centre.  His survey 
involved insurance centers in Europe, North America and Asia which 
are compared against twelve criteria.  Some of the criteria which 
qualify it as an international centre are political stability, geographical 
location, developed communication system, highly qualified 
personnel, multilingualism, stable legal and regulatory environment 
and liberal authority attitude.  Based on his investigation, he 
concluded that only London is qualified as an international insurance 
centre, as it complies with all the criteria listed.  He also included 
several secondary advantages by looking at strong currency and 
strong international network links.  As with the London market, its 
strong alliance with the United States is indeed a strong network link 
and a positive attribute. 
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The London Insurance Market is a part of the UK insurance industry 
that manages tradable insurance and reinsurance internationally.  It 
encompasses almost all general businesses and predominately high-
exposure risks.  Its main players are large international insurance 
companies and Lloyd’s syndicates.  As one of the world’s largest 
international insurance market, the strength lies within the skilled 
workforce and concentrated skilled support services, the number and 
concentration of insurance companies and its proximity to Lloyd’s.  In 
addition, the innovative underwriting and open approach to regulation 
are also an added advantage in the market.  According to Herve-
Bazin (1994), the London Insurance Market conquers the global 
market in two lines of business namely the marine, aviation and 
transport market and the London market reinsurance sector. 
Lloyds of London 
Lloyds of London can never escape the discussion revolving around 
the UK insurance industry.  It is an insurance market in its own right.  
It plays a major role in the industry, and its reputation as one of the 
oldest and most historical insurance institutions in the world is 
indisputable.  The following part gives a brief insight about Lloyds of 
London. 
 
2.4 LLOYDS OF LONDON 
           2.4.1 Historical Background and Its Evolution 
Lloyds of London is best known as one of the oldest and most 
historical insurance institutions, with more than 300 years of operation 
to its name (James 2007).  The institution, which is originated from a 
coffee shop in 1688, has now been the world’s oldest and most 
distinguished insurance marketplace. It started out as Edward Lloyd’s 
Coffee House, which is an informal place in which insurance business 
took place.  At that time, up until the early 20th century, the insurance 
contracts revolved around marine cargo, hull and war risk insurance. 
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Lloyds diversified its business in 1887, encompassing property risks 
in addition to the marine insurance business.  The official Lloyds was 
launched in 1774, with 79 members comprising of merchants, brokers 
and underwriters.   Each member contributed to the process of 
obtaining a premise for their operation, which started in a Room at the 
London Royal Exchange (Lloyds Fact Sheet 2009).  Its operations 
were officiated in 1871 where membership was formally regulated, 
and the election committee was given more authority to control its 
operation (Herschaft 2005). 
 
The evolution continued throughout the 20th century.  Nowadays, 
Lloyds is known as the world’s best insurance marketplace, home to 
some of the most skilled and experienced insurance experts.  Lloyds 
is also known for its innovative efforts in insuring unique risks and 
creating new coverage areas such as kidnap and ransom, space and 
aviation, cyber-liability, contingency coverage for large international 
and national sporting events and even terrorist threats. 
 
Lloyds has also had its fair share of misfortunes.  It faced major 
losses in the mid- 80s and early 90s due to a series of catastrophic 
events including the Piper Alpha oil spillage, hurricane Andrew and 
massive asbestos claims (Carter and Falush 2009, and James as 
cited in Cummins and Bernard 2007).  This led to the implementation 
of the 1996 Reconstruction and Renewal Plan.  It is aimed at 
rebuilding the market.  The by-product of this is the Equitas 
Reinsurance, which provided an opportunity for Lloyds members to 
run-off their pre-1992 liabilities and current and new members to trade 
forward.  Equitas is a completely separated entity from Lloyds. 
 
2.4.2   Lloyds as an insurance marketplace 
As a key player in the British insurance industry, Lloyds is essentially 
different from any other conventional insurance companies.  It is not 
an insurance company or it does not write insurance business BUT it 
is an insurance marketplace that provides accommodation and 
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services for members to conduct insurance transactions (Herschaft 
2005 and Carter and Falush 2009).  It is also regarded as a partially 
mutualised market where its members unite as syndicates to insure 
risks (Lloyd’s Highlight 2009). 
 
The uniqueness of Lloyds lies in its formation as an insurance 
marketplace. It has diverse markets, expanding across the market 
portfolio, size and structure of market participants. Lloyds is also 
known for its characteristics as a specialist insurance market.  It is 
famous as the initiator of great policies.  The first marine, aviation, 
motor, satellite and reinsurance policies were all transacted at Lloyds 
during the 19th and 20th century. This led to the development of 
innovative and unique insurance products such as coverage against 
computer hacking attacks, intangible assets and intellectual property 
risks. 
 
In terms of capacity, Lloyds operates on the basis of unlimited liability, 
backed by the personal wealth of its members (aggregation of Names 
without limit).  Its unlimited liability is also supported by the Lloyds 
Central Fund (in 2006, it reported a £2,054 million in excess of 
technical reserves) and was guaranteed by the American deposits, 
providing additional security to policyholders (Carter and Falush 
2009). It was estimated that corporate members provide 90% of 
Lloyds’ market capacity.  Each member must be able to show its 
ability to support Lloyds’ total underwriting business by holding 
sufficient capital.  Lloyds implements a risk-based capital system, 
which is an assessment system based on market average 
performance.  Recently, they switched to the Individual Capital 
Assessment system in order to align capital and risk in a more 
efficient way. 
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2.5     SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 
The structure of insurance supervisory authorities has been subjected to 
many reforms.  These changes are focused on improving the current 
structure and strengthening the taskforce.  Policy reforms, re-regulations and 
improvements have been implemented in reactions to the financial crisis in 
2007-2008 (Véron 2012).  In the UK itself, the most recent reform was 
announced in the Financial Services Bill Jan.2012, which outlined the 
foundations for the new proposed regulatory regime.  HM Treasury does the 
groundwork for the restructuring, together with the Bank of England (Bank) 
and the Financial Services Authority (FSA).  These three bodies are the 
main authoritative bodies and have been involved in the UK insurance 
supervision and regulations since their inception.   
 
Prior to this new reform, the prudential and conduct business unit is 
designed and placed as one unit under the responsibility of the FSA.  The 
new structure, however, focuses on regulating the insurance industry at 
macro and micro prudential levels.  The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in 
the Bank is responsible for macro-prudential supervision, which focuses on 
persevering financial stability.  It has the power of direction over micro-
prudential regulators, which are the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
and Financial conduct Authority (FCA).  Under the new structure, the PRA 
will be a new subsidiary of the Bank while the FCA will remain as an entity 
under the FSA and will be reporting directly to the HM Treasury and 
Parliament.  As a subsidiary of the Bank, the fundamental principle of the 
PRA is to enhance the financial soundness of insurers.  The PRA has to 
ensure that insurers can fulfill their financial obligations in terms of claim 
payments.  On the other hand, the FCA is responsible for protecting and 
ensuring fair treatments of customers (Adams 2013).   
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Diagram 2.5.1 
Roles of the bodies in the new regulatory structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: HM Treasury Report (February 2011) and Chartered Insurance 
Institute: Policy Briefing April 2013 
 
According to the new regulatory structure, insurers, reinsurers and Lloyd’s 
are subject to dual-regulation, whereas insurance intermediaries will be 
regulated only by the FCA (Whear et al 2013).  The dual-regulation system 
should provide better solutions for supervising the insurance industry.  It 
empowers the Bank to focus specifically on the safety and soundness of 
insurance companies and the FSA to concentrate on consumer protection.  
The outcome of this dual-regulation is beneficial to both insurance 
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companies and policyholders, where all parties to the insurance contract are 
protected against financial insolvency and unfair business practices. 
 
The new regulatory reform was enacted on April 1st, 2013.  Upon its 
inception, it allocated six month's transition period for insurers to change 
their regulatory status disclosure.  However, the enactment of this new 
reform triggered concerns among the insurers (ABI 2012).  First of all, the 
transition period of six months is deemed insufficient and restricted.  The 
proposed transition period should consider the complexity and volume of 
works that firms will have to undertake in order to comply with the new 
regulation.  It involves various amounts of documentation for each and every 
product, and this is indeed a tedious and time-consuming process.  Besides 
documentations, insurers also have to make changes to their IT system.  
The changes involve mapping, developing, testing and refining phases 
which definitely take more than six months to complete.  Thus, a longer time 
frame is necessary and more reasonable in order for insurers to comply with 
the regulation.   
 
Apart from the time restriction, another main concern that could hamper 
insurer’s compliance in this matter is the cost involved in the transition 
process.  In their cost benefit analysis, FSA estimated that the cost incurred 
in the process is around £100 to £2,500.  However, the real scenario is very 
different.  ABI (2012) reported that an insurer who experienced 
documentation changes incurred the cost of approximately £500,000.  In 
addition, another insurer spent £1.7m to make changes to the IT system, 
customer communications and marketing materials in order to accommodate 
changes in their product lines.  It is clear that this transition process will 
trigger higher cost than the amount anticipated by the regulator.   
 
Both issues, which are the transition period and cost incurred are inter-
related.  The cost could be reduced if the transition period is extended. For 
instance, if the timescale is lengthened into 12 months, the marketing and 
communication cost will be reduced as it can be incorporated into the annual 
business review cycle. A longer timescale will also help to reduce the 
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amount of outdated material which will need to be destroyed.  After a year of 
establishment, the new regulatory reform is still being reviewed and refined 
in order to accomplish its objectives.   
 
2.6 SUMMARY OF UK INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
After more than 300 years of operations, the UK insurance market has 
grown to become the largest in Europe and the third largest in the world 
(after the United States and Japan). In the UK itself, the industry is a major 
contributor to the UK economy and its tax take, which totaled up to £8.2 
billion in the latest tax year.  It controls 13.4% of investment in the London 
stock market; with a major portion of investment in pension funds compared 
to other financial institutions such as banks and unit trusts.   
 
In addition, the insurance industry contributed a significant amount of income 
derived from its overseas business, which accounted for one-fifth of the net 
premium income, a total of £54 billion (£41 billion from long-term business 
and £13 billion from general business).  The insurance industry is also one 
of the major employers, offering job opportunities in various areas and 
expertise.  The latest regulatory reform, which introduced dual-regulation of 
insurers, brings the UK in tandem with international regulatory practice.   
 
The industry has also suffered shortcomings and problems.  The recent 
outlook highlights that the industry is experiencing uneven economic 
recovery and is still susceptible to the risk of recession (Crawford et al 
2014).  Subsequent to the Solvency II regulation, the UK insurance industry 
is subject to the evolvement of regulatory reform.  The pressure of dual-
regulation is unavoidable.  FCA’s thematic reviews challenge many firms’ 
current business models, while the PRA focuses on risk management and 
solvency.  One of the PRA’s requirements is to evaluate insurer’s financial 
strength by judging its solvency.  Some of the criteria to be measured 
include the quality, location, amount of capital, internal capital models, 
liquidity, funding and performances during financial distress.  In addition, UK 
insurers are further challenged to implement the Financial Reporting 
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Standard 102, to replace the current UK’s generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) in 2015.    
 
Insurers have always been subjected to a complex regulatory environment, 
but changes in recent years increase the levels of complexity.  Hodgson 
(2013) criticizes that all these regulatory reforms will impede the diversity 
and flexibility on a competitive insurance industry. He agrees that greater 
focus should be placed on mitigating insolvency risk among insurers.  
However, in doing so, the level of capital requirement has been increased 
which could exceed insurer’s financial capacity.  The impact of higher capital 
requirement is more severe to insurers with smaller financial capacity.  If 
they fail to comply with the capital requirement, they will be forced to exit the 
industry.  This, together with market pressure will affect the outcome of the 
industry.  In addition to the regulatory reforms and political uncertainty, 
insurers are also subject to other challenges due to volatility of the global 
financial markets, slow recovery and double-dip recession, emerging 
technologies and terrorism (Hodge and Michel 2014). 
 
As a conclusion, the UK insurance industry remains a strategically important 
player in the UK financial system.  The industry is recovering from the recent 
financial turmoil which is evident from the slow rise in the total premium 
volume in 2013.  This is also apparent in the increase in both the insurance 
density and insurance penetration.  Insurers should adopt a holistic 
approach to deal with changes and challenges in the industry, where this will 
create competitive advantage and cost saving advantage.  Success and 
longevity in the industry depend on the ability of each insurer to restructure 
and simplify their organizations in order to create more efficient operations 
that can take advantage of emerging growth opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the literature concerning the financial performance by 
insurance companies.  The chapter starts with a brief overview of the 
definition of key concepts in the study.  This is followed by a general review 
of the subject matter in order to identify the gap in literature.  This chapter 
will also include discussions on the approaches and models that have been 
used to measure financial performance and determinants of financial 
performance, which become the basis for the theoretical framework and 
hypothesis development.  Since this study attempts a comparative analysis 
between two different periods, the justification for the selected periods and 
its breakpoint will also be reviewed. Justification of the proposed research is 
also provided at the end of the chapter. 
 
3.1 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
 3.1.1 Defining Financial Performance 
Scholars have been trying to find a universal definition of FP.  
Previous studies have seen FP being defined in many ways; from a 
neutral definition to an extreme definition.  Currently, there is no 
ultimate definition of FP.  There have been many attempts to define 
FP but most of them seem to fit only a particular theme of research or 
usage (Allen and Wood 2006).  Burca and Batrinca (2014) argue that 
despite the various models that could be used to analyse financial 
performance, there is no consensus on a valid definition and 
quantification of this concept.  In addition, scholars believed that a 
single target variable could not be found for defining FP (Crockett 
1997, Houben and Kakes 2004 and Schinasi 2004).   
 
Allen and Wood (2006) investigate the ultimate definition of FP, which 
was first introduced in 1994 as “financial stability” by the Bank of 
England.  They conclude that there is still lack of a widely-accepted 
definition.  In addition, the concept of stability is deemed slightly 
vague and difficult to define (Heikensten 2004).   
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The concept of “financial performance” has been interchangeably 
used with other terms such as “financial strength”, “financial 
solvency”, “financial health” and “financial stability”. These various 
terms are simply the operationalised measures of FP and do not infer 
a failure or possible failure of an insurer (Chen and Wong 2004).  
 
Earlier research has tended to focus on the concept of “financial 
insolvency” to measure the FP of an insurance company (Browne and 
Hoyt 1995, Carson and Hoyt 1995, Pottier 1998 and Pottier and 
Sommer 1999).  However, the financial insolvency concept is rather 
rigid and is not suitable for universal application (Kramer 1996 and 
Sharpe and Stadnik 2007).  Cases of insurer insolvency are more 
prominent among US insurers during the late 80s and 90s, thus 
financial insolvency is regarded as a country-specific definition. 
 
On the other hand, financial strength has been broadly described as 
stability in the general level of prices, the efficiency of performing key 
economic functions and periods of profound structural change 
(Duisenberg 2001 and Bundesbank 2003).  Mishkin (1992) and Issing 
(2003) agrees that financial strength is represented by the prevalence 
of a financial system which is able to endure in a lasting way, without 
major disruptions and efficient allocations of savings to investment 
opportunities.  Correspondingly, it has also been interpreted as the 
robustness of the financial system and its ability to withstand 
disturbances and shocks in the economy without giving way to 
cumulative process and preventing them from having a disruptive 
effect on their system (Wellink 2002, Padoa-Schioppa 2003 and 
Bundesbank 2003). 
 
However, due to the strenuous effort in finding a single, ultimate 
definition of FP, some scholars opt to define it by defining the 
opposite, which is the financial instability.  In this instance, financial 
instability is referred to as financial market conditions that harm, or 
threaten to harm the economy’s performance through their impact on 
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the working of the financial system.  It is also defined as a situation in 
which economics performance is potentially impaired by price 
fluctuations or the inability of financial institutions to meet their 
contractual obligations (Crockett 1997, Chant 2003 and Ferguson 
2003). 
 
Hence, it could be assumed that FP is a complex matter, even at its 
definition.  Without an ultimate definition, the most neutral and 
acceptable approach to defining FP should be flexible and can be 
adjusted to suit particular needs. By looking at all possible definitions 
of FP, it could be concluded that there are two broad perspectives of 
an acceptable definition.  FP can be defined neutrally to suit into a 
particular research theme, or it can be defined holistically, by 
combining all extremes.  Thus, by looking at a holistic approach, FP 
can be defined as the robustness of the system, the efficiency of key 
economic functions and the absence of threats or harms that can 
impair financial performance. 
 
3.1.2 Defining Financial Strength Ratings (FSR) 
Financial strength ratings (FSR) are defined as comprehensive 
measures of risk because they include all of the relevant risk factors 
associated with financial strength rating determinants (Florez-Lopez 
2007). In short, FSR represents an overall assessment of an insurer’s 
creditworthiness (Frydman and Schuermann 2008). In addition, FSR 
provides insights into insurer’s financial strength and capacity to fulfil 
their on-going obligations to the policyholder (Wang 2010, Eckles and 
Pottier 2011 and Doherty et al 2012).  
 
These ratings, together with the financial and non-financial 
information obtained during the rating process can become a powerful 
tool to assist decision-making for the stakeholders.  This is attributed 
to the nature of the rating assessment that encompasses multiple 
aspects of a firm (Amin and Kamalkhani 2009).  However, the rating 
process is not totally transparent, and their analysis and determinants 
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are not available to the public.  Thus, it becomes a constraint for 
stakeholders to manipulate and use the rating information (Estrella et. 
al., 2000).   
 
The importance of FSR for an insurer varies according to the type of 
the insurance buyer. Epermanis and Harrington (2006) demonstrate 
that insurance ratings are imperative and directly influence buyer’s 
purchasing decision.  FSR is also the main source of buyers’ 
information about the financial quality of insurers, thus buyers are 
willing to pay higher prices to obtain insurance covers from an insurer 
with higher ratings (Kartasheva and Park 2012).  These findings are 
consistent with findings from past studies (Sommer 1996 and 
Cummins and Danzon 1997), which establish that insurance price is 
positively related to insurer’s financial quality.  Corporate insurance 
buyers tend to choose insurers that are highly rated.  This is due to 
the nature and complexity of the business risk, which requires very 
detailed and specific insurance covers.  On the other extreme, 
personal insurance buyers who seek personal insurance covers such 
as motor insurance and homeowner insurance require less 
sophisticated policies.  In this case, prices and demand are less 
sensitive to an insurer’s financial strength (Doherty et al 2012). 
 
3.2 REVIEW ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF INSURANCE 
COMPANIES. 
This section serves as the foundation for the study. It will start by looking at 
general reviews of financial performance of insurance companies.  In 
addition, it will also consider the location of study and types of insurers in the 
discussion. 
 
Earlier studies related to FP concentrate on analyzing the insolvency risk or 
predicting insurers’ failure (Doumpos et al 2012).  Insolvency within the 
insurance industry has become a major issue of public debate and concern 
in the late 80s (Brockett et al. 1994), and the identification of potentially 
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troubled firms has become a major regulatory research objective.Previous 
studies on the topic of insurer insolvency prediction include Pinches and 
Trieschmann (1974), Harrington and Nelson (1986), Ambrose and Seward 
(1988), BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990), BarNiv and McDonald (1992), 
Baranoff (1993), Pottier (1998) and Pottier and Sommer (1999).  BarNiv and 
McDonald provide a particularly good review of the previous research 
techniques, and the research was consulted for further information on 
alternative approaches. 
 
However, the US-focused theme, which revolves around insolvency, is 
regarded as rigid and very country-specific (Kramer 1996 and Sharpe and 
Stadnik 2007).  For other insurance industries, especially the newly 
developed industries with a highly regulated structure and no insurer 
failures; insolvency issue is almost non-existent.  In this case, they are more 
concerned on assessing the strength and stability of the insurers operating 
in the industry (Kramer 1996 and Ceccarelli 2003).  In addition, scholars are 
trying to evaluate insurer performance in order to detect distress among the 
companies that will allow the regulators to take corrective actions (Sharpe 
and Stadnik 2007). 
 
Moving away from the insolvency issue, most recent studies evaluate 
financial performance from various aspects. Interestingly, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) contend that due to the intangible nature of insurance 
products, the determinants of financial performance become a difficult 
concept.  In this vein, Burca and Batrinca (2014) claim that relevant studies 
on the financial performance of insurance companies are limited, if 
compared to reviews on banks performance.   
 
Adams and Buckle (2003) evaluate insurers’ financial performance in an 
offshore financial centre, namely the Bermudian insurance market.  Their 
analysis consists of 47 insurers with data from 1993 to 1997.  Their study is 
restricted to company characteristics as independent variables.  Results 
from the panel data analysis show that insurers with high leverage, low 
liquidity and reinsurance companies have better financial performance than 
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those at the opposite side.  They also highlight that there is a positive 
relationship between underwriting risk and performance, while size and 
business activities are not relevant to performance.   
 
However, their conclusion on variable “size’ contradicts many other previous 
findings.  Elsewhere, company size has been found to be positively 
correlated to financial performance.  Browne et al (2001) provide empirical 
evidence that company size is positively related to the financial performance 
of US life insurers.  The same conclusion has been presented in early 
studies; emphasizing that there is a positive relationship between financial 
performance and company size (Grace and Timme 1992).  The debate 
behind this shows that larger insurance companies normally have greater 
capacity for handling adverse market fluctuations relative to smaller insurers, 
have better economics of scale and they are also financially-able to obtain 
managerial professionals. 
 
Shiu (2004) examines the financial performance of UK general insurers over 
the period of 1986 -1999.  She uses three key indicators in her study which 
are investment yield, percentage change in shareholders’ funds and return 
on shareholders’ fund.  This empirical study tested 12 explanatory variables 
and discovered that the financial performance of UK general insurers is 
positively correlated with interest rate, return on equity, solvency margin and 
liquidity.  In addition, performance is negatively correlated with inflation and 
reinsurance dependence.  She also conducted another study that focuses 
on UK life insurers, by using both firm-specific and economic variables (Shiu 
2005).  She derives a conclusion that life insurers’ financial performance is 
positively related to bonds-to-total assets, equities-to-total assets and the 
level of new business. 
 
On a different basis, Curak et al (2011) study the determinants of financial 
performance of the Croatian insurers.  This study focuses specifically on 
composite insurers.  These are insurance companies that are licensed to 
transact both life and general insurance products.  They establish that 
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company size, underwriting risk, inflation and return on equity are the 
determining factors in insurers’ performance.   
 
The European insurance markets are evolving rapidly nowadays. Earlier 
studies attempted to evaluate the financial strength of general insurers in a 
Dutch market (Kramer 1996) and general insurers in an Italian market 
(Ceccarelli 2003).  There are several recent studies conducted on other 
European insurers that provide valuable insight into the discussion (Kozak 
2011 and Burca and Batrinca 2014).  Kozak (2011) examines the profitability 
of 25 general insurance companies in Poland during 2002-2009.  The main 
finding derived from this study shows that the profitability and efficiency of 
insurers are negatively correlated with types of insurance product offered.  
Hence, it could be concluded that offering various types of insurance policy 
entails higher cost which will affect the profitability of an insurer.   
 
Subsequently, Burca and Batrinca (2014) evaluate the financial performance 
of the Romanian insurance market between the period of 2008 and 2012.  
They study 41 insurers and have employed panel data regressions using 13 
variables.  They discover that company size, loss ratio, financial leverage, 
growth, underwriting risk, risk retention ratio and solvency margin are key 
determinants that affect the financial performance of Romanian insurers. 
 
Similar findings are derived from the Ethiopian insurance sector (Mehari and 
Aemiro 2013).  They use a sample of nine Ethiopian insurers over the period 
of 2005 – 2010 to investigate the impact of firm-specific factors on insurers’ 
performance.  They conclude that the size, loss ratio (risk), tangibility and 
leverage are key determinants of insurer performance.  On the other 
extreme, growth, insurer’s age and liquidity are statistically insignificant 
determinants. 
 
There have been extensive studies concerning insurer’s financial 
performance in the Asian insurance market.  Connelly and Limpaphayom 
(2004) examine the influence of board characteristics of Thailand life 
insurers on performance.  They discover that board composition is positively 
45 
 
related to profitability but negatively related to underwriting risk.  They also 
indicate that board size is not a relevant determinant of performance. Chen 
and Wong (2004) conduct a comparative analysis to compare the financial 
health of insurers in Japan, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia.  These are well-
established insurance industries among the developing countries.  On a 
different note, Charumathi (2012) investigates the performance of life 
insurers in the Indian market.  The Indian insurance market is the least 
profitable market among all Asian countries since it is suffering from fall in 
new business premium during 2010-2011.  His sample includes 23 Indian 
life insurers over the period of 2008 – 2011.  He finds that leverage and 
premium growth have negatively influenced the profitability of Indian life 
insurers. 
 
Ahmed et al (2011) and Malik (2011) both investigate the financial 
performance of Pakistani insurance companies.  Their samples differ 
slightly, whereby Ahmed et al (2011) focus on five life insurers while Malik 
(2011) includes all insurers (34 insurers) in his analysis.  Their findings are 
almost similar – financial performance of Pakistani insurers is influenced by 
size, risk and leverage.  In addition, Malik (2011) contributes to the literature 
by defining the variables’ association; performance is positively correlated to 
size and negatively correlated to leverage and risk.  However, it could be 
assumed that both studies have an obvious limitation, in terms of the 
number of insurers included in the sample which provide a small sample 
size.  
 
The study takes a different approach when applied to a Malaysian 
landscape.  The Malaysian insurance industry is sub-divided into two main 
categories, which are the conventional insurance and the Islamic insurance.  
The conventional insurance is similar to all other insurances while the 
Islamic insurance is a sharia’-compliant mutual risk arrangement on the 
basis of mutual protection and joint responsibility (Billah 2007).  Islamic 
insurance companies are also known as Takaful operators, in which they 
have to ensure that their operational activities are Sharia’ compliant. 
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Subsequently, Yakob et al (2012) and Ismail (2013) examine the financial 
performance of Takaful operators and insurers in Malaysia. Yakob et al 
(2012) use the CAMEL rating approach in her analysis which follows a study 
conducted by Hsiao and Whang (2009) on Taiwanese insurers.  On the 
other hand, Ismail (2013) uses panel data over the period of 2004 to 2007 in 
his observation.  He observes that size, reinsurance dependence and 
solvency margin are key factors that affect the financial performance for both 
conventional insurers and Takaful operators.  Interestingly, there is no 
significant difference between the types of insurers, most probably due to 
similar operational functions and similar regulatory supervision under one 
regulatory body. 
 
3.3 SOME APPROACHES TO EVALUATE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
In this section, the discussion will focus on approaches/models that have 
been used in the previous study that relate to our primary objectives.  The 
aim is to investigate the financial performance of insurers on the basis of its 
rating performance.  Thus, some approaches that have been used to 
evaluate the rating performance of insurers will be discussed.  This section 
will be sub-divided appropriately.  
 
3.3.1 Markov Model 
Lando and Skodeberg (2002) apply the Markov chain model to 
estimate transition matrices.  They utilize the continuous-time method 
and demonstrate the estimation of transition intensities for the Markov 
chain.  They also compute the discrete-time method (cohort method) 
transition matrix.  Following their study, Berd (2005) employs the 
continuous-time Markov model to describe the rating transition 
process.  He argues that the discrete (cohort) method is inconsistent 
with the Markovian assumption for rating transitions, which reflects a 
non-Markov behavior of ratings.  However, the cohort method has 
been extensively used in many studies (Frydman and Schuermann 
2008, Hadad et al 2009 and Wang 2010).  In addition, the cohort 
method also becomes the primary estimation used by many rating 
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agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor (Carty 1997 and 
Carty and Fons 1997). 
 
The work of Frydman and Schuermann (2008) assumes that the 
rating process is time-homogeneous Markov.  Thus, the prediction of 
credit rating transitions could be based on past credit quality changes 
of the firm.  They propose a parsimonious model that combines two 
Markov chains, focusing on the speed of movement among credit 
ratings.  They also study the non-Markov behavior of their data that 
implies that the future distribution of a firm’s rating does not only rely 
on its current rating, but also on its past rating history. 
 
Hadad et al (2009) examine the rating migration matrices of financial 
corporations and bond performance in Indonesia.  They utilize both 
the cohort method and the continuous method in their study.  In 
addition, they supplement their analysis by looking into the non-
Markovian approach.  In this instance, they examine the rating quality 
in terms of its rating activity and rating drift of their sample.  The 
cohort method resulted in transition matrices with uneven probability 
distribution along its diagonal area and it failed to depict the 
relationship between rating stability and rating grades.   
 
Alternatively, the continuous method has presented a consistent 
outlook and it successfully reflects the relationship between rating 
stability and rating grades.  Both methods demonstrate that the 
creditworthiness of financial companies and bond performance 
improve over time.  It is also evident from the rating activity and rating 
drift analysis. 
 
Insurance ratings are not renewed as frequently as bond ratings.  
Thus, this limitation is acknowledged in Wang (2010) as a restriction 
to apply the continuous method.  With the absence of continuous 
data, this study reverts to the cohort method, which is extensively 
used by rating agencies to estimate the probabilities of insurer’s rating 
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transition.  They also incorporate the difference of economic and 
industry cycles in their analysis.  They provide a body of evidence that 
the distribution of insurer’s rating changes is influenced by economic 
and industry cycles and those insurers in favour of the economic and 
industry cycles reflect better overall performance. 
 
 A study by Malik and Thomas (2012) applies the Markov model to 
examine the rating transitions of consumer loans.  Their Markov chain 
model is constructed based on the behavioral scores that influence 
the credit risk portfolio of consumer loans.  Sample is derived from 
credit card customers of a major UK bank, over the period of 2001 – 
2005.  This paper contributes a pilot scheme to employ the Markov 
chain on behavioral scores to predict the risk of consumer loans. 
 
There is an alternative body of literature that demonstrates the 
importance of non-Markovian behaviors in rating dynamics.  An 
example of a Non-Markovian behavior describes the influence of the 
current rating downgrade on the next rating downgrade, rather than 
an upgrade (Dang and Partington 2005).  Subsequently, Lando and 
Skodeberg (2002) establish an adverse association between 
transition probabilities and the length of time to remain in a particular 
rating grade. 
 
Hamilton and Cantor (2004) argue that the direction of prior rating 
change tends to influence transition probability.  In addition, Figlewski 
et al (2006) show that the rating momentum does exist and they 
include the ageing factor in their evaluation.  They establish that the 
longer the length of time since the firm is first rated, the higher 
possibility that the firm will default. 
 
A recent study by Wang and Carson (2014) examines the non-
Markov effects for general insurers’ rating transitions.  They analyse 
three different rating drift phenomena by using the Cox proportional 
hazard model and Best rating for the period between 1995 and 2006.  
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Compared to bond ratings, there is still lack of studies of insurance 
rating transitions.  Nevertheless, insurance ratings are imperative in 
the academic literature and to various stakeholders in the insurance 
business.  They declare that the study is the first one to investigate 
the non-Markovian behavior as reflected in the rating drifts. They 
contributed to the body of literature by providing two findings.  Firstly, 
insurers with secure rating grades have higher probabilities to remain 
in their current rating grades.  Secondly, rating changes are positively 
correlated with future rating performance.   
 
3.3.2 Rating Transition Matrices (RTM) 
Rating transition matrices (RTM) are also known as credit transition or 
credit migration matrices.  According to McNulty and Levin (2000), 
these matrices are a convenient approach depicting past changes in 
the credit quality of obligors (obligors are firms or entities under 
evaluation).  Their inputs are vital to many risk management 
applications including risk assessment and credit term structure 
modeling (Jafry And Schuermann 2004 and Frydmann and 
Schuermann 2008).   Some of the earlier applications of the RTM can 
be found in bond pricing models introduced by Jarrow and Turnbull 
(1995), credit derivative pricing models like in Kijima and 
Komoribayashi (1998) and Acharya et. al (2002) and also 
CreditMetrics simulation for credit portfolio models developed by 
Gupton et al (1997). The application of these matrices can also be 
beneficial in analysing flow in the population, measuring policy impact 
or forecasting future changes.   
 
Transition matrices are widely used to explain the dynamics of 
changes in an event,e.g., credit quality of a company.  In fact, these 
matrices are also one of the key elements imposed by the New Basel 
Accord capital requirements (BIS 2001).   These methods are 
becoming more well-known in the financial industry where historical 
transition matrices are published on an annual basis by many rating 
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agencies worldwide (Israel et. al. 2001 and Lando and SkØdeberg 
2002). 
 
There are two generally-accepted methods of estimating transition 
matrices, the cohort method and the duration method (Jarrow, Lando 
and Turnbull 1997, Lando and SkØdeberg 2002, Mählmann 2006, 
Frydmann and Schuermann 2008 and Hadad et. al 2009).  The cohort 
method is also known as the discrete method or the time-
homogeneous method as used by Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997).  
For ease of estimation, this method assumes that the probability of 
changing from one rating to another is constant over time 
(homogeneous).   This method also assumes that future rating 
changes are not affected by the rating history, which is referred as the 
ergodicity of the Markov chain (a Markov property).   
 
The other method, which is known as the duration or the continuous 
time method relies on the assumption that rating agencies have 
access to continuous-time data on rating transitions and they know 
the exact dates within a year that a company changes its rating or is 
downgraded.  This method has been applied in many researches 
(Bangia et. al 2002;  Lando and SkØdeberg 2002 and Krüger et. al. 
2005) and is based on modern survival analytic techniques which 
have several advantages over the cohort method (Jafry and 
Schuermann 2004).  The objective of the duration method is to 
estimate a generator matrix, i.e. its matrix algorithm, which will be 
used to tabulate the transition matrices over any time horizon 
(Frydman and Schuermann 2008 and Engelmann and Ermakov 
2011). 
 
RTM reflects the credit quality of a company by looking at the rating 
changes.  The quality in question is either improving or deteriorating, 
reflected by the upgrading and downgrading of letter rating obtained 
by the company (Hadad et al, 2009). RTM is also used to explain the 
migration of creditor quality as measured by proxies such as bond 
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ratings (Jones, 2005).  According to the same fundamental, this 
research uses the RTM to explain the migration effect of insurers’ 
quality, with the proxies being insurers’ financial strength ratings 
(FSR). 
 
3.3.3 Reviews on financial strength rating performance analysis 
Earlier studies focus on debt rating determinants by measuring 
profitability, liquidity, capitalisation, interest coverage, debt status and 
industry indicators (Blume et. al. 1998; Estrella et. al. 1999, Tabakis 
and Vinci 2002; Altman and Rijken 2004, Amato and Furfine 2004 
and Grunert et al 2005).  All studies assess large financial 
corporations and banking institutions and none focuses on insurance 
companies.  In addition, all studies, except those by Tabakis and 
Vinci (2002) and Grunert et al (2005), concentrate on US financial 
and banking corporations.   
 
Blume et al (1998) and Amato and Furfine (2004) have a similar 
approach in their studies.  Both investigate the credit rating 
performance of large financial corporations in the US by employing 
the ordered probit regression model (OPM).  They reach a similar 
conclusion; credit ratings are influenced by profitability and liquidity.  
On a different basis, Grunert et al (2005) investigate the influence of 
internal credit ratings of four major German banks.  Their study differs 
by incorporating non-financial factors, namely management quality 
and market position in their analysis.  They propose that the 
combination on financial and non-financial factors leads to a more 
accurate prediction of future defaults events.  However, non-financial 
data are not easily accessible.  This might become a limitation in 
many studies. 
 
Tabakis and Vinci (2002) analyse and compare rating determinants 
for 67 European banks by using rating information from Standard & 
Poor (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch rating agencies. They establish that 
rating agencies rely on balance sheet information, profitability, 
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liquidity, efficiency, capital adequacy and loan intensity ratios to 
evaluate banks’ financial performance. 
 
Insurer ratings are extensively used to evaluate insurers’ financial 
strength and insolvency risk (Wang and Carson 2014).  Again, 
previous studies focused mainly on insurers in the United States (US) 
(Gaver and Pottier 2005, Eckles and Pottier 2011, Doherty et al 2012, 
Eckles and Halek 2012 and Kartasheva and Park 2012). 
 
To the best of author’s knowledge, the most prominent study that 
evaluates UK insurers’ rating performance is the work conducted by 
Adams et al (2003).  Their study compares insurer rating performance 
between two rating agencies and the determinants of rating grades 
assignment.  Their sample consists of 40 insurers with A.M Best 
ratings, 25 insurers with Standard & Poor ratings and 28 non-rated 
insurers over the period of 1993 to 1997.  The dependent variable 
(DV) is an ordinal variable, which is the propensity to be assigned a 
particular rating.  They employ an ordered probit regression model 
(OPM) in their analysis which consists of seven explanatory variables 
(leverage, profitability, liquidity, growth, size, organizational form and 
reinsurance).  Their outcomes show that rating assignments from 
both agencies are influenced by profitability and liquidity.  
Subsequently, mutual insurers tend to have higher ratings than stock 
insurers and leverage is negatively-related to rating grades, i.e 
insurers with lower financial leverage will have better ratings.   
 
Gaver and Pottier (2005) investigate 80 publicly-traded US general 
insurers (also known as property-liability insurers) that have the Best 
FSR for the year end of December 1997.  Their focus is to investigate 
the influence of holding company financial information on the rating 
determinants. They highlight that capitalization, liquidity, profitability 
and size are key determinants that affect ratings both at individual 
firm level and group level.  Their study, however, includes an 
53 
 
extremely short period of observation, which is only one year.  This is 
a major drawback that can be addressed in future research. 
 
Economic and finance theories suggest a positive association 
between firm efficiency and financial strength.  Thus, Eckles and 
Pottier (2010) investigate the relationship between insurer efficiency 
and insurer financial strength ratings.  Their study differs from the 
others in which they use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in 
order to measure efficiency.  The DEA is a linear optimization method 
that could be used to calculate efficiency scores.  It also allows for the 
estimation of the “best practice” efficiency frontier for firms in the 
sample.  DEA has been used in various efficiency studies within the 
property-liability insurance sector (Cummins and Nini 2002 and 
Brockett et al 2004). Interestingly, they manage to provide evidence 
that conforms to the theory.  However, as the stand-alone criteria, firm 
efficiency is a weak predictor of financial strength ratings.  Thus, firm 
efficiency itself is deemed as an insufficient determinant and should 
be used in conjunction with other firm-specific characteristics. 
 
In another study, Eckles and Halek (2012) examine the determinants 
of abnormal financial market reactions to insurer rating changes.  
They analyse the characteristics of rating changes relative to market 
reactions following rating downgrades. Their sample consists of 109 
publicly traded US insurers who receive rating downgrades from 
various rating agencies over the period of 1993-2003.  A general 
conclusion derived from their study indicates that the market reacts 
differently to the basic rating downgrades issued by different rating 
agencies. 
 
Kartasheva and Park (2012) investigate the impact of rating changes 
on firms’ credit quality.  This is another US-based study to 
demonstrate the real effects of new rating standards on the credit 
quality of insurers.  Interestingly, their sample includes insurers who 
are exposed to catastrophic risks, specifically hurricane Katrina in 
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2005.  Prior to the hurricane, major rating agencies revised their 
standards and introduced stringent standards for insurers exposed to 
catastrophic risks.  According to the revised standards, insurers are 
required to hold larger capital in order to maintain position in the same 
rating grade.  However, this new requirement has affected the credit 
risk distribution in the industry and reduced insurers’ ability to sustain 
large losses resulted from catastrophic events.  This might be due to 
the requirement imposed by the revised standards, where insurers 
hold larger capital to maintain their rating grade but at the same time 
have difficulties in raising capital. 
 
In addition, Florez-Lopez (2007) and Van Gestel et al (2007) examine 
the ability to develop classification models to forecast insurance 
ratings.  Van Gestel et al (2007) provide a detailed discussion on the 
appropriate financial variables that could be tested to determine rating 
changes according to types of insurer. However, there are two major 
drawbacks linked with these studies.  First of all, the samples used in 
these studies are usually concentrated on large insurance firms that 
apply financial ratings.  Second of all, there are various criticisms 
against rating agencies such as fallibility, bad faith, timeliness and 
bias towards market criticism (Golin 2001). 
 
Some of the various challenges faced by rating agencies include the 
lack of timeliness in making rating changes (Loffler 2005 and Gu et al 
2014).  In addition, there is no ultimate rating methodology and the 
rating assessment does not cover the whole spectrum of insurance 
operations (Goldstein et al 2000 and Cheng and Neamtiu 2009). 
 
3.4 OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
An important part of the analysis is a financial strength comparison between 
two distinctive periods, namely the pre-financial and post-financial crisis 
periods. Based on data availability, the time frame for all analyses is a five-
year period starting from 2006 to 2010.  Thus, a specific breakpoint between 
these two periods needs to be justified clearly. 
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Schwartz (1986) defines financial crisis as a state triggered by fears 
indicating that the payment will be unobtainable.  She claims that no 
financial crisis has occurred in the United States since 1933 and none has 
occurred in the United Kingdom since 1866.  Hence, the recent financial 
crisis that has affected the world’s economy has been a shock and an 
unforeseen event. 
 
The origin of the financial crisis that hit the financial markets in the United 
States and across the world was multi-faceted, as it was triggered by asset 
price bubble and aggravated by others, such as financial innovations that 
masked risks, companies that failed to follow their own risk management 
practices and regulators and supervisors who failed to control excessive 
taking (Baily et. al. 2008).   There are many names to the most recent 
financial crisis that began in 2007.  It is a global phenomenon, thus dubbed 
the Global Financial Crisis.  In the UK itself, it is often referred as the Credit 
Crunch.  However, from the economists’ perspective; there is no general 
definition of credit crunch (Clair and Tucker 1993, Nehls and Schmidt 2004 
and Gern and Jannsen 2009).  The difference lies in the cause of the 
contraction and whether credit is limited by means other than the price.  
 
The crucial point of the UK financial crisis which started in mid-2007 was the 
main emphasis on many economists and scholars’ discussions (Barrell and 
Davis 2008, Mizen 2008, Martin and Milas 2009, Busch 2010, Erkens et. al 
2010, Vriesendrop and Gramatikov 2010 and Evans 2011).  In these papers, 
the onset of the financial crisis is pinpointed to mid-2007, July 2007 or the 
summer of 2007.  Even though financial crisis phenomena are not an 
uncommon event, the crisis during this period (2007 to 2010) is the largest 
and the worst since the Great Depression in 1929 – 1933 (Barrell and Davis 
2008 and Trivedi 2010).  Busch (2010) claims that the UK was exposed to a 
severe economic downturn in mid- 2007 and becomes one of the hardest hit 
countries in the western world with a projected budget deficit of 12.6% in 
2008. 
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Vriesendrop and Gramatikov (2010) conduct a survey to examine the impact 
of the financial crisis on the global market.  Their survey focuses on 435 
professional insolvency practitioners across 10 countries, and 74 
respondents are from the UK.  Of all the UK representatives, 59 of them are 
practitioners with more than 15 years of experiences in the field of 
insolvency law and who have been dealing with more than 200 cases of 
business in financial troubles since 2004. Observations from 2004 to 2007 
are pooled into the before crisis period and those after 2007 are clustered 
into the after crisis period. Following this trend, it becomes the basis for the 
comparative breakpoint used in our study. 
 
Within the insurance industry itself, insurers’ assets and liabilities or their 
balance sheets are still affected by the recent financial crisis (Guinn et. al. 
2008 and Schich 2009).  This is because assets are mostly held in bonds 
and stocks, which simultaneously face valuation pressure during the crisis 
(Schich 2009).  There are also risks that arise out of investment write-downs 
and underwriting losses.  The degree of impact varies, according to the 
industrial sector and individual company.  However, general insurers will be 
heavily challenged, with an 8% decline in the first three quarter in 2008 
(Guinn et. al. 2008).  Mortgage and financial insurers, as well as large 
reinsurance companies are also exposed to credit and market risks during 
the crisis.   Schich (2009) and Harrington (2009) also discuss the impact of 
financial crisis on the credit rating performance.  The possibilities of a rating 
downgrade are greater, as illustrated in the US life insurance sector during 
the fall of 2008.  Its rating outlook is modified from stable to negative by at 
least one of the three major rating agencies.  Subsequently, rating agencies 
in other jurisdictions, including Europe also project a negative outlook since 
the onset of the financial crisis in mid-2007.  Harrington (2009) mentions that 
several large US insurers had experienced rating downgrade and suffered a 
certain degree of financial distress.  In addition, a few insurers sought and 
received permission in some jurisdiction to modify their financial reporting in 
order to improve their reported capital.   
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In 2008, A.M Best reported that 81% of US property-casualty insurers 
managed to maintain their current rating grades, 4% experienced rating 
downgrades, and another 4% were upgraded.  Again, the effect of the 
financial crisis is reflected in the rating movements.  The federal financial 
assistance (TARP) was introduced and granted to qualified insurers such as 
Hartford Financial (US$3.4 billion) and Lincoln Financial (US$950 million).  
Schich (2009) mentioned that larger financial guarantee insurers suffer from 
rating downgrades which impede their business opportunities.  A good rating 
grade is vital to their business models and rating downgrade is a 
disadvantage in their operations. 
 
The reliability and efficiency of credit ratings in evaluating insurer’s financial 
strength have also been discussed in previous studies.  Tower and Impavido 
(2009) propose that the international solvency standard should be reviewed 
as there is no commonality in measuring and assessing insurer’s financial 
strength other than its ratings.  A similar proposal is raised by Murphy 
(2008), questioning the lack of regulation which resulted in inadequate 
disclosures and difficulties in understanding and analysing the credit ratings 
as compared to bond ratings. 
 
Thus, it could be presumed that the financial crisis does affect insurer’s 
financial strength, and this effect could be reflected in their rating 
performances.  This effect is projected using rating transition matrices by 
comparing the performance between two periods, namely the pre-financial 
crisis and post financial crisis.  However, it should be noted that the 
transition matrices only illustrate the changes and not the reason why it 
happens.  Based on the discussion, the selection of breakpoint is justified 
between a pre-financial crisis period and post-financial crisis period.  All data 
from 2006 to 2007 will be grouped into the pre-financial crisis period and 
data from 2008 onwards will be grouped into the post-financial crisis period. 
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3.5 DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL STRENGTH RATING (FSR) 
PERFORMANCE 
This section reviews the literature on the possible relationship between 
financial performance and its determinants.  The discussions will serve as 
the basis to formulate research hypotheses that correspond to the 
fundamental theory based on the empirical reviews. 
 
The US-based National Association of Insurance Companies (NAIC) 
introduced a set of standard financial ratios that could be used to evaluate 
the financial condition of insurance companies and other financial service 
companies. It focuses on capital adequacy, management operations, 
earnings and liquidity (also known as the CAMEL criteria).  These ratios 
have been used extensively to evaluate insurer’s financial performance 
(Adams et al 2003, Charumathi 2012, Yakob et al 2013 and Doumpos et al 
2013).  Browne et al (1999) highlight that regulators and insurance 
managers have been trying to use various financial indices to evaluate 
financial performance.  This leads to the assumption that there is no 
universal guidance or specification regarding the most suitable determinants 
which influence the performance of insurance companies. 
 
Adams et. al (2003) conduct a UK-based study to investigate the financial 
strength ratings performance by employing the CAMEL criteria as the basis 
of their rating framework.  The firm-specific financial characteristics that they 
tested in their study are leverage, profitability, liquidity, company size, 
reinsurance, growth and organisational form.  In addition, Mao et al (2014) 
list down several financial indices that could be appropriately used in 
measuring insurer’s performance.  The financial indices are profitability, 
capitalization, liquidity, reserve adequacy, investment, underwriting capacity 
and reinsurance.  According to Van Gestel et al (2007), all of these variables 
are appropriate for assessing the performance for all types of insurance 
companies.   
 
Within the insurance industry itself, financial strength ratings (or insurer 
ratings) have been traditionally used as measures of insolvency risk and 
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financial quality (Adiel 1996, Anthony and Petroni 1997,  Cummins and 
Danzon 1997 and Pottier 1998).  It could be concluded that there are several 
dominant financial factors that influence insurer’s solvency and bankruptcy. 
The factors are asset, liability and profitability (Kahane et. al. 1986 and 
MacMinn and Witt 1997), liquidity (Kahane et al 1986), capitalisation 
(Kahane et. al. 1986, MacMinn and Witt 1997 and Doherty 1989), size 
(Cummins and Sommer 1996), growth (Harrington and Danzon 1994), 
diversification (Sommer 1996) and use of reinsurance (Berger et. al. 1992).  
However, insurers’ financial strength and rating determinants have not been 
discussed by many (Pottier 1997, Pottier and Sommer 1999, Burton et. al. 
2003, Gaver and Pottier 2005 and Florez-Lopez 2007).   
 
Nonetheless, Doumpos et al (2012) argue that there is no theoretical 
guidance for the selection of specific criteria to measure performance and 
propose a basis for criteria selections.  The variables to be selected should 
be based on data availability, previous studies on insurance firms and efforts 
to incorporate various aspects of the financial profile of insurers.  This study 
attempts to investigate the financial performance of insurance companies by 
using specific variables (determinants) that have been used in other studies.  
In this study, the evaluation of financial performance is based on its financial 
strength ratings, and the determinants to be examined depend on data 
availability and efforts to expand the works of previous studies.   
 
This study employs the CAMEL criteria as the basis of the FSR framework.  
Each determinant is discussed and its association to the financial 
performance will also be established.  Altogether, eight variables are 
selected as determinants of the financial strength rating performance and 
the selection is heavily restricted by the data availability issue. The variables 
are explained as follows: 
 
3.5.1 Leverage (LEV) 
The financing or leverage decision is imperative as this factor 
influences the shareholder’s risk and return and the market value of 
the firm (Pandey 2007).  As in Van Gestel et. al (2007), this variable 
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measures the capital adequacy of an insurer.  It is one of the 
important criteria for the CAMEL approach. Adams et al (2003) define 
leverage as a determinant to reflect an insurer’s ability to write new 
business without causing financial stress on its capital.  They argue 
that higher financial leverage will increase the potential for adverse 
effects of variation in underwriting performance.  Eventually, this will 
impair insurer’s ability to fulfill its obligations to policyholders and 
investors. 
 
Interestingly, several previous studies show contradicting findings of 
the relationship between leverage and financial performance (Gupta 
et.al. 2010).  Ghosh et. al. (2000) and Berger and di Patti (2006) 
indicate a positive relationship between leverage and FP while 
several other studies reported a negative correlation (Gleason et. al. 
2000, Simerly and Li 2000 and Zeitun and Tian 2007).  However, their 
measurement of leverage is based on the trade-off theory for the 
capital structure and which might not be appropriate for evaluating the 
financial strength rating performance of insurers.  A.M Best (2010) 
claims that insurer that is highly-leveraged might not be able to fulfill 
its financial obligations during the occurrence of large catastrophic 
loss event.  Burca and Batrinca (2014) demonstrate a negative 
linkage between financial leverage and insurer’s performance. 
 
Thus, based on the empirical evidence, it is hypothesised that 
insurers with lower leverage will have a higher probability of obtaining 
a higher rating grade.  In this instance, it is assumed that leverage is 
negatively correlated with the FSR performance.   
 
3.5.2 Profitability (PROFIT) 
There are many ways to measure profitability, but its measurement 
must be in accord with the application.  Profitability is a key 
determinant in evaluating insurer’s performance (A.M Best 2010).  In 
finance, profitability could be measured using return on investment 
capital, return on equity or return on assets (Nguyen 2006).  On the 
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topic of insurance performance, profitability is a measure to evaluate 
investment efficiency and management ability to control expenses 
and premium prices.  Kashish (1998) show a positive linkage between 
profitability and insurer performance.  In addition, Gaver and Pottier 
(2005) conclude that a more profitable insurer will have lower 
insolvency risk and higher FSR.  Thus, it is hypothesised that insurers 
with higher profits will have a higher probability of obtaining a higher 
rating grade. 
 
3.5.3 Liquidity (LIQUID) 
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFAS, 2006) defines 
liquidity as the availability of cash in the near future, after fulfilling the 
financial obligations over a specific period.  Almajali et al (2012) 
establish that liquidity has a significant effect on insurer’s financial 
performance, in which higher liquidity allows a firm to deal with 
unexpected contingencies and to fulfill its financial obligations 
(Omondi and Muturi 2013).  In an insurance setting, the company with 
higher liquidity signifies a better claim payment ability and stronger 
financial condition (Shiu 2004) which will increase their chances at 
obtaining better rating grade.  Thus, it is hypothesised that insurers 
with higher liquidity will have higher probability of obtaining a higher 
rating grade.  We conclude that liquidity is positively related to FSR 
performance. 
 
3.5.4 Company size (SIZE) 
There is a positive relationship between size and company 
performance which is due to the operating cost efficiency by 
increasing outputs and minimizing the unit of cost (Hardwick 1997).  
Bouzouita and Young (1998) propose that company size tends to be 
positively correlated with assigned credit ratings since larger 
companies have the means to obtain managerial expertise, 
economies of scale, depict better market positions and good public 
reputation.  Subsequently, Hvide and Mȍen (2007), Fenn et al (2008), 
Flamini et al (2009) and Kartasheva and Park (2012) conclude that 
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larger firms have better performance and they are more competitive 
than smaller firms.  All studies predict a positive linkage between size 
and financial performance. 
 
This variable is measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets 
of the insurance companies (Malik 2011, Ismail 2013, Burca and 
Batrinca 2014).  However, Van Gestel et al (2007) introduce an 
alternative to measuring company size, which is the gross premium 
written instead of the total asset.  They argue that this proxy is more 
suitable for insurance companies.  This alternative has been tested in 
several recent researches, such as the ones conducted by Ahmed 
(2011) and Charumathi (2012).   
 
This variable is included in the evaluation with the assumption size 
and FSR performance being positively correlated.  The hypothesis to 
be tested should be looking at larger insurers which will have higher 
probability of obtaining a higher rating grade. 
 
3.5.5 Reinsurance (REINS) 
Reinsurance is a risk transfer mechanism from the primary insurer to 
a third party in order to reduce uncertainty related to the frequency 
and magnitude of future losses.  Calandro and Lane (2001) suggest 
that reinsurance factor should be added to the list of determinants of 
insurer performance. To date, there is no definite association between 
reinsurance and rating performance.  Thus, it might be meaningful to 
study the effect of reinsurance on FSR performance.  
 
High reinsurance dependency could signify a negative outlook 
towards the insurer’s overall performance.  A possible explanation for 
this suggestion could be that the extent of the reinsurance usage has 
a potentially conflicting impact on an insurer’s business uncertainty 
(Gatzlaff 2009 and Cole et al 2011).  Pottier and Sommer (1999) 
establish an adverse association between the amount of reinsurance 
held and rating grade assigned to insurers.  Similar finding is evident 
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in Sharpe and Stadnik (2007).  Hence, higher dependency on 
reinsurance is not a favourable practice in maintaining good FSR 
performance.   
 
On the other hand, higher reinsurance dependency could influence 
better rating grades since greater burden of risk has been shifted to 
the reinsurer.  From a rating agency perspective, reinsurance gives a 
positive impact to ratings performance in several ways.  First, 
reinsurance influence better rating grades if it is used to obtain 
flexibility to underwrite additional businesses.  Second, it is also 
useful in order to obtain reinsurer’s expertise and access to new 
business ventures (Ehrlich et al 2010).  Third, reinsurance can be 
utilised to allow a parent company to assume all adverse risk from its 
subsidiaries.  In this instance, unfavorable risk from the subsidiaries 
will be transferred to its parent and favorable risks will be retained.  
Retaining good risks provide positive outlooks for the subsidiaries 
(Kuschel et al 2011).  Fourth, reinsurance can be used as a means to 
exit a business.  This often has a very positive rating implication since 
insurers will only make an exit from unprofitable businesses.  
Retaining all the profitable businesses helps to boost rating grades 
and performance (Wallace et al 1993). 
 
Since the positive impacts outweigh the negative impacts, it is 
concluded that insurers holding higher amount of reinsurance will 
have a higher probability of obtaining a higher rating grade.   
 
3.5.6 Growth (GROWTH) 
The impact of growth on firm’s uncertainty and potential ratings is 
ambiguous (Cole et al 2011).  They claim that strong growth position 
may signify that policyholders are confident with the financial strength 
of the insurer, thus reducing uncertainty.  In earlier studies, Adams et 
al (2003) suggest that positive growth in the annual surplus could 
signal a favourable financial position, which could lead to stronger 
future cash flow performance and higher economic value.  Epermanis 
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and Harrington (2006) and Eling and Schmidt (2008) state that rating 
upgrades for low-rated insurers help to generate increases in growth 
which will help to increase the overall performance. 
 
However, a higher growth rate could trigger financial strain, especially 
for life insurers since a growing business involved “new business 
strain’.  Brennan et al (2013) claim that rapid growth is one of the key 
factor that trigger financial distress and failure among insurers. They 
study cases and the cause of insurers’ failures and they found that 
Taisei Fire Insurance (Japan), Independent Insurance (UK) and AIG 
(UK) suffered financial distress and failed due to rapid growth and 
incorrect expansion strategy. 
 
In this study, it is hypothesised that insurers with greater growth in the 
annual surplus will have a higher probability of obtaining a higher 
rating grade.   
 
3.5.7 Business Type (TYPE) 
Prior literature has highlighted that different insurance business types 
are associated with systematically different levels of risk, focusing on 
the business written and investments (Downs and Sommer 1999, 
Cole et al 2009). This variable is included as a qualitative variable and 
will be measured as a proxy to capture the differences in business 
type.  The data consist of all insurers; life insurers, general insurers 
and composite insurers.  Thus, a dummy variable will be created to 
represent each and every type of insurers.   
 
Traditionally, life insurers’ operations had been more predictable than 
the others.  Their operations were realised through the application of 
actuarial principles in policy valuation and solvency requirement.  Life 
insurers also operate based on long-term capacity, providing them a 
more stable platform and less exposure to unanticipated losses.  On 
the other hand, the general insurer is more susceptible to 
unanticipated losses caused by fluctuating annual premiums, 
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reducing operating costs and revising underwriting terms at short 
notice.  Again, this is due to the nature of the general insurance 
business, which is a short-term contract.   
 
Adams et. al. (2003) claims that there is no clear prediction about the 
impact of business type towards financial performance.  However, 
based on the nature of each business, general and composite 
insurers tend to seek for ratings.  A possible justification is that 
obtaining good rating grades will help to boost company’s reputation, 
reduce the cost of capital and signal better financial performance 
(Kartasheva and Park 2012).  Thus, this study proposes that general 
and composite insurers are more likely to be assigned a higher rating 
grade than life insurers.   
 
3.5.8 Organisational form (FORM) 
This is another qualitative, proxy variable to be included in the model.  
Van Gestel et al (2007) ascertain that this variable could be used to 
evaluate all types of insurance companies and its organizational 
forms.  This variable captures the difference in risk perception 
between a stock-listed company and mutual insurer.   
 
In an earlier study, Pottier and Sommer (1997) indicate that mutual 
insurers obtain higher rating grades that stock insurers.  Conversely, 
Kartasheva and Park (2012) highlight that stock insurers are 
positively related to firm’s rating.  This is due to their ability to access 
a wider pool of investors and thus, it needs to pay a lower cost of 
external financing.  Following Kartasheva and Park (2012), it is 
hypothesised that stock insurers are more likely to be assigned higher 
rating grades than mutual insurers. 
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3.6 JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH AND 
SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW. 
 
Based on these discussions, it could be concluded that insurers’ financial 
performance is an important research theme in finance.  To date, it is 
admitted that there is still a lack of study done beyond the US continents.  In 
addition, the US-based study on this subject matter is deemed rigid and very 
country-specific and does not allow for a replication in a very different 
industry.  These US-based studies have focused on insolvency and failures 
among insurers, common in the US market, thus narrowing the scope of the 
study. The US insurance market is also a very established market, with the 
largest percentage shares of the world market.  Thus, a direct-country 
comparison is unjustifiable.   Initial studies focus on large insurance 
industries such as those in the US and UK.  However, recent studies have 
started to explore the theme in various settings and geographical 
landscapes.  This is indeed important contributions to the existing literature 
of insurers’ performance.   
 
According to the Association of British Insurers (ABI 2013), the UK is the 
largest insurance industry in Europe and the third largest in the world, after 
the US and Japan.  However, it is evident that there is still a lack of study 
about FP in the UK.  Why does this happen?  This issue needs to be 
acknowledged by scholars and reasons for the lack of study need to be 
established. 
 
Based on previous studies, it is evident that studies are more concentrated 
on the industry as a whole rather than focusing on the different types of 
insurer.  It is known that the nature of life and general business differs in 
terms of its risk, operations and obligations.  Thus, one should question the 
importance of the differences between life and general insurers, whether the 
differences give a significant impact in evaluating financial performance.  By 
acknowledging the difference, one should be able to perform a very 
meticulous and precise study on the focus group.  On the other hand, there 
is a wider scope of study that has not been fully explored, which is related to 
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the approaches and methods that could be employed to identify insurers 
experiencing financial problems at its earliest stage.  Accordingly, this study 
attempts to help identify those with financial problems at early stage that is 
before they become insolvent. 
 
Based on the literature, rating performance is a significant factor that affects 
the financial performance of the insurance companies.  Thus, this study will 
investigate the possibility of rating changes.  This study is then extended to 
investigate the significant determinants that affect the rating performance.  It 
is assumed that rating changes are attributable to several firm-specific 
factors that will be tested in the study. In addition, the effect of the recent 
financial crisis on insurance performance, as reflected in the rating 
movements will also be studied. 
 
This study attempts to extend the previous approach of Adams et al (2003) 
and Gaver and Pottier (2005).   It follows a similar approach used by Adams 
et al (2003) but it aims to be different by including more explanatory 
variables in the model, and the model in this study defines the dependent 
variable using a 6-point scale.  This study also extends its observation, as 
compared to Gaver and Pottier (2005) to encompass a period between 2006 
and 2009 in the regression analysis.  To the best of author’s knowledge, 
financial strength rating studies among the UK insurers have not been the 
subject of many researches, relative to US insurers.  Thus, this study seeks 
to contribute to the body of literature by examining the financial strength 
rating determinants of UK insurers. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter explains the research design employed in the study.  This study 
utilises secondary data that have been derived and based on one particular 
database, which is the A.M Best Insurance Report Online – Non-US 
Database (AMB).  The fundamental property of the database is explained 
thoroughly in this section.  This chapter will also provide clarification about 
the sample selection for the analyses and the justification for the financial 
crisis breakpoint adopted in this study.   
 
4.1 DATA SETS USED IN THE STUDY 
This study utilises two sets of secondary data.  The first data set is the rating 
data which are published by accredited rating agency.  The second data set 
refers to the insurers’ financial data.  These data are obtained from the 
financial reports of insurance companies that are included in the rating 
agency’s database.  This study chooses A.M Best Insurance Report Online: 
Non-US Database (Best).  The database provides both ratings and financial 
data, which fulfil the data collection requirement in this study. 
 
4.1.1 Justification on the Selected Credit Rating Agency and 
Database 
There are many external credit rating agencies in the market such as 
A.M Best (Best), Standard & Poor, Moody’s and Fitch.  Each rating 
agency has their sets of standards and methodologies in the rating 
analysis.  However, Trueck and Rachev (2009) state that these 
variations are tolerable and acceptable, even by the regulatory 
bodies.  Table 4.1.1.1 summarises the similarities/differences of the 
factors considered in the rating assessment between three external 
credit rating agencies.  In this instance, the focus of assessment is 
mainly on insurance companies. 
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Table 4.1.1.1 
Financial Strength Rating Determinants Used in Rating Agencies’  
Assessments 
A.M. Best (Best)     Standard & Poor’s  
(S&P) 
Moody’s 
 Business profile 
 Management and 
strategy 
 Operating 
performance 
 Investment portfolio 
and capitalization 
 Comprehensive 
quantitative/qualitative 
assessment regarding 
company’s balance 
sheet strength 
 Non-insurance risks 
 Loss-reserve 
 Reinsurance activities 
 Business plan  
 Regulatory filings. 
 Industry risk 
 Management and 
corporate strategy 
 Business reviews 
 Underwriting results  
 Investment policy 
and results 
 Interest rate risk 
management 
 Capitalization 
 Liquidity 
 Capital and capital 
requirements. 
 Competitive situation 
 Regulatory trends 
 Adequacy of equity 
capital 
 Investment risk 
 Profitability 
 Liquidity 
 Products and 
distribution channels 
 Quality of 
management and 
organization  
 Others 
Source: Author’s compilation with reference to Chorafas (2004) and A.M 
Best Credit Methodology (2010). 
 
From the information in Table 4.1.1.1, it is assumed that there are 
common similarities among these rating agencies such as Best and 
Moody’s consideration of the regulatory aspect in their evaluation.  In 
addition, capital and financial performances are the main criteria for 
their assessments.  Best performs comprehensive assessments on 
the balance sheet strength, S&P looks at underwriting, investment 
and liquidity while Moody focuses on investment, profitability and 
liquidity.   
 
In this study, the selection of a rating agency is influenced by factors 
such as financial constraint, data availability, accessibility and 
research requirements.  Rating agencies database is costly and the 
access to the database needs to be purchased, which is on a yearly 
basis.  In addition, there are several packages to be chosen that give 
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different data accessibility to users.  All these options involve a 
significant cost that is beyond researcher’s financial capacity. The 
data analysis for this study requires both rating and financial data of 
UK insurers.  These data are available in the A.M Best Insurance 
Report Online – Non- US Database that can be purchased on a 
student’s concession basis.   
 
After weighing all available options against its cost, the A.M Best 
rating agency is selected for this study.  The decision to select the 
A.M Best database is also influenced by credentials as the oldest 
rating agency of insurance companies and its ability to offer the most 
comprehensive insurance rating coverage (Bouzouita and Young 
1998, Wang 2010, Eckles and Pottier 2011 and Kartasheva and Park 
2012).  One-year access to the database was purchased in 2011.  
The database provides rating data from 2003 to 2010 and financial 
data from 2006 to 2010.   
 
4.1.2 The Basic Properties of the Data 
Rating Data: A.M Best Financial Strength Ratings (FSR) 
A common practice in all rating agencies is to provide two different 
sorts of ratings that are the issue-specific credit ratings and issuer 
credit ratings (Trueck and Rachev 2009).  Issue-specific credit ratings 
are assessments of the creditworthiness of an obligor (the entity or 
firm being assessed) about a particular financial obligation, a specific 
class of financial obligations or a specific financial program.  On the 
other hand, issuer credit rating focuses on the obligor’s overall 
capacity to meet its financial commitments – or its fundamental 
creditworthiness.  This basic principle serves as the fundamental 
guidelines used by Best in setting their rating standards.  
 
Within Best’s insurance segment itself, there are many types of credit 
ratings assigned.  These include the financial strength rating (FSR), 
long-term issuer credit rating, short-term issuer credit rating, long-term 
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debt rating and short-term debt rating.  Basically, the FSR relates to 
issue-specific credit ratings and the others are linked to issuer credit 
ratings. Best’s FSR is the summary measures of insurers’ financial 
strength.  It reflects the overall insolvency risk measures and provides 
rating agency’s opinion of the insurer’s overall financial strength and 
ability to fulfil its policyholder obligations (Wang 2010 and Eckles and 
Pottier 2011).   
 
In this study, the analysis focuses on Best’s Financial Strength 
Ratings (FSR) which is exclusively assigned to insurance companies.  
Best’s FSR provides an independent opinion based on 
comprehensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations of insurers’ 
balance sheet strength, operating performance and business 
structure (A.M Best 2010). These ratings are assigned on company 
basis and not on specific policies, contracts or risks basis.  It is 
assigned based on third party’s audited financial data and any other 
relevant information pertaining to it.  The primary source of this 
information is acquired through company’s annual and quarterly (if 
available) financial statements.  In addition, valuable inputs are also 
attained from meetings with senior personnel and company 
management.  However, its reliability and accuracy are not verifiable 
by the agency.   
 
Rating Grades: Symbols and Explanations 
The FSR is an independent opinion of an insurer’s financial strength 
and their ability to fulfil its ongoing insurance policy and contract 
obligations.  On the other hand, Issuer Credit Ratings (ICR) and Debt 
Credit Ratings (DCR) are projected on corporate securities and any 
other insurance-related securitisations.  ICR refers to the assessment 
on an issuer/entity’s ability to meet its ongoing senior financial 
obligations while DCR evaluates the issuer/entity’s ability to fulfil 
ongoing financial obligations to security holders upon maturity.  ICR is 
applicable to all publicly-traded holding companies including all rated 
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insurance companies.   However, FSR is exclusively targeted on the 
financial strength of insurance companies.   
 
Based on this specification, the analysis in this study opted for the 
Best FSR which serves as an indicator of insurers’ financial strength 
and ability. FSR scales include 16 individual rating grades which are 
grouped into ten categories.  These categories are further clustered 
into two distinctive pools categorised as secure and vulnerable.  The 
grades and categories are illustrated in Table 4.1.. The most superior 
rating grade is denoted as “A++” which is assigned to insurers with 
superior financial performance.  On the other extreme, rating grade 
“D” is assigned to insurers with poor financial performance and 
susceptible to adverse changes and economic conditions.   Rating 
grades “E”, “F” and “S” reflect problems and issues related to financial 
performance which include regulatory intervention, liquidation and 
suspension. 
 
In addition, Table 4.1.2.2 depicts other relevant rating categories, 
modifiers and outlooks used by Best in assessing insurer’s financial 
strength.  These additional designations are introduced to provide 
more information about a rated entity or security.  The Not Rated (NR) 
categories are assigned to companies with conditions that could 
impede the rating analysis process. Some of the issues that make 
these companies disqualified for a Best Credit Rating are attributed to 
their limited financial information, small level of surplus, lack of 
sufficient operating experience or due to their dormant or run-off 
status.  As it is difficult for Best to develop an opinion on the 
company’s balance sheet and operating performance, these 
companies will be assigned a NR-status appropriated to their causes 
(e.g. NR-1 for companies with insufficient data). 
 
On the other extreme, Best designed specific rating categories 
applicable to short-term rating exercise.  The evaluation will be based 
on the entity’s or security’s financial ability to fulfill its short-term 
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obligations.  The categories ranged from “strongest” to “in default”, 
which reflect the current financial condition of an entity. 
 
Table 4.1.2.1 
Rating Grades and Categories Used in A. M. Best Financial Strength 
Ratings. 
 
A. M. Best Financial Strength Ratings: Scales 
Position Descriptor Definition Grade(s)/Symbol 
Secure Superior  Assigned to companies that have superior ability to 
meet their on-going insurance obligations 
A++  and A+ 
 Excellent Assigned to companies with excellent ability to 
meet their on-going insurance obligations 
A and A- 
 Good Assigned to companies with good ability to meet 
their on-going insurance obligations 
B++ and B+ 
Vulnerable Fair Fair ability to meet ongoing insurance obligations.  
Financial strength is vulnerable to adverse changes 
in underwriting and economic conditions 
B and B- 
 Marginal Marginal ability to meet ongoing insurance 
obligations and vulnerable to adverse changes in 
underwriting and economic conditions 
C++ and C+ 
 Weak Weak ability to meet ongoing insurance obligations 
and very vulnerable to adverse changes in 
underwriting and economic conditions 
C and C- 
 Poor Poor ability to meet ongoing insurance obligations 
and extremely vulnerable to adverse changes in 
underwriting and economic conditions 
D 
 Under 
Regulatory 
Supervision 
Assigned to companies (and subsidiaries/affiliates) 
placed under a significant form of regulatory 
supervision, control or restraint – including cease 
and desist orders conservatorship or rehabilitation, 
but not liquidation – that prevents the conduct of 
normal , ongoing insurance operations 
E 
 In 
Liquidation 
Assigned to companies placed in liquidation by a 
court of law or by a forced liquidation. 
F 
 Suspended Assigned to rated companies when sudden and 
significant events affect their balance sheet 
strength or operating performance and rating 
implications cannot be evaluated due to a lack of 
timely or adequate information. 
S 
Source: A. M. Best 2010. 
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Table 4.1.2.2 
Rating Categories, Rating Modifiers and Rating Outlooks Used by A.M Best 
A. M.Best Financial Strength Ratings: Scales 
Position Descriptor/Explanation Grade(s)/Symbol 
Not Rated (NR) Categories 
 Insufficient data NR-1 
 Insufficient size and/or operating experience NR-2 
 Rating procedure inapplicable NR-3 
 Company request NR-4 
 Not formally followed NR-5 
Short-term Ratings 
Strongest Assigned to entity with the strongest ability to repay short-
term obligations 
AMB-1+ 
Outstanding Assigned to entity with an outstanding ability to repay short-
term obligations 
AMB-1 
Satisfactory Assigned to entity with a satisfactory ability to repay short-
term obligations 
AMB-2 
Adequate Assigned to entity with an adequate ability to repay short-
term obligations 
AMB-3 
Speculative Assigned to entity with speculative credit characteristics and 
is vulnerable to adverse economic or other external changes 
which could affect its ability to meet financial commitments 
AMB-4 
In Default Assigned to entity with default on payment or when a 
bankruptcy petition or similar action has been filed. 
D 
Rating Modifiers 
Positive Indicates a reasonable likelihood of a rating upgrade  
Negative Indicates a reasonable likelihood of a rating downgrade   
Developing Indicates an uncertainty to the final rating outcome, but a 
reasonable likelihood of a rating change 
 
Under 
Review 
Indicates that rating may change in the near term, typically 
within six months 
“u” 
Public Data Indicates rating assigned to a company that chose not to  
participate in A.M Best ‘s interactive rating process 
“pd” 
Syndicate Indicates rating assigned to a Lloyd’s syndicate “s” 
Rating Outlooks 
Positive Favourable financial/market trends, good possibility of a 
rating upgrade 
+ 
Negative Unfavourable financial/market trends, good possibility of a 
rating downgrade 
- 
Stable Stable financial/market trends, low possibility of a rating 
change 
Stable 
Source: A. M. Best 2010. 
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In Table 4.1.2.2, Rating Modifiers are used as financial strength 
indicators in a shorter duration, typically for rating assessments within 
six months.  Under the Rating Modifier, a company can be assigned a 
status similar to the outlook; positive, negative or developing status.  
Positive and negative implications are associated with rating 
upgrades and downgrades while developing status indicates the 
uncertainty to the final rating outcome but with a definite likelihood of 
change.  In addition, any abrupt change or potential immediate 
change is signposted using “Under Review Modifier”, denoted as “u”.  
This modifier is assigned after a review has been done in order to 
determine the impact of company’s rating.   
 
Rating Outlooks are used as indicators of the potential future direction 
of the ratings.  It could be projected as positive, negative or stable 
outlook.  These outlooks are designed to project ratings over an 
intermediate period between the next 12 to 36 months.  Positive 
outlook is associated with a rating upgrade and negative outlook 
indicates the opposite.  A stable outlook is assigned to companies 
that have stable financial and market trends, with a low probability of 
rating change in the near future.  
 
On the other hand, similar grades, scales and rating evaluations are 
also being used by other credit rating agencies.  Error! Reference 
ource not found..1.2.3 illustrates the rating grades, outlooks and 
modifiers used by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.  From the table, it could 
be assumed that all rating agencies have a distinctive similar 
approach in assessing the financial strength on insurance companies.  
All agencies have exclusive rating grades to cater to insurers and this 
also includes specific rating modifiers and rating outlooks. 
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Table 4.1.2.3: Rating Grades Used by Other Rating Agencies  
Source: Author’s compilation based on S&P 2010, Moody’s 2010 and Fitch 
2010 
  
S&P IFSR Moody’s IFSR Fitch IFS 
Grade Definition Grade Definition Grade Definition 
AAA  Extremely strong financial 
security characteristics 
Aaa Exceptional financial 
security 
AAA Exceptionally stunning 
financial strength 
AA Very strong Aa Excellent AA Very strong 
A Strong A Good A Strong 
BBB Good Baa Adequate BBB Good 
BB Marginal Ba Questionable BB Moderately weak 
B Weak B Poor B Weak 
CCC Very weak Caa Very poor CCC Very weak 
CC Extremely weak Ca Extremely poor/in default CC Extremely weak 
R Under regulatory 
supervision 
C Extremely poor prospects 
of financial security 
C Distressed 
NR Not rated     
S&P IFSR – Short Term Moody’s IFSR – Short Term Fitch IFS – Short Term 
A-1 Strong ability to meet it 
financial commitments on 
short term policy obligations. 
P-1 Superior ability to fulfill short 
term claims and obligations 
F1 Strong capacity to fulfill 
shore term obligations 
A-2 Good ability P-2 Strong ability F2 Good capacity 
A-3 Adequate ability  P-3 Acceptable ability F3 Adequate capacity 
B Vulnerable with ongoing 
uncertainties 
NP Not Prime. Does not fall 
within any of the prime 
rating categories 
F4 Weak capacity 
C Currently vulnerable to 
nonpayment 
  C Very weak capacity 
R Under regulatory supervision     
Rating Modifiers Rating Modifiers Rating Modifiers 
+ Positive or negative symbol is 
attached to a rating to 
indicate the relative position 
of a credit within the rating 
category (only applicable to 
rating grades AA to CCC) 
1 Obligations rank in the 
higher end of generic rating 
category 
+ Positive or negative 
symbol is attached to a 
rating to indicate the 
relative position of a 
credit within the rating 
category (not applicable 
to AAA-rated or below B-
rated) 
- 2 Mid-range ranking - 
  3 Lower- range ranking   
Rating Outlooks Rating Outlooks Rating Outlooks 
+ A rating may be raised   + A possible upgrade  
- A rating may be lowered   - A possible downgrade 
Stable A rating is not likely to 
change 
  Evolving A possible 
upgrade/downgrade 
Dev. Developing. A rating may 
be raised or lowered 
  Stable Rating is likely to remain 
at current grade 
N.M Not  meaningful     
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Based on information provided in Table 4.1.2.1, Table 4.1.2.2 and 
Table 4.1.2.3, it could be justified that Best’s FSR provides the most 
rating grade variations relative to the other rating agencies.  There are 
16 rating grades under Best while the other agencies provide up to 10 
rating grades only.  Best’s FSR also has the added advantage by 
providing additional five options for the “Not Rated” (NR) categories. 
All rating agencies provide specification for their own short –term 
FSR, rating modifiers and rating outlooks.  However, Moody’s does 
not use rating outlooks in their assessment.   
 
Pottier and Sommer (1999) show that the determinants of the rating 
itself differ across rating agencies.  However, these differences do not 
signify the superiority of one rating agency to the others (Eckles and 
Halek 2012).  Despite all these variations (rating classifications and 
standards), there is a high congruence between the rating systems 
across these agencies (Trueck and Rachev 2009 and Hill et al 2010). 
 
4.2 LOCATION OF STUDY AND TIME HORIZON 
In 2013, the UK insurance industry generated approximately USD330 billion 
(Insurance Key Facts 2014) in premium income, making it the third largest 
insurance market in the world (after the United States and Japan) and the 
largest in Europe.  Its shares in the world’s insurance market accounted for 
7.10%, which was a 2.37% increase from the previous year (Sigma 
No.3/2014).  The industry is a key contributor to the UK economy and its tax 
take, which totaled up to £8.2 billion in the latest tax year (ABI 2013).  It 
controlled 13.4% of investment in the London stock market and contributed a 
significant amount of income derived from its overseas business, which 
accounted for one-fifth of the net premium income, a total of £54 billion (£41 
billion from long-term business and £13 billion from general business).  
 
The UK insurance industry is a vital component of the nation’s financial 
services industry.  It is prudently regulated and is subject to the dual-
regulatory approach.  The aims of this prudent regulation are to ensure that 
policyholders are protected in all circumstances and to monitor the financial 
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performance and stability of these financial service providers.  Despite all 
these measures, the UK insurance industry is still exposed and affected 
during the most recent financial crisis (Boyle 2013).  Evidence of the impact 
has been discussed in Chapter 2 (refer to Figure 2.2.1.2).   The impacts are 
measured using ID and IP, where there is a noticeable decline during the 
financial crisis periods (2007 -2009). 
 
Thus, this study attempts to investigate the extent of the financial crisis 
impact on the financial performance of UK insurers.  A comparative analysis 
is also included in the study.  It compares the overall financial performance 
before and after the financial crisis.  In order to achieve this purpose, the 
study will use data between 2006 and 2010 which are available and 
accessible from the Best database. This 5-year time horizon is deemed 
appropriate in order to reflect the financial performance of insurers before 
(leading to) the financial crisis and the consequences.  The selected 
financial crisis breakpoint is justified in Section 4.4. 
 
4.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
This is an UK-based study focusing on insurance companies that are 
licensed to transact business in the UK.  To date, there are more than 900 
insurers operating in the UK (ABI 2013).  However, to obtain a rating is a 
voluntary exercise which involves significant costs (Pottier and Sommer 
1999).  Thus, not all insurers are motivated to obtain ratings.  Insurer’s 
financial strength rating could be seen as a signal for their financial strength. 
Good rating grades are associated with good financial performance and 
weak rating grades are linked with problems or distress in the financial 
performance.   
 
The first part of the analyses aims to predict the insurer’s rating transition 
matrices, specifically useful in identifying rating migration at a certain period, 
the heterogeneity of rating migration and the volatility level of the migration.  
The analysis is extended by incorporating a regression model that is used to 
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determine the financial characteristics that influence insurer’s rating.  For this 
part, a sample set is acquired from the A.M Best database.   
 
The first sample contains the FSR of UK insurers over an eight year period 
starting from 2003 to 2010.  This sample is obtained after screening the data 
available for this entire period.  The data are screened in several stages.  
Firstly, the data are derived from unconsolidated financial statements.  
Secondly, captive insurance, branches of insurance firms, holding 
companies and reinsurance companies are omitted from the sample.  Then, 
insurers who do not have complete data as required for the analysis are also 
excluded.  After the initial screening process, there are 73 insurers with the 
most complete data over the time frame.  Out of these 73 insurers, 16 are 
Lloyds Syndicates which are then excluded from the sample.  The main 
reason of this omission is due to the characteristics of the Lloyds Syndicate 
itself.  Instead of being real companies, these syndicates are only groups of 
insurance traders operating under the name of Lloyds.  The final sample 
consists of 57 insurers operating in the UK. 
 
The second part of the analyses attempts to evaluate the key determinants 
that influence the rating performance.  The same sample set as in the 
ratings analysis will be used.   However, for the purpose of the regression 
analysis, the study will utilize the financial data for these 57 insurers instead 
of the rating data as in the first part.  The selection criterion is based on 
insurers with the most complete and available data over a five-year period 
starting from 2006 to 2010.  Even so, the number of insurers that meet this 
criterion is restricted, thus this study is forced to adopt an alternative 
approach in order to expand the sample size.  Hence, the second data set 
adopts an unbalanced panel data approach. This is similar to a previous 
study by Doumpos et al (2012) which uses unbalanced panel data set for the 
period of 2005 to 2009.  However, their research focuses on macroeconomic 
variables to measure the financial performance of general insurers.     
 
The original sample which consists of 57 insurers was further reduced to 49 
insurers.  This reduction is mainly due to limited data availability, where at 
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the time of data compilation, the financial data for the year 2010 were mostly 
not available.  Hence, the sample size is reduced and the time horizon 
restricted to a four-year horizon, i.e. from 2006 to 2009.  The panel data 
provided 190 observations over the four-year period.   This is almost similar 
to the research conducted by Adams and Buckle (2003) on the Bermuda 
insurance market, which included 47 insurers/reinsurers over a five year 
period, i.e. 1993 to 1997. 
 
As has been mentioned before, rating services can be quite costly and the 
rating process is a non-compulsory requirement to insurers.  Thus, this could 
be a significant reason for the missing and unavailable data within the 
database, limiting the sample size and observations that could be 
undertaken. This could potentially lead to a skewed or biased sample.  
 
4.3.1 Sample selection bias 
The major concern with using datasets like A.M Best is the possibility 
of biases being introduced in the empirical analysis due to the non-
random selection of samples (Heckman 1979). Individual units under 
observation are likely to get ‘self-selected’ leading to a bias in the 
empirical investigation.   
 
The nature of the sample relies heavily on the nature of the A.M Best 
database. The method of sampling used in this study may 
systematically exclude a section of the population whose effect on the 
estimates and the associated inferences are quite different. In other 
words, the estimate is a function of a biased selected sample and is 
not a randomly drawn sample from the population.  Additionally, 
analysts will be more likely to use samples like a panel of individual 
units or firms which data are available for a certain length of time. 
This is a customary practice to ensure the stability of the individuals 
under investigation.  However, they may systematically omit certain 
sections of the population and thus lead to biased estimates for the 
population as a whole.  
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Nevertheless, following Heckman (1979), it can be formally shown 
that non-randomly selected samples lead to biased estimates and this 
can be treated as the problem of omitted variables.  
 
4.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FINANCIAL CRISIS BREAKPOINT 
Another important element of the analysis is the comparative analysis 
between two distinctive periods, which are the pre-financial and post-
financial crisis periods. Thus, a specific breakpoint between these two 
periods needs to be justified clearly.  We specify a five-year time frame, 
starting from 2006 to 2010 in this study.  This specification depends heavily 
on the availability of data.  In our defense, these five-year periods are able to 
reflect the changes leading to the crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis.  
Detailed discussion on the financial crisis has been discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The crucial point of the UK financial crisis or credit crunch which started in 
mid-2007 was discussed by many economists and scholars’ discussions 
(Barrell and Davis 2008, Mizen 2008, Martin and Milas 2009, Busch 2010, 
Erkens et. al 2010,  Vriesendrop and Gramatikov 2010 and Evans 2011).  In 
these papers, the onset of the financial crisis is pinpointed to mid-2007, July 
2007 or the summer of 2007.  Even though the financial crisis phenomena 
are not an uncommon event, the crisis during this period (2007 to 2010) is 
the largest and the worst since the Great Depression in 1929 – 1933 (Barrell 
and Davis 2008).  Busch (2010) claims that the UK was exposed to a severe 
economic downturn in mid-2007 and was named one of the hardest hit 
countries in the western world with a projected budget deficit of 12.6% in 
2008.   
 
In a survey conducted by Vriesendrop and Gramatikov (2010), the dataset is 
divided into two periods, namely the “before” financial crisis and “after” 
financial crisis periods.  In their survey, all data from 2004 to 2007 are 
pooled into the “before” crisis period and all data after year 2007 pooled into 
the “after” crisis period. Using a similar approach, O’Neill and Xiao (2012) 
evaluate the performance of 20 financial practices using data collected from 
2005 to 2010.  The sample in their study is divided in to two pools: the pre-
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crisis pool (data from 01/01/2005 to 31/12/2007) and the post-crisis pool 
(data from 01/01/2008 to 31/12/2010).  The crisis periods specifically adhere 
to the benchmark issued by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER 2008) which specifies that the crisis began in December 2007. 
 
Accordingly, for the comparative analysis, the original dataset in this study is 
divided into two distinct categories, which are the pre-financial crisis (Pre-
FC) and post-financial crisis (Post-FC) periods.  It is decided that data up to 
the year 2007 (2006 and 2007) go into the pre-FC group and data for the 
year 2008 to 2010 are assigned to the post-FC group.  The decision to 
include data for year 2007 into the estimation is supported by Baluch et al 
(2009), Elliott (2011) and Shah (2013).  
 
Baluch et al (2009) study the effect of financial crisis on the UK insurance 
market.   They explain that during the emerging financial crisis which started 
in mid-2007, insurance stocks have fallen as rapidly as banking stocks.  
However, the impact of the decline is more apparent in the late 2008.   Elliott 
(2011) and Shah (2013) claim that due to the time lag, the effect of the 
financial crisis will only be visible in 2008.  McKinnis (2002) acknowledges 
that the presences of time lag effects are common in panel data researches 
that deal with financial, economic, demographic and government policy 
variables.  In this instance, the study will be using financial indicators derived 
from the financial statements.  
 
Time lag effects could be defined as the interval between the onset of the 
financial crisis (the cause) and the impact of the crisis (the effect). 
Alternatively, it could be described as the delay between the time of an 
exposure onset, such as the onset of the financial crisis, and the subsequent 
outcome, such as the impact of the crisis on the financial institution (Gail 
2005).  Time lag effect is vital in the effectiveness of economic policy 
(Pettinger 2008).  He illustrated that an interest rate cuts can take up to 18 
months to have its full effect.  In other words, it takes more than one year 
before any changes in the economy start to be visible.  He also claims that 
the delay between an economic action and its consequences is inevitable.   
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Thus, it could be concluded that the impact of the financial crisis which 
breaks out in mid-2007 can only be assessed at a much later date, which 
could take up to 18 months after its onset. Subsequently, for the purpose of 
this study, the crisis year date or the breakpoint for the two groups is fixed at 
the end of 2007.  This study will adopt a similar approach used by 
Vriesendrop and Gramatikov (2010) and O’Neill and Xiao (2012), which is to 
include the financial data for year 2007 into the pre-crisis pool.  
 
4.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE RATING ANALYSIS 
 
4.5.1 Data and Sampling 
The rating analysis employs secondary data sources, which are rating 
data obtained from the A.M. Best Insurance Report Online – Non-US 
Database.  The sample consists of 57 insurers.  The sample selection 
is hindered by limited data availability.  One-year access to the 
database (2010 – 2011) is purchased, which provides rating data 
from 2003 to 2011.  However, data for 2011 are mostly incomplete 
and unavailable, thus the sample size is restricted to include all 
available data from 2003 to 2010.   
 
There are two possible justifications for data limitation and 
unavailability.  First of all, rating assessment is a voluntary practice 
and second of all, rating assessment by external rating agencies is 
expensive.  A. M Best rating services are charged between US$5,000 
to US$500,000.  Thus, an insurer might not be motivated to apply for 
rating assessment if their company is having financial issues.  
Otherwise, even if an insurer is keen to apply for rating assessment, 
the rating fee might be unaffordable.   
 
4.5.2 Theoretical Foundation 
The Markov model is a stochastic model that describes a sequence of 
possible events in which the possibility of each event depends on the 
present event.  The first known model is introduced by Singer and 
Spilerman (1976).  It provides a convenient framework for analyzing 
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the structural mechanisms that underline social change and for 
extrapolating shifts in the state distribution of a population.  It is most 
commonly used in the study of mobility (Singer and Spilerman 1976 
and Shorrocks 1978) but could also be applied to diverse substantial 
areas.  To date, the model has been used in many credit risks and 
pricing applications, focusing on the credit rating dynamics of firms 
(Berd 2005 and Frydman and Schuermann 2008).  In its simplest 
form, Markov model is also known as the Markov chain-based model. 
 
A Markov chain is a random process with a Markov property.  The 
chain refers to a process which has a discrete (finite or countable) 
state space. It models the state of a system with a random variable 
that changes over time, which does not have any memory. This 
becomes the main element in the Markov property which is also 
known as ergodicity.   
 
The term “ergodicity” is derived from the word “ergodic” which refers 
to a dynamic system which has the same behavior over time as 
averaged over space.  This dynamic system has no memory, and the 
future of the process depends on the present but is independent of 
the past (Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull 1997).  In terms of random 
variables, the evolution of a system can be forecast if the present 
state is known without having to rely on previous or historical states. 
 
The Markov model is useful in decision-making problems where risk is 
continuous over time.  It is also useful for cases where the timing of 
events is vital and for recurring important events (Sonnenberg and 
Beck 1993).  It is assumed that all events are represented as 
transitions over time from one state to another, e.g. from A to B, from 
good to bad, etc.  These transitions can be reflected using matrix 
algebra, cohort (discrete) estimations, transition matrices or as Monte 
Carlo simulation (McNulty and Levin 2000).   
 
85 
 
In this instance, the study adopts the cohort (discrete) estimation 
approach and this will be employed for estimating rating transition 
matrices (RTM).  Although this method ignores the within-year 
transitions which may underestimate low-grade default intensities and 
overestimate high-grade ones, this method provides an overview of 
the evolution of the rating movements at a specific point of time 
(Kavvathas 2001). In addition, the cohort method has been used by 
many credit risk managers in order to predict future changes in their 
ratings (Xing et al 2012). 
 
4.5.3 The Basic Properties of, and Estimation of Rating 
Transition Matrices (RTM) 
4.5.3.1 The Basic Elements of RTM 
RTM comprises of two primary elements, namely the choice of 
classification variables and the time horizon measurement 
(Deng et. al 2004).  The first element refers to the criteria used 
to classify financial risk or credit risk of obligors.  One of the 
criteria could be a single financial variable such as return on 
equity, which is a proxy to measure profitability.  It could also 
be the composite index taken from many financial factors, such 
as credit scores.  
 
The second element relates to the time horizon measurement 
or the length of time over which to construct one transition 
matrix (Barry et. al 2002).  They found that ratings are more 
stable or have less extreme changes in shorter time horizon. 
However, it is likely to be affected by “noise” which could be 
eliminated in the long term (Bangia et. al 2002).  Alternatively, 
longer time horizon will result in greater ratings’ volatility, which 
is due to diverse business operating conditions.  Customary 
practice suggests that a common time horizon is one-year 
(Barry et. al 2002).  It could be an “absolute’ one-year 
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measurement or a “pseudo” one-year, which is actually an 
average of several years’ data into a single measurement. 
 
In this study, the criteria used to measure the financial strength 
of insurers will be the rating grades assigned by A.M Best 
rating agency to the insurers.  This rating agency is selected 
based on its credentials as one of the oldest rating agencies 
which specialize as rating insurance companies worldwide 
(A.M Best 2010).  It provides the most comprehensive 
insurance rating coverage as compared to other rating 
agencies, covering 95% of the US insurance market 
(Kartasheva and Park 2012).  Its financial strength ratings 
evaluate obligors’ (insurers) ability to fulfill their obligations to 
policyholders.  These ratings are mostly used by insurance 
brokers and included in various insurance contracts.  Thus, 
rating changes which are reflected in A.M Best reports have a 
direct effect on the market perception with regard to the 
financial strength of an insurer. 
 
Nonetheless, transition matrices could be estimated for any 
desired transition horizon (Bangia et al 2002 and Hadad et al 
2009) It is most common to use annual data and 5-yearly data 
for analysis.  According to Kryzanowski and Menard (2001), 
the time horizon of the analysis does influence the probability 
of a bond to remain at its initial rating.  The longer the time 
horizon, the lesser the possibility of remaining unchanged. 
 
4.5.3.2 The Properties of RTM 
A Markov chain is a stochastic process based on a sequence 
of random variables X0, X1, X2, ..., Xn exhibiting the Markov 
property.  There are two key features in a Markov chain.  
Firstly, the outcome of each experiment is one of a set of 
discrete states and secondly, the outcome of an experiment 
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depends only on the present state, and not on any past states.  
Markov chains are useful in analysing trends and predicting 
future outcomes.   
 
A general definition could be written as follows: 
P(𝑋𝑛+1|𝑋0, … , 𝑋𝑛 = P  (𝑋𝑛+1|𝑋𝑛)              (1) 
 
Where X0, X1, X2, ..., Xn are the sequence of random variables.  
In this study, Xn denotes the rating grades included in the 
analysis.  These rating grades are assigned to insurance 
companies by independent rating agency to reflect the financial 
performance of the insurer.  The rating grades use a 
combination of alphabetical letters, numbers and mathematical 
operators (+ and -) as indicators of insurers’ financial strength 
and ability.  Altogether, there are eight rating grades evaluated 
in this study – A++, A+, A, A-, B++, B+, B and NR5.  As shown 
in Table 4.1.2.1 (page 68), grade A++ is the most superior 
rating grade under the A.M Best rating evaluation.  On the 
other hand, grade B signifies vulnerable position and NR5 is 
categorised in a different rating category, the Not Rated 
category (Table 4.1.2.2). 
 
Based on Crossman et al (2009), a discrete time and discrete 
state space stochastic process is Markovian if and only if the 
conditional probabilities do not depend on (X0, . . . , Xn) in full, 
but only on the most recent state of Xn.  The probability of 
going to any next state at time n + 1 depends only on the state at 
time n. The system is said to be memoryless. 
 
The possible values of Xn form a countable set S, which is 
called the state space of the chain. Following the approach of 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), a discrete time or time-
homogeneous Markov chain has a finite state space S = {1, 2, 
…, k}.  In this study, the state space S represents the different 
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rating grades. A state space of 1 denotes the best rating grade 
and a state space k represents the default case or the weakest 
rating grade.  In this study, which uses A.M Best ratings, the 
state space 1 represents the highest A++ rating grade and the 
state space k denotes the NR state (insures with a No Rating 
category). 
 
The probability of the rating transition process moving from 
state i to state j is denoted by Pij.  A matrix to depict this Pij is 
known as the transition matrix of the Markov chain.  A Markov 
transition probability model can precisely illustrate the evolution 
of these credit ratings.  The model begins with a set of discrete 
quality credits ranges (states/ rating categories), into which all 
observations (e.g. firms or institutions) can be classified.   
 
Let us presume that there is K discrete categories into which 
all observations can be ordered.  This could be used to define 
a transition matrix, Pij, as a matrix of probabilities depicting the 
likelihood of credit quality remaining unchanged or migrating to 
any of the other K-1 categories over a given time horizon.  In 
this instance, each element of the matrix, Pij, shows the 
probability of credit quality being equal to i in period t-1 and 
credit quality equal to j in period t.  This discrete time, time-
homogeneous finite state space Markov chain is specified by a 
K x K transition matrix, Pij as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 
[
 
 
 
 
𝑝11 𝑝12 … 𝑝1𝐾
𝑝21 𝑝22 … 𝑝2𝐾
⋮ ⋮ … ⋮
𝑝𝐾−1,1 𝑝𝐾−1,2 … 𝑝𝐾−1,𝐾
0 0 … 1 ]
 
 
 
 
                                (2) 
 
Based on Equation (2), Pij denotes the transition probability of 
moving from state i at time t-1 to state j at time t.  The term 
homogeneous is often omitted when referring to “Markov 
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Chains”.  Furthermore, the basic properties for every Markov 
chain transition matrix are as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 0 for all  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘},                            (3) 
and 
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 = 1 for all  𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}              (4) 
 
where Pi,j refers to the transition probability of moving from 
state i to state j.  Equation (3) states that transition probabilities 
must always be a non-negative value, while Equation (4) 
shows that all entries on one line are equal to 1 (Mѳller 2006). 
 
Alternatively, Markov chains could also be described 
graphically, where the rows and columns are labeled by the 
probabilities of going from one state to the other states.  The 
construction of the transition matrices is explained as follows.  
Conditional upon a given rating grade at time t (rows), the 
transition (or migration) matrix P is a description of the 
probabilities of being in any of the various grades at time 
t+1(columns).   
 
There are eight rating grades evaluated in this study.  The 
rating grades are A++,A+, A, A-, B++, B+, B, and NR5.  Rating 
grade A++ is the most superior, which is followed by the rest.  
Rating grade NR5 is assigned to firms that are not formally 
evaluated.  All these rating grades allow the estimation of 8 * 8 
= 64 unique elements of matrix P; which is a conceptual 
interpretation as illustrated in Figure 4.5.3.2.1. 
 
Note that the highlighted areas (along the diagonal lines) 
represent the areas which have no transition.  In other words, 
any value that falls within the highlighted areas refers to the 
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probability of not having a rating change or maintaining the 
current rating grades.  
 
Figure 4.5.3.2.1 
Basic Structure of the Transition Matrix 
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Source: Author’s compilation based on own dataset with reference to 
Bangia et al (2002). 
 
4.5.4 Estimation Methods and Models 
4.5.4.1   Rating Quality (Non-Markov Approach) 
Scholars have been discussing the non-Markov approach to 
reflect rating dynamics (Lando and Skodeberd 2002, Hamilton 
and Cantor 2004, Dang and Partington 2005, Figlewski et al 
2006, Hadad et al 2009 and Wang and Carson 2014).  They 
present an alternative to the Markov model, by proposing that 
the direction of prior rating transition could influence future 
transition probabilities.  Rating quality is an indicator that could 
be utilised to strengthen the rating transition results (Hadad et. 
al. 2009).  They analyse rating activity and rating drift in order 
to support the non-Markovian assumption that the rating 
momentum does exist and rating transitions are influenced by 
both past and current events.  
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Rating activity and rating drift are good indicators for rating 
quality (Carty and Fons 1994).  In addition, analysts should 
also examine the annual percentage of insurers affected by 
letter rating changes.  Measurements of rating activity and 
rating drift are explained as follows: 
 
Rating Activity (RA) 
RA is one of the most important indicators in evaluating the 
quality trend of corporate ratings (Hadad et al, 2009).  The 
purpose of RA is two-fold: it enables analysts to capture the 
effects of multiple rating changes for a single issuer within a 
given year and the relative size of rating changes.  It also 
serves to evaluate the pace of rating change, based on units of 
letter ratings changed per issuer.  RA can be measured by 
calculating the sum of all upgraded and downgraded letter 
rating changes divided by the number of issuer outstanding at 
the beginning of the given year (Carty and Fons 1994). The 
mathematical expression to define RA is as follows: 
 
𝑅𝐴 =
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠+𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
           (5) 
 
Rating Drift (RD) 
RD can be utilized to estimate the increase or decrease in 
aggregate credit quality.  It summarises the overall increase or 
decrease in the credit quality of the rated sample as a 
percentage of one letter grade.  According to Lando and 
Skodeberg (2002), RD is the dependency on previous ratings 
and can be characterised as a non-Markovian behavior. It is 
computed by aggregating the number of upgrades less the 
number of downgrades. The difference is divided by the 
number of issuers operating at the beginning of the given year 
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(Carty and Fons 1994).  RD can be computed as in equation 
below: 
 
𝑅𝐷 =
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠−𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
           (6) 
 
A positive RD indicates that the number of upgrades has 
surpassed the downgrades, while a negative RD indicates that 
the number of downgrades has surpassed the upgrades 
(Hadad et a 2009).  In this instance, a positive upgrade reflects 
an improvement in the rating quality and a negative upgrade 
reflects a decline in the credit quality.  Thus, RD reflects rating 
improvement or decline over a particular period of time. 
 
RA and RD analyses should be examined together with the 
annual percentage of issuers affected by letter rating. This 
additional test is an important indicator to reflect the overall 
trends of credit quality. 
 
4.5.4.2   Rating Transition Matrices (Markov Approach) 
To the best of author’s knowledge, there has been little 
discussion about the application of rating transition matrices 
(RTM) to evaluate insurers’ rating performance.  To date, 
previous researches under this theme are conducted for the 
benefits of the rating agency.  The most prominent studies are 
conducted by Pottier and Sommer (1999) and Gaver and 
Pottier (2005), which concentrate on firm-specific factors.  A 
recent study by Wang (2010) focuses on the economic and 
industry cycle impacts on rating transitions. 
 
RTM reflects the credit quality of a company by looking at the 
rating changes.  The quality in question is either improving or 
deteriorating, reflected by the upgrading and downgrading of 
the letter rating obtained by a company (Hadad et al, 2009). 
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RTM is also used to explain the migration of creditor quality, as 
measured by proxies such as bond ratings (Jones 2005).  
Following this approach, this study uses RTM to explain the 
migration effect of insurers’ quality, with the proxies being 
insurers’ financial strength ratings (FSR).   
 
The underlying principle in this estimation is as follows: given 
that there are Ni firms (obligors) in a given rating category i at 
the beginning of the year and that out of this population, Nij 
have migrated to the category j, then the one year transition 
rate is estimated as: 
 
PijΔ= 
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖
 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ,                               (7) 
 
where Ni is the number of obligors in the rating grade i at the 
beginning of each time period and Nij is the number of rating 
transitions from the rating grade i to rating grade j that are 
observed during the time period.  PijΔ reflects the probability 
estimate of transition from rating grade i to grade j over a 
specific time period.  An important consequence of this is that if 
a transition from i to j does not occur in a given period, then the 
estimate of the corresponding rate is equal to 0.   
 
In this study, the RTM will adopt the cohort method.  It is 
assumed that rating transitions are Markovian, i.e. that rating 
transitions are ergodic and have no memory and that transition 
probabilities are time-homogeneous.  Thus, it is possible to 
compute transition matrices for arbitrary time periods.  The 
cohort method will also allow for a direct estimation of a one-
yearly transition matrix which will be shown in the analysis.   
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Even though the cohort method has some limitations, it has 
been widely used in many credit risk and pricing applications in 
the literature.  It has also been accepted as the basic, 
convenient and simple estimation method (Lando and 
SkØdeberg 2002, Frydman and Schuermann 2008 and 
Engelmann and Ermakov 2011).  We will also follow this 
conventional approach employed in the literature. In addition, 
the selection of the cohort method also arises due to the 
restricted access to data.  The A.M Best database which has 
been purchased for this research only publishes yearly rating 
information and we have no access to real-time rating data 
changes.   
 
In this study, the rating transition matrices will be estimated as: 
i. Three-year transition matrix (2008 – 2010) 
ii. Five-year transition matrix (2006 – 2010) 
iii. Eight- year transition matrix (2003 – 2010) 
 
The study will first attempt to estimate the total sample and 
then it will estimate the matrices according to the sub-sample.  
The sample will be divided into three sub-samples, according 
to the type of insurers.   
 
In the comparative analysis, the sample will be clustered into 
two distinguished groups based on the specified crisis 
breakpoint periods. The comparative analysis uses five-year 
data, from 2006 to 2010. The breakpoint is specified at year 
“2007” thus, data from 2006 to 2007 will be grouped under the 
pre-financial crisis (Pre-FC) period.  Data from 2008 to 2010 
will be grouped under the post-financial crisis (Post-FC) period.  
It will also attempt total sample estimation and sub-sample 
estimation, according to the type of insurers. 
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4.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS 
 
4.6.1 Data and Sampling 
The regression analysis employs secondary data sources, which are 
financial statement data obtained from the A.M. Best Insurance 
Report Online – Non-US Database.  This analysis is an extension of 
the rating analysis, thus we use the same sample set as is in the 
rating transition analysis.  The original sample consists of 57 insurers.  
However, the sample size is reduced to 49 insurers.  The reduction is 
primarily due to limited data availability where at the time of the data 
compilation, financial data for the year 2010 were mostly not 
available. Thus, the final sample in this analysis includes 49 UK 
insurance companies which cover the period of 2006 – 2009.   Table 
4.6.1.1 summarises the sample selection according to type of 
insurance companies. 
 
Similar to the rating analysis, the sample size for the regression 
analysis is restricted due to lack of data availability.  This issue has 
been acknowledged in previous studies (Hadad et al 2009, Ismail 
2013 and Burca and Batrinca 2014).  Hence, the unbalanced panel 
data approach is adopted in order to expand the sample size. 
 
Table 4.6.1.1 
Summary of Insurers Included in the Sample According to Business 
Types 
Business Type 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total  
(Obs.)  
General insurer 39 39 39 35 152 
Life insurer 7 7 7 5 26 
Composite 
insurer 
3 3 3 3 12 
Total (Insurers) 49 49 49 43 190 
Source: Author’s computation. 
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Panel data or longitudinal data consist of two-dimensional 
observations, which are the time-series dimension and cross-
sectional dimension (Hsiao 2005).  Repeated observations over time 
are available for the same units of observation or individuals.  The 
time-series dimension (T) is denoted as t and the cross-sectional 
dimension (N) denoted by i. By using panel data, we can get better 
estimations and we will be able to test for more sophisticated 
behavioural models, with less restricted assumptions (Baltagi 2013). 
 
Theoretically, there are two types of panel data that can be used in a 
study.  These are balanced panel data and unbalanced panel data.  A 
panel is said to be balanced if there is an observation for every unit of 
observation, for every time period.  A panel is unbalanced if some 
observations are missing (Dougherty 2011).  There are pros and cons 
of using any one of the data set.  If one is using an unbalanced panel, 
one needs to acknowledge the possibility that the causes of missing 
observations are endogeneous to the model.  Similarly, if a balanced 
panel has been created artificially by eliminating all units of 
observations with missing observations, the data set may not be 
representative of its population. 
 
Based on the sample in Table 4.6.1.1, the time-series dimension 
refers to the specific years included in the observation, which starts 
from 2006 and ends at 2009.  Thus, T is equal to four.  The cross-
sectional dimension (N) refers to the number of companies included 
in the data, which are 49 companies.  Based on the unbalanced panel 
data approach, researcher is able to expand the sample size, which 
includes 190 observations over the four-year period. 
 
4.6.2 Choice of Dependent Variable (DV) and its Measurement 
Following earlier studies (Adams et al 2003, Gaver and Pottier 2005, 
Eckles and Pottier 2011 and Kartasheva and Park 2012). This study 
relies on one commonly used measure of FSR performance, which is 
the rating grades (RATING) assigned by Best to the insurers over the 
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four-year period.  Similar to bond ratings, insurer FSR is inherently 
ordered (Pottier and Sommer1999).  The DV is the numerical 
conversion of the Best FSR from A++ to D.  This conversion results in 
an ordinal DV.  Becker and Kennedy (1992) and Katchova (2013) 
provide examples of ordinal DV, which include credit ratings, student 
grades and rating systems.  Rating conversion has been used 
extensively in previous work, several of which are Morgan (2002) and 
Gu et al (2014). 
 
In this study, rating grades are combined following the verbal 
descriptions provided by Best.  Each rating grade is assigned an 
ordered numerical value accordingly, in a descending order.  A higher 
value signifies a higher rating.  Table 4.6.2.1 illustrates the rating 
distribution for the sample under observation. 
 
Table 4.6.2.1 
Ratings Distribution for 190 Observations, 2006-2009 
Rating Description Numeric  
value 
Number of 
observations 
A++ Superior 5 18 
A+ Superior 4 46 
A Excellent 3 63 
A- Excellent 2 46 
B++ Very Good 1 6 
B and below Financially Vulnerable 0 11 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Based on the number of observations provided in Table 4.6.2.1, the 
sample shows a tendency for higher rating grades, between A++ and 
B++.  There are only 11 observations under the financially vulnerable 
category (B and below).  Following the verbal descriptions as in Best, 
A++ and A+ are grouped together under the “Superior” category, 
while A and A- are pooled into the “Excellent” category.  However, the 
researcher made several adjustments to the categories. The 
researcher categorises A++, A+, A and A- into their respective 
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category so that it can depict the actual rating performance of the 
sample. 
 
4.6.3 Choice of Explanatory Variables and Their Measurements 
The choice of explanatory variables is based on their theoretical 
relationship with the dependent variable.  This study accounts for 
firm-specific determinants that affect the financial strength rating 
performance of UK insurance companies. These explanatory 
(independent) variables, their measurement and their expected 
relationship to FSR are summarised in Table 4.6.3.1.  Altogether, 
there are seven explanatory variables to be tested, six are financial 
variables and the other is a qualitative variables.   
 
Table 4.6.3.1 
Choice of Explanatory Variables (IV), Measurements and Expected Relation 
to FSR 
 Variable(s) Measurement / Sources Expected Sign 
1. Leverage 
(LEV) 
LEV is measured as the ratio of accumulated 
reserve to its total assets. 
 
Adams et al (2003), Van Gestel et al (2007) 
and Burca and Batrinca (2014) 
- 
2. Profitabilty 
(PROFIT) 
PROFIT is measured as the ratio of net 
underwriting expenses and losses to its net 
premium earned. 
 
Kashish and Kashram (19980 and Gaver and 
Pottier (2005) 
 
+ 
3. Liquidity 
(LIQUID) 
LIQUID is measured as the ratio of current 
assets to its current liabilities. 
 
Shiu (2004), Almajali (2012) and Omondi and 
Muturi (2013) 
+ 
4. Company  
Size 
(LNSIZE) 
SIZE is measured as the natural log of gross 
premium written. 
 
Van Gestel et al (2007), Ahmed (2011) and 
Charumathi (2012) 
+ 
5. Reinsurance 
(REINS) 
REINS is measured as the ratio of annual 
reinsurance ceded to its net premium written. 
 
Wallace et al (1993), Ehrlich et al (2010) and 
Kuschel et al (2011) 
 
 
+ 
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 Variable(s) Measurement / Sources Expected Sign 
6. Growth 
(GROWTH) 
GROWTH is measured by looking at the 
absolute change in the annual reported surplus. 
 
Adams et al (2003), Epermanis and Harrington 
(2006), Eling and Schmidt (2008) and Cole et al 
(2011) 
 
+ 
 
7. Business 
Type 
(TYPE) 
This is a qualitative variable. 
TYPE is measured by using dummy variables: 
0 = general (non-life) insurer 
1 = life insurer 
 
Downs and Sommer (1997), Adams et al (2003) 
and Cole et al (2011) 
+/- 
No definite 
association 
 
8. Organisation
al Form 
(FORM) 
This is a qualitative variable. 
FORM is measured by using dummy variables: 
0 = stock insurer  
1 = mutual insurer 
 
Pottier and Sommer (1997), Van Gestel et al 
(2007) and Kartasheva and Park (2012) 
+/- 
No definite 
association 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on earlier studies. 
 
4.6.4 Research Hypotheses 
This study tests the following hypotheses, which were constructed 
based on prior empirical literature.  In addition, the hypotheses are 
formulated based on the connections between the dependent variable 
and explanatory variables.  The study attempts to provide answers to 
the following hypotheses: 
 
All else being equal: 
H1:  Insurers with lower leverages will have a higher probability of 
obtaining a higher rating grade. 
H2: Insurers with higher profits will have higher probability of 
obtaining a higher rating grade. 
H3:  Insurers with higher liquidity will have higher probability of 
obtaining a higher rating grade. 
H4:  Larger insurers will have higher probability of obtaining a 
higher rating grade. 
H5:  Insurers with higher amount of reinsurance held will have a 
higher probability of obtaining higher rating grade. 
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H6:  Insurers with greater growth in annual surplus will have a 
higher probability of obtaining higher rating grade. 
 H7:  General insurers (non-life) are more likely to be assigned a 
higher rating grade than life insurers 
 H8: Stock insurers are more likely to be assigned a higher rating 
grade than mutual insurers. 
 
4.6.5 Research Model 
The dependent variables (DV), explanatory variables (IV) and 
hypotheses lead to the construction of a research model as illustrated 
in Diagram 4.6.5.1. 
 
Diagram 4.6.5.1 
Research Model 
 
 
 
 
  
Determinants of Financial Strength Rating (FSR) Performance of  
UK Insurance Companies 
Leverage 
Profitability 
Liquidity 
Company Size 
Rating (FSR) 
Business Type 
Reinsurance 
Growth 
Organisational 
Form 
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4.6.6 Estimation Method and Model 
The regression analysis is employed in order to analyse the key 
financial determinants associated with Best’s ratings changes.  It 
attempts to identify which among the financial determinants have the 
most influence on financial strength ratings, as reflected in the 
transition analysis.   
 
A suitable regression model is developed to evaluate the financial 
determinants associated with the financial strength rating.  It attempts 
to highlight the important determinants that influence the rating 
grades.  Gaver and Pottier (2005) use a similar approach by 
conducting a one-year ordered probit regression model (OPM) for 80 
US-based insurance companies.  They find that there is a positive 
slope coefficient where insurers with higher independent variable (IV) 
values will be more likely to have higher rating grades and lower 
insolvency risk.  However, the study is conducted based on a one-
year data, which is a very short-term period with few observations. 
 
This study employs the ordered probit regression model (OPM).  The 
OPM is applicable to the case of more than two outcomes of an 
ordinal DV and is widely used in many analyses (Winship and Mare 
1984, Jackson and Perraudin 2000 and Greene 2003).  Since the DV 
used in this study conforms to the ordinal variable definition, the 
ordered probit model is used to estimate the regression for the 
variables hypothesised to be associated with these ratings.  
Alternatively, the ordered logit regression model (OLM) can also be 
used in the estimation.  However, Torres-Reyna (2009) establishes 
that there is no significant difference between OPM and OLM, and 
both models provide similar results. Conversely, ordinal DV could not 
be estimated consistently using the ordinary least square regressions 
(OLS) (Greene 2003). 
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The model attempts to improve on previous approaches of Gaver and 
Pottier (2005) by using the panel data analysis and extending the time 
horizon by studying data from the year 2006 to 2009.  The dependent 
variable (DV) is the six-category Best FSR (Gaver and Pottier 2005, 
Lopez 2007 and Eckles and Pottier 2011) which is considered as 
ordinal measures.  There are eight independent variables which 
include two dummy variables to represent business type and 
organisational forms.  The panel variable in this study is “Company 
ID” assigned by A.M Best.   
 
Table 4.6.6.1 
Variables Used in the Estimation 
Variable(s)  Measured by: 
Dependent Variable:  
RATING Ordinal DV Ordinal variable categorised into the 
following:  (FSR) 0 = if the firm is assigned a Best rating of B 
or lower   1 = if the rating is B++ or B+ 
  2 = if the rating is A- 
  3 = if the rating is A 
  4 = if the rating is A+ 
  5 = if the rating is A++ 
Explanatory Variables:  
LEV Leverage Accumulated reserve divided by total assets 
PROFIT Profitability Net underwriting expenses and losses 
divided by net premium earned 
LIQUID Liquidity Current assets divided by current liabilities 
LNSIZE Size Natural log of gross premium written 
REINS Reinsurance Annual reinsurance ceded divided by net 
premiums written GROWTH Growth Change in surplus 
TYPE Business 
Type 
 
 Ty 
Dummy variable 
0 =general insurers, 1 = life insurers 
FORM Organisational 
Form 
Dummy variable 
0 = stock; 1 = mutual insurer 
𝜺𝒊𝒕 Error Term  
Source: Author’s compilation based on the empirical literature 
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Cizkowicz (2015) explains that time dummy allows to control for time-
specific fixed effect while time trend is a variable to control for the 
exogenous increase in the dependent variable which is not explained 
by other variables.  The objectives of this study do not focus on any 
time-specific effects.  Thus, based on the literature, it is assumed that 
the “year dummy” is not required to be included in the OPM model.  
The model is amended appropriately.  The “year dummy” is 
eliminated from the estimation (as shown in Equation (8) and (9)).  All 
regressions follow the amended model accordingly.  The variables 
included in the estimation model are defined in Table 4.6.6.1 
 
The OPM is used to identify the relationship between the financial 
strength rating performance of insurance companies and leverage, 
profitability, liquidity, company size, reinsurance, growth, business 
type and organisational form. Our model construction is as follows: 
Estimated model: 
𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷 𝟎  +  ∑𝜷𝒎(𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒎) + 𝜺𝒊𝒕               (8) 
 
where Ratingit is the ordinal, dependent variable (DV) and it is coded 
on a six-point scale from 0 to 5.  The independent variables are LEV, 
PROFIT, LIQUID, LNSIZE, REINS, GROWTH and FORM.  The 
estimated model also includes λt that represents year (time variable) 
and εit that represents the error term.  Thus, the equation to be 
estimated could be expressed in detailed as: 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 0  + 𝛽 1𝐿𝐸𝑉 𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽 2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 3𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷 𝑖𝑡 +
                      𝛽 4𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡    +   𝛽 5𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑆 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 𝑖𝑡 +
                      𝛽 7𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽 8𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                            (9) 
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Additionally, the study compares the probit model that explains the 
financial strength rating performance on the basis of standard error 
estimation (Regression 1) with a probit model that explains the 
performance on the basis of robust standard error estimation 
(Regression 2).  This comparison has been attempted in previous 
studies in order to test for the robustness of the analysis (Grunert et al 
2005 and Eckles and Pottier 2011).  It is also an advantage to test the 
model based on its type of insurance business – general, life and 
composite insurance companies, as in Kartasheva and Park (2012).  
However, the model will specifically focus on general insurers due to 
data limitations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This chapter deals with ample empirical analysis and discussions about the 
findings from the analysis.  There are two parts in this chapter.  First off, the 
rating analyses that focus on the construction of rating transition matrices 
(RTM).  Secondly, the regression analyses seeking to identify the 
determinants that influence rating performance.  The comparative analyses 
that cover two different periods, namely the pre-financial crisis (Pre-FC) and 
post-financial crisis (Post-FC) period will also be performed.  The 
comparative analysis attempts to identify changes in insurance companies’ 
performance as reflected in the ratings assigned to them.    
 
5.1 EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES. 
 
Table 5.1.1 
Research Objectives, Research Questions and Empirical Analysis Strategies 
 Research Objectives Research Questions Data Analysis Strategy 
1. To investigate the probability 
of change in an insurer’s 
financial performance, as 
reflected in rating changes. 
 
What is the probability 
of a rating change? 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
Rating Quality 
Rating Transition 
Matrices (RTM) 
2. To compare insurers’ rating 
performance between pre- 
financial crisis and post-
financial crisis periods. 
 
Does the rating 
performance differ 
between the pre-
financial crisis and 
post-financial crisis? 
Descriptive Analysis 
Comparative Analysis 
using RTM  
3. To identify which financial 
determinants have the 
greater influence on the 
financial strength rating as 
reflected by the transition 
analysis. 
 
Which financial 
determinants have the 
greater influence on 
the financial strength 
rating? 
Descriptive Analysis 
Regression Model using 
Ordered Probit 
Regression Model 
(OPM)  
4. To compare and contrast the 
financial strength rating 
performance between two 
financial periods, viz. the pre-
financial crisis and post-
financial crisis. 
Does the financial 
strength rating 
performance differ 
between the pre-
financial crisis and 
post-financial crisis 
periods? 
Descriptive Analysis 
Comparative Analysis 
using OPM 
 Source: Author’s compilation 
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The objectives, research questions and chosen analysis are summarised in 
Table 5.1.1.  This is a summary about the intentions for this chapter.  
Empirical analyses will be preceded by an appropriate descriptive analysis.  
In addition, a suitable diagnostics test will also be included in the discussion. 
 
The aims of the rating analysis are to estimate the rating transition matrices, 
specifically used to identify rating transition at a certain period and to 
compare rating transition between two particular periods.  The empirical 
analysis should be able to answer the following research questions - (1) 
What is the probability of a rating change? and (2) Do rating performances 
differ between the pre-FC period and post-FC period? 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS FOR RATING DATA 
 
5.2.1 Number of Insurers by Type of Business 
Table 5.2.1.1 
Number of Insurers by Type of Business from 2003 to 2010 
Type / 
Year 
General Life Composite Total 
(Insurer) 
2003 37 7 6 50 
2004 39 7 6 52 
2005 40 7 6 53 
2006 42 7 6 55 
2007 43 7 6 56 
2008 44 7 6 57 
2009 44 7 6 57 
2010 44 6 6 57 
Total (Obs.) 334 55 48 437 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 5.2.1.1 shows the number of insurers by type of business from 
2003 to 2010.  The data depicts changes in the total number of 
insurers by year. There were a total of 50 insurers in 2003 relative to 
57 insurers in the last consecutive three years – 2008, 2009 and 
2010.   
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The difference is acknowledged because the number of insurers in 
the sample depends on those who have been assigned ratings during 
the period of observation. The sample selection is heavily based on 
data availability and not by any other preferences.  This study 
includes all insurers that have the most available and complete data 
between 2003 and 2010; based on an unbalanced panel data 
approach.  Following this approach, the total number of observations 
(Obs.) is 437 observations. 
 
Rating assignment is a voluntary practice and expensive (Kartasheva 
and Park 2012).  Thus, an insurer is neither inclined nor forced to 
maintain the annual rating assessment without particular motives.   
One example of a motive to obtain rating is to signal good financial 
performance to the market in order to secure new business growth 
and lower the market cost of capital. Additionally, an insurer might be 
motivated to obtain rating to derive the benefits from the rating 
process, which is to resolve agency conflict and to reflect on prudent 
managerial and financial practices (Adams et. al 2003 and Kisgen 
2007).   
 
There were 37 general insurers in 2003 and the number had risen 
slowly to 44 in the last consecutive three years.  Conversely, life and 
composite insurers depict more stable distributions.  There were 
seven life insurers (except in 2010) and six composite insurers 
throughout the 8-year observation periods. The sample is dominated 
by larger numbers of general insurers relative to the others.  This 
conforms to the hypothesis that general insurers are more likely to be 
rated than life insurers (H7). 
 
5.2.2 Rating Conversion 
In the initial analysis, rating grades are converted into equivalent 
numerical scales which provide a total of eight ordinal rating 
categories, as in Table 6.2.2.1.  The rating grades and descriptions 
correspond to the descriptions used by A.M. Best.  Each rating grade 
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is allocated an ordered numerical value due to the ordinal nature of 
the variables.   Rating conversion has been employed in other studies 
such as Eckles and Pottier (2011) and Kartasheva and Park (2012). 
 
Table 5.2.2.1 
Rating Conversion, 437 Sample Observations, 2003 - 2010 
Rating Description Numeric  
value 
Number of 
observations 
A++ Superior 1 36 
A+ Superior 2 93 
A Excellent 3 133 
A- Excellent 4 120 
B++ Good 5 25 
B+ Good 6 6 
B Fair 7 1 
NR5 Not formally followed 8 23 
 Source: Author’s computation 
 
As shown in Table 5.2.2.1, over 87% of sample insurers are rated “A-“ 
and above (total number of all observations for A- and above, relative 
to total observation).  The large percentage implies that most insurers 
in the sample are assigned with higher rating grades.  This could be 
an indicator that the sample consists of insurers with good financial 
performance.  Conversely, the conversion also includes a “NR5” 
rating grade.  The “NR5” grade is assigned to insurers with conditions 
that could impede the rating assessment process.  Examples of these 
conditions include insufficient data (NR1), company’s request to be 
omitted from the assessment (NR3), and not formally followed (NR5) 
(A. M. Best 2010). The “NR5” grade is accounted in the sample 
primarily due to their remarkable rating progression, i.e. from “NR5” to 
“A-“within the observation periods. 
 
5.2.3 Rating Grades Assigned by Type of Business 
Following the rating conversion, Table 5.2.3.1 exhibits the distribution 
of rating grades assigned, relative to the type of insurance business.  
There are eight rating grades (A++, A+, A, A-, B++, B+, B and NR5) 
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assigned to insurers (general, life and composite) in the sample.  The 
unbalanced panel yields 437 observations.   
 
Table 5.2.3.1 
Rating Grades Assigned by Type of Business 
Type / 
Grade 
General Life Composite Total 
(Insurer) 
A++ 35 0 1 36 
A+ 56 20 17 93 
A 103 16 15 133 
A- 96 13 11 120 
B++ 20 5 0 25 
B+ 1 0 5 6 
B 1 0 0 1 
NR5 22 1 0 23 
Total (Obs.) 334 55 48 437 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
It appears from Table 5.2.3.1 that almost all insurers in the sample 
secure good rating grades where the distribution concentrates on 
grade “A-“ and above.  General insurers depict a widespread rating 
distribution since they have observations in all rating categories, with 
most observations lie on “A-“ and above.  
 
5.2.4 Number of Insurers According to Rating Grades and Year 
Table 5.2.4.1 
Number of Insurers According to Rating Grades from 2003 to 2010. 
 200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
Obs. 
A++ 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 36 
A+ 7 15 13 14 14 14 8 8 93 
A 13 6 9 11 14 18 30 32 133 
A- 13 15 15 19 18 17 12 11 120 
B++ 4 7 7 1 1 1 2 2 25 
B+ 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 
B 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NR5 6 3 3 4 3 3 1 0 23 
Total 50 52 53 55 56 57 57 57 437 
  Source: Author’s computation 
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The study employs the frequency analysis to determine the number of 
insurers under each rating category by year.  Table 5.2.4.1 depicts a 
summary of all UK insurers that have been assigned the “Financial 
Strength Rating” (FSR) from 2003 to 2010.  
 
Data in Table 5.2.4.1 are further simplified to highlight the difference 
between two different points of observation; namely 2003 and 2010. 
The summary is presented in Table 5.2.4.2. 
 
Table 5.2.4.2 
Differences in Data in 2003 and 2010 
 A++ A+ A A- B++ B+ B NR5 
2003 5 7 13 13 4 1 1 6 
2010 4 8 32 11 2 0 0 0 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Data in Table 5.2.4.2 show that most insurers achieved good ratings 
in most years; with grades A+, A and A- being the most frequent 
ratings.  Scores in year 2003 were the most varied, with insurers 
being rated in all categories.  In contrast, scores in year 2010 were 
less varied but with more concentration rested on the better ratings 
(B++ and above).   
 
According to Best’s rating categories, rating grades of B+ and above 
are placed in the “Secure” category.  Accordingly, rating grades of B 
and lower are placed in the “Vulnerable” category (A.M. Best 2010)  
The bold, horizontal/vertical line between grade “B+” and “B” in Table 
5.2.4.1 and Table 5.2.4.2 differentiates the grades according to the 
secure and vulnerable groups as specified by Best.  The summary in 
Table 5.2.4.2 highlights a distinct difference, whereby in 2003, there 
were 43 insurers in the “secure” category and seven insurers fell into 
the “vulnerable” category.  Interestingly, all 57 insurers managed to 
be placed in the “secure” category in 2010. 
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The improvement in rating scores could be justified because most 
insurers are well aware of the advantages of obtaining good ratings 
and they will make significant attempts to improve their financial base, 
in order to obtain the highest possible rating grades.  Superior rating 
grades play an important role in influencing the market and customers 
about their financial strength and stability that contribute significantly 
to profitable business opportunities.  This is consistent with Adams et 
al (2003) and Kartasheva and Park (2012) that highlight the 
advantages of obtaining rating grades. 
 
5.3 RATING QUALITY (NON-MARKOV APPROACH) 
Rating quality is an indicator that could be utilised to strengthen the 
rating transition results (Hadad et. al., 2009).  These analyses support 
the non-Markovian assumption that rating momentum does exist and 
rating transitions are influenced by past and current events. 
Subsequently, rating activity (RA) and rating drift (RD) are good 
indicators for rating quality (Carty and Fons 1994).   
 
In addition, analysts should also examine the annual percentage of 
insurers affected by letter rating changes.  It is useful to detect 
improvement in rating performance on an annual basis, as for it to 
become a good starting point to evaluate rating activity and rating 
drift. 
 
The first objective attempts to investigate the probability of rating 
changes.  Subsequently, it seeks answer to the question – what is the 
probability of a rating change?  Rating change could be defined as 
changes to a higher rating grade (upgrade) or changes to a lower 
rating grade (downgrade).   
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Table 5.3.1 
Rating Changes by Year, 2003 - 2010 
 Upgrades Downgrades Rating  Activity Rating Drift 
Year Numbe
r 
% Numbe
r 
% (RA) % (RD) % 
2004 10 17.54 4 7.02 27.45 11.76 
2005 10 17.54 3 5.26 25.00 13.46 
2006 4 7.02 2 3.51 11.32 3.77 
2007 9 15.79 1 1.75 18.18 14.55 
2008 4 7.02 0 0 7.14 7.14 
2009 4 7.02 3 5.26 12.28 1.75 
2010 9 15.79 7 12.28 28.07 3.51 
Average: 7 12.53 3 5.01 18.49 7.99 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 5.3.1 summarises the number of insurers and the percentage of 
rating changes, as well as the activity and drift measurements for all 
insurers in the sample.  The outcomes are estimated according to the 
non-Markovian approach, assuming that rating changes are 
influenced by past events.  Note that the evaluated outcomes start at 
2004 and not 2003.  This is necessary since data for the year 2003 
serve as the basis of comparison with data for the year 2004.  Due to 
data restrictions, the researcher does not have data for the year 
leading to 2003, thus changes in 2003 have not been captured in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 5.3.1 also highlights the annual rating changes for insurers in 
the sample over the period of 2003 – 2010.  The average scores are 
computed as the total sums in each column relative to the observation 
period (7 years, 2003 as the basis of comparison).  A general 
conclusion shows that rating upgrades surpass the rating downgrades 
in all year.  Over the entire period, rating upgrades averaged 12.53% 
per year and rating downgrades averaged 5.01% per year.  This 
finding answers our first research question – that there is a higher 
probability of a rating upgrade than a rating downgrade.  In addition, it 
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corresponds to the findings from previous studies (Carty and Fons 
1994 and Hadad et al 2009). 
 
Data for Figure 5.3.1 are based on the computations of RA and RD 
which are presented in Table 5.3.1, whereby it is concluded that RA 
and RD are highly pro-cyclical.  RA averaged 18.49% per year and 
RD averaged 7.99%.  The average trend lines are also included in 
Figure 5.3.1.  RA depicts the relative size of rating changes and the 
speed of rating changes.  RA was the highest in 2010 (28.07%) and 
lowest in 2008 (7.14%),  in the span of two years.  This could be a 
good sign that the quality of insurers’ rating is improving at a 
remarkable speed. 
 
Figure 5.3.1 
Rating Activity (RA) and Rating Drift (RD) for All Insurers, 2003 - 2010 
 
 Source: Author’s computation 
 
RD summarises the overall increase/decrease in the credit quality of 
the rated insurers in the sample as a percentage of one letter grade.  
In this instance, RD was the highest in 2007 (14.55) and lowest in 
2009 (1.75%), also in the span of two years.  The lowest value could 
be linked to the effect of the financial crisis which occurred in mid-
2007, where most insurers experienced or were exposed to financial 
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vulnerabilities.  RD scores following the crisis show a drastic decline, 
from 14.55% (2007) to 7.14% (2008) and it dropped to 1.75% (2009).  
The score improved slightly in 2010 (3.51%), indicating an 
improvement in the overall credit quality of the insurers. 
 
As a conclusion, findings from the rating quality analysis provide early 
indicators of the rating performance and contribute to answer the 
research questions as follows: 
i. There is a higher probability of rating upgrades than rating 
downgrades. (Answering research question 1) 
ii. There is a notable difference in the rating performance 
between the pre-financial and post-financial crisis periods. 
(Answering research question 2) 
 
In addition, the findings conform to the underlying assumptions of the 
non-Markov approach where the direction of prior rating transition 
could influence future transition probabilities, as reflected in the 
analysis (Lando and Skodeberd 2002, Hamilton and Cantor 2004, 
Dang and Partington 2005, Figlewski et al 2006, Hadad et al 2009 
and Wang and Carson 2014). 
 
5.4 RATING TRANSITION MATRICES 
 
In this analysis, the rating transition matrices (RTM) will be estimated as: 
i. Eight-year transition matrix (RTM 2003 – 2010) 
ii. Five-year transition matrix (RTM 2006 – 2010) 
iii. Three- year transition matrix (RTM 2008 – 2010) 
 
Bangia et al (2002) establish that transition matrices can be estimated for 
any desired transition horizon. However, a shorter measurement interval 
reflects lesser transitions and less extreme movements. The justification for 
the different time settings for all matrices is to investigate rating transitions at 
various time settings. In this case, each matrix is differentiated in terms of its 
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duration, short-term transition (three years), long-term transition (five years) 
and overall transition (eight years).  It is predicted that there will be 
significant differences in the result that will be able to answer the research 
question – what is the probability of a rating change? 
 
The discussion will include another measurement of rating quality, which is 
the rating magnitude.  Rating magnitude (RM) is the degree of change from 
one letter rating to another.  As an example, a rating change from A++ to A+ 
represents a 1-rating magnitude and a rating change from A to A++ 
represents a 2-rating magnitude (regardless of an upgrade or a downgrade).  
It is useful to reflect the extent of rating transition, irrespective of the 
movements.  It could reflect the magnitude of a rating upgrade or the 
magnitude of a rating downgrade (Hadad et al 2009) 
 
After the overall estimations, the study will attempt to estimate the transition 
matrices according to their types of business.  There are three types of 
insurers in the sample – general, life and composite insurers.  All sub-
samples will be estimated on the most recent five-year time period, from 
2006 to 2010, as follows: 
 
i. RTM for general insurers (RTM General) 
ii. RTM for life insurers (RTM Life) 
iii. RTM for composite insurers (RTM Composite) 
 
Hadad et al (2009) state that the most commonly used matrix is based on 
the annual or five-yearly observation periods.  This serves as the basis for 
the analysis, which focuses on five-year transition matrices, according to 
type of business.  It is predicted that there will be a significant difference in 
rating transitions relative to the type of business. 
 
The descriptive characteristics of the data used for estimating all matrices 
are summarised in Table 5.4.1.  The summary provides detailed information 
on the data that are being used in each transition matrix by highlighting the 
number of observations (N*), number of companies (n*) and duration of 
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study (T).  In addition, the characteristics of the data set (balanced vs. 
unbalanced panel) are also mentioned.  An unbalanced panel arises out of 
data unavailability.  Thus, all companies with at least three-year complete 
data are accounted in the sample.   
 
Table 5.4.1 
Descriptive Characteristics of the Data Used in the Transition Matrices 
Group N* n* T 
(year) 
Year of 
observation(s) 
Characteristics 
of data 
All insurers 437 57 8 2003 - 2010 Unbalanced panel 
All insurers 282 57 5 2006 - 2010 Unbalanced panel 
All insurers 171 57 3 2008 - 2010  Strongly balanced 
panel 
General only 218 45 5 2006 - 2010 Unbalanced panel 
Life only 34 7 5 2006 - 2010 Unbalanced panel 
Composite only 30 6 5 2006 - 2010 Strongly balanced 
panel 
N* refers to number of observations over the analysis duration, which is derived from n* x T 
n* refers to number of insurers in the dataset 
 
The full sample consists of 437 observations taken from 57 insurers over the 
eight-year period.  However, the data are regarded as unbalanced, 
indicating that there are some missing data in the sample. Due to data 
limitation, the sample accounts for 57 insurers with almost complete data 
over the eight-year period. An insurer with incomplete data but who has at 
least three-year data is also included in the sample.  This is done in order to 
increase the sample size and generalisability of the outcomes. 
 
The highlighted cells in these matrices indicate areas with “NO 
TRANSITION”, i.e the rating grade remains at the current rating grade 
category.  All companies have a higher possibility of remaining at their 
current rating category if higher percentages are shown along the diagonal 
(the highlighted areas) (Carty and Fons 1994 and Schuermann and Jafry 
2004).  
 
117 
 
5.4.1 Eight-Year Rating Transition Matrix 
Table 5.4.1.1 
Eight-Year Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
All Insurers, 437 observations, 2003 - 2010 
Rating:  To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ B+ B NR5 
A++ 93.75 6.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A+ 1.18 88.24 10.59 0 0 0 0 0 
A 0 7.92 88.12 2.97 0 0 0 0 
A- 0 0 15.60 83.49 0.99 0 0 0.92 
B++ 0 0 0 30.43 69.57 0 0 0 
B+ 0 0 16.67 16.67 0 66.67    0 0 
B 0 0 0 0 100.00 0 0 0 
NR5 0 0 8.70 8.70 8.70 4.33 0 69.57 
Note: “B” rated insurers managed to migrate from its current rating grade (B) to 
grade B++.  However, the column for “B” grade is included for ease of observation. 
 
Outcomes in Table 5.4.1.1 reflect that the probability of A++ insurers 
having their rating unchanged is 0.9375, while there is a small 
(0.0625)[i.e 1 – 0.9375] probability of a downgrade.  Some of the 
interesting outcomes are presented in bold. For the A-, B++ and B+ 
rating grades, the probability of upgrades exceeds that of 
downgrades, i.e insurers with B++ rating grade have 0.3043 
probability of obtaining a higher grade (grade A-).  It shows that rating 
grades around the mid-range (A, A-, B++ and B+) are more likely to 
experience rating changes, as reflected in the matrix. 
 
In contrast, insurers with higher ratings tend to maintain their position, 
with smaller chances of rating transition.  Interestingly, in the 
prediction, B rated insurers in the sample show remarkable chances 
(prob=1.000) to improve their rating grade, up to 2-rating magnitude 
(i.e. from grade B to B++, the difference is two grades higher). 
Another noteworthy finding is that NR5-rated insurers’ exhibit a total 
probability of 0.3043 [i.e. 1 – 0.6957] to be upgraded into better rating 
categories.  These possible upgrades will be a signal to the public on 
the improvements made by the NR5 rated insurers and will help to 
boost company’s profile.   
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5.4.2 Five-Year Rating Transition Matrix 
Table 5.4.2.1 
Five-Year Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
All Insurers, 282 observations, 2006 - 2010 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ B+ NR5 
A++ 94.44 5.56 0 0 0 0 0 
A+ 0 84.00 16.00 0 0 0 0 
A 0 1.37 97.26 1.37 0 0 0 
A- 0 0 19.70 80.30 0 0 0 
B++ 0 0 0 20.00 80.00 0 0 
B+ 0 0 50.00 0 0 50.00 0 
NR5 0 0 9.09 18.18 9.09 0 63.64 
Note: No companies fall into the rating category B for the years observed thus the 
column for grade B is omitted from the table. 
 
The five-year transition matrix is presented in Table 5.4.2.1.  Similar 
to Table 5.4.1.1, this matrix attempts to depict rating movements over 
the long run (duration of 5 year or more).  The analysis shows that the 
probability of A++ rated insurers remaining at their current rating 
grade is 0.944, with only a slight chance of downgrades 
(prob=0.0556).  Again, it is a reflection that the A++ rated insurers 
have an extremely stable rating performance, with the probability of 
unchanged rating almost 1.00.   
 
Similar to findings in Table 5.4.1.1, the probability of upgrades for A- 
and B++ rated insurers surpasses its downgrades.  In addition, B+ 
rated insurers have the opportunity of 3-rating magnitude (moving 
from grade B+ to A- involves three grade differences) to be upgraded 
to higher rating grade.  Surprisingly, A+ rated insurers are vulnerable 
to rating downgrades (prob=0.16 in Table 5 and prob=0.1059 in Table 
8).  It is difficult to determine the reason for this probability of 
downgrades since the matrix only analyses rating transitions but it 
does not provide any justifications for the transitions.  
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5.4.3 Three-Year Rating Transition Matrix 
Table 5.4.3.1 
Three-Year Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
All Insurers, 171 observations, 2008 - 2010 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ NR5 
A++ 100.00 0 0 0 0 0.00 
A+ 0 68.18 31.82 0 0 0.00 
A 0 2.08 97.92 0 0 0.00 
A- 0 0 27.59 72.41 0 0 
B++ 0 0 0 0 100.00 0.00 
NR5 0 0 0 50.00 25.00 25.00 
Note: No companies fall into the rating category of grades B+ and B for the years 
observed thus column for grades B+ and B are omitted from the table. 
 
Table 5.4.3.1 depicts the transition matrix in short-run, 3-year 
observations from 2008 to 2010.  Outcomes from the matrix show that 
A++ rated insurers remain steadfast with a remarkable chance of 
remaining in the current rating position.  In addition, B++ rated 
insurers are also predicted to have a stable outlook, by having their 
rating unchanged (prob=1.000).  This is slightly different relative to the 
rating performance in the other two periods (8-year and 5-year).  In 
this estimation, A- insurers also depict chances of rating upgrades 
(prob=0.2759).  This positive rating outlook corresponds to the 
findings in Table 8 and Table 5.   
 
In contrast, A+ rated insurers are still susceptible to the rating 
downgrade (prob=0.3182) in the short-run.  This percentage of 
downgrade (31.82%) is the worst compared to the other two periods 
(8-year and 5-year).  It indicates that A+ rated insurers experience 
deterioration in their financial performance, as reflected in their rating 
downgrades. It is worth mentioning that NR5-rated insurers also have 
greater probabilities of obtaining good ratings in the rating 
assessment.  The total probability of upgrades is 0.3636 [i.e 1 – 
0.6364].   
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5.4.4 Overall Conclusions for Rating Transition Matrices for All 
Insurers 
Findings from Table 5.4.1.1, Table 5.4.2.1 and Table 5.4.3.1 can be 
concluded as follows: 
i. A++ rated insurers reflect the strongest performance in all 
periods of observations (eight-year, five-year and three-year).  
The probability on remaining at their current rating grade is 
very high, with probability scores of more than 0.9300.  The 
findings conform to Carty and Fons (1994) that the higher-
quality ratings have a higher likelihood of remaining unchanged 
than the lower-quality ratings. 
ii. Interestingly, from all three estimations, A-, B++ and B+ depict 
greater chances of rating upgrades relative to the downgrades.  
Thus, it can be concluded that for any of the given time 
horizons, insurers with these rating grades (A-, B++ and B+) 
tend to obtain higher ratings at the end of the period.  In 
addition, mid-range rating grades tend to be more changeable 
as compared to the other grades.   
iii. A+ grade is defined as “superior” grade and is assigned to 
insurers with superior financial position (A.M. Best 2010).  
Despite their superior financial position (as reflected in the 
rating grade), these insurers are exposed to higher chance of 
rating downgrades in all estimations.  Thus, the contradicting 
results for A+ rated insurers require further investigation. 
iv. Frydman and Schuermann (2008) highlight that the reason for 
an insurer to be assigned an NR-grade is unknown.  The NR-
grade itself does not reflect “good’ or “bad” rating performance.  
In this study, NR5-rated insurers show remarkable chances of 
rating upgrades in all three estimations. Thus, it is concluded 
that in this study, NR-rated insurers do not signify poor 
financial performance. 
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As a conclusion, outcomes from these analyses reflect higher 
probabilities of rating upgrades which are achievable if the insurers 
show remarkable improvements in their financial performance.  Thus, 
the outcomes managed to answer the first research question, that 
there is a higher probability of a rating change, which concentrates 
more on rating upgrades.   
 
5.4.5 Rating Transition Matrices According to Type of Insurers. 
 
Table 5.4.5.1 
Descriptive Characteristics of the Data Used in Transition Matrices 
Group N* 
 
n* T(year) 
2006 to 2010 
Characteristics  
of data 
General only 218 45 5 Unbalanced panel 
Life only 34 7 5 Unbalanced panel 
Composite 
only 
30 6 5 Strongly balanced 
panel 
N* refers to the number of observations for the 5-year period. 
n* refers to the number of insurers included in the sample. 
 
Table 5.4.5.1 provides a brief summary of the sample used in the 
transition matrices.  The sample is sub-divided into types of business, 
which are general, life and composite.  The descriptive characteristics 
are summarised in Table 5.4.5.1.  It is obvious that general insurers 
dominate the sample and data unavailability is apparent with the 
application of unbalanced panel data. 
 
Table 5.4.5.2 illustrates the transition matrices according to the type 
of insurers.  The matrices are compiled for ease of observation.  
Values in bold indicate significant findings that will be discussed.  
Discussions begin with individual analysis, discussing trends in each 
and every matrix and then it will provide conclusions on the overall 
trends of the transition matrices. 
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Table 5.4.5.2 
Rating Transition Matrices According to Type of Insurers 
 
Matrix A 
Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
General Insurers, 218 Observations, 2006 - 2010 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ NR5 
A++ 94.44 5.56 0 0 0 0 
A+ 0 86.21 13.79 0 0 0 
A 0 0 98.25 1.75 0 0 
A- 0 0 18.87 81.13 0 0 
B++ 0 0 0 20.00 80.00 0 
NR5 0 0 9.09 18.18 9.09 63.64 
Note: No companies fall into rating grades B+ and B during the observation period  
(2006 to 2010).  Thus, rows/columns for rating grades B+ and B are omitted from 
the table. 
 
Matrix B 
Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
Life Insurers, 34 Observations, 2006 - 2010 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A+ A A- 
A+ 66.67 33.33 0 
A 0 100.00 0 
A- 0 22.22 77.78 
Note: No companies fall into rating grades A++, B++, B+, B and NR5 during the 
observation  
period (2006 to 2010).  Thus, rows/columns for these rating grades are omitted from 
the table. 
 
Matrix C 
Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
Composite Insurers, 30 Observations, 2006 - 2010 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A+ A A- B+ 
A+ 100.00 0 0 0 
A 10.00 90.00 0 0 
A- 0 33.33 66.67 0 
B+ 0 50.00 0 50.00 
Note: No companies fall into rating grades A++, B++, B and NR5 during the 
observation period (2006 to 2010).  Thus, rows/columns for these rating grades are 
omitted from the table. 
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In Table 5.4.5.2, Matrix A depicts rating transitions for general 
insurers during 2006 to 2010.  There are 218 observations derived 
from 45 companies over a five-year period (as shown in Table 
5.4.5.1).  A++ and A rated insurers reflect the highest probabilities of 
remaining in the same rating grades, with a probability score of more 
than 0.9000.  A- insurers have high chances of rating upgrades 
(prob=0.1887) while A+ insurers are at risk of rating downgrades 
(prob=0.1379).  Insurers in the NR5 category depict positive rating 
outlook, a total of 0.3636 chances of rating upgrades. 
 
Matrix B shows rating transitions for life insurers during 2006 to 2010.  
The matrix consists of 34 observations derived from 7 insurers.  Even 
though this is a small sub-sample, the matrix is constructed to 
highlight significant findings that correspond to this study.  The matrix 
generates outcomes for only three rating grades, A+, A and A-.  The 
trends in Matrix B are almost similar to those in Matrix A.  A+ rated life 
insurers are still facing the risk of downgrades (prob=0.3333), A-rated 
life insurers remain remarkably strong (prob=1.000) and A- rated life 
insurers should be looking forward to upgrades (prob=0.2222). 
 
Matrix C presents transition outcomes for composite insurers.  There 
are 30 observations and six insurers in the estimation.  There are four 
rating grades generated from the sub-sample.  Surprisingly, A+ rated 
composite insurers show remarkable performance, with a 1.000 
chance of rating unchanged.  In addition,  A and A- rated composite 
insurers also depict positive rating outlooks, which indicate rating 
upgrades in the future (prob=0.1000 for A and prob=0.3333 for A-). 
 
Outcomes from all matrices can be concluded as follows: 
i. General insurers depict more rating grade variations during the 
observation (2006 – 2010).  There are six grades generated 
(A++, A+, A, A-, B++ and NR5).  In contrast, there are only 
three grades to represent life insurers’ rating performance and 
four grades for composite insurers.  We assume that the lack 
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of data primarily causes differences. Our justification is similar 
to previous studies that dealt with limited data that 
subsequently restrict the possible outcomes (Hu et al; 2002, 
Bae et al 2007 and Fuertes and Kalotychou 2007). 
ii. The rating variations which are evident in Matrix A can be an 
indicator that financial performance in the general insurance 
market is more volatile than the others, as reflected in the 
rating fluctuations. 
iii. Life insurers depict lesser variations in rating grade transitions.  
This might be attributed to the nature of the life insurance 
business itself.  It is a long term business transaction with a 
more stable cash flow and performance outlook.  Thus, the life 
insurance business is less volatile compared to general 
insurance business.  It is reflected in the stability of the rating 
transition over the years which centers on the higher grades 
(good grades) 
 
As a conclusion, outcomes from these analyses reflect a significant 
difference in rating performance as influenced by the type of 
insurance companies.  The outcomes correspond to our hypothesis 
that general and composite insurers are more likely to be rated than 
life insurers.  The outcomes are also in accordance with Kartasheva 
and Park (2012) where general and composite insurers tend to obtain 
good rating grades in order to boost company’s reputation, reduce 
cost of capital and signal stronger financial performance. 
 
5.5 RATING TRANSITION ANALYSIS: A COMPARISON OF PRE-
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS PERIODS 
 
The focal point of the UK financial crisis or credit crunch which started in 
mid-2007 has been discussed by many economists (Barrell and Davis 2008; 
Mizen 2008; Martin and Milas 2009; Busch 2010; Erkens et. al 2010; 
Vriesendrop and Gramatikov 2010 and Evans 2011).  In these papers, the 
onset of the financial crisis is pinpointed to mid-2007, July 2007 or summer 
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of 2007.  The particular breakpoint is important since it will be the basis our 
comparison.  Hence, referring to the literature, the crisis year date or the 
break point for the two groups is set as the year 2007.   
 
In a survey conducted by Vriesendrop and Gramatikov (2010), data are 
divided into two periods, namely the “before” financial crisis period and 
“after” financial crisis period.  All data before 2007 are pooled into the 
“before” period and data after year 2007 are pooled into the “after” period.  A 
similar approach is evident in Salvador et al (2011) who studied the effect of 
the financial crisis on rating performance.  Their sample is taken from the 
Spanish banking sector from 2000 to 2009.  They focus on the differences in 
the rating performance, before and after the financial crisis event.  
Observations from 2000 to 2007 are classified as before the crisis and those 
from 2008 to 2009 are classified as after the crisis. 
 
De Mey (2009) conducts a qualitative analysis to investigate the effect of the 
financial crisis on life insurer’s financial reporting standard.  He concludes 
that the crisis has a significant effect on financial reporting frameworks, 
where life insurers have to modify their frameworks to suit the needs of 
various stakeholders.  In addition, Salvador et al (2011) conclude that the 
financial crisis has a significant effect on rating performance.  However, they 
use credit ratings assigned to banks.  Following the same basis, this study 
attempts to evaluate the effect of the financial crisis on insurer’s rating 
performance. 
 
This study attempts to have a different take, in terms of the location of study 
and the population to be observed.  The study selects the UK as the location 
of study and the UK insurance industry as the population.   Within the scope 
of the author’s knowledge, this approach has not been attempted in any 
other studies.  Thus, the study aims to investigate the effects of the financial 
crisis on the rating performance by comparing outcomes from the two 
specified periods.  The original dataset in this study is divided into two 
distinct categories, which are the pre-financial crisis (Pre-FC) and post-
financial crisis (Post-FC) periods.  It is decided that data up to the year 2007 
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(2006 and 2007) are assigned to the pre-FC group and data for the year 
2008 to 2010 into the post-FC group.   
 
Table 5.5.1 
    Descriptive Characteristics of the Data Used in the Comparative Matrices 
   282 Observations, 2006 to 2010 
 Pre-Financial Crisis  
(Pre-FC) 
(2006 to 2007), T = 2 
Post-Financial Crisis  
(Post-FC) 
(2008 to 2010), T = 3 
 N* n* N* n* 
General insurers 85 43 133 44 
Life insurers 14 7 20 7 
Composite 
insurers 
12 6 18 6 
Total 111 56 171 57 
    N* refers to the number of observations over the analysis duration (n* x T) 
     n* refers to the number of insurers in the dataset 
   Source: Author’s computation 
 
Based on the data in Table 5.5.1, the total number of observations for both 
periods is 278 observations, which is derived from 57 insurance companies 
over a five-year period (2006 to 2010).  In the Post-FC, the number of 
insurers by type of business corresponds to the original sample distributions 
(44 general insurers, seven life insurers and six composite insurers).  
However, there is a slight variation in figures for the pre-FC period, where 
there are only 43 instead of 44 general insurers.  Thus, the total number of 
insurers in the pre-FC period is 56, and not 57.   
 
This difference is due to the characteristics of the data itself, which is 
unbalanced.  Dougherty (2006) states that the panel data are described as 
unbalanced if some observations are missing from the observations.  With 
regard to the data availability constraint, all companies with three- year or 
more of complete data are included in the sample.  This is applicable to all 
57 companies in both periods.  From the sample, it is detected that there is 
one general insurer who only has complete data for a three-year period 
(2008 to 2010).  Thus, this insurer will be accounted in the post-FC period 
but not in the pre-FC period.  It is assumed that this is the possible rationale 
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behind the variation [i.e. 44 -43] in the total number of general insurers. In 
this comparative analysis, the rating transition matrices (RTM) will be 
estimated as: 
i. Comparative RTM for all insurers 
ii. Comparative RTM for general insurers 
 
This study will only be comparing transitions for all insurers and general 
insurers.  Transitions from life and composite insurers will not be attempted 
due to a small number of observations. Table 5.5.2 illustrates the rating 
distributions according to the type of business that supports our justification 
for excluding life and composite insurers from the comparison. 
 
Table 5.5.2 
Descriptive Analysis of the Rating Data (2006 -2010). 
Rating Data Distribution During the Pre-Financial Crisis (pre-FC) Period  
According to Type of Business, 2006 - 2007 
Type/Grade A++ A+ A A- B++ B+ B NR5 Obs. 
General 10 16 21 29 2 0 0 7 85 
Life 0 8 0 6 0 0 0 0 14 
Composite 0 4 4 2 0 2 0 0 12 
Total 10 28 25 37 2 2 0 7 111 
 
Rating Data Distribution During the Post-Financial Crisis (post-FC) Period 
According to Type of Business, 2008 -2010 
Type/Grade A++ A+ A A- B++ B+ B NR5 Obs. 
General 12 18 59 35 5 0 0 4 133 
Life 0 4 12 4 0 0 0 0 20 
Composite 0 8 9 1 0 0 0 0 18 
 12 30 80 40 5 0 0 4 171 
Source: Author’s  computation 
 
Table 5.5.2 depicts a comparative rating distribution by type of business.  
There are more observations for general insurers, both in pre-FC (85 obs.) 
and post-FC periods (133 obs.).  The rating distribution for general insurers 
also shows a wider distribution, encompassing seven grades, with null score 
in grade B.  This variation implies that there is a certain degree of fluctuation 
on the rating performance among general insurers.  The variation shown in 
Table 5.5.2 conforms to the ABI report (2009) which indicates that the UK 
128 
 
general insurance performance is affected by the financial crisis with a 
significant decrease in net written premiums.  The decrease in the net 
written premium will substantially affect the financial performance as a whole 
 
In contrast, the number of observations in life and composite insurer is small 
relative to general insurers.  There are only 34 obs. for life insurers in both 
periods (pre-FC=14, post-FC=20) and 30 obs. for composite insurers (pre-
FC=12, post-FC=18).Rating distributions for life and composite insurers are 
less volatile relative to the general insurers. The rating score is highlighted in 
the table for ease of observation.  It shows a tendency towards the higher 
rating grades (A+, A and A-), with the distributions clustered around these 
grades in both periods.  It infers that the rating performance of life and 
composite insurers is less affected by the financial crisis.  Thus, it is 
assumed that life and composite insurers’ performance is better than general 
insurers, as reflected in fewer rating fluctuations and variations in the 
distribution. 
 
5.5.1 Comparative Rating Transition Analysis: All Insurers 
  
Table 5.5.1.1 depicts the comparative transition analysis for all 
insurers during the pre-financial crisis (Matrix D) and post-financial 
crisis periods (Matrix E). The number of observations for each period 
is specified in the headings, the values in the diagonal are highlighted, 
and the outstanding result are shown in bold. Notes at the bottom of 
each matrix are supplied to acknowledge data omission. For example:  
 
“No companies fall into the rating category for grades B+ and B during 
the observation period (2008 to 2010).  Thus, rows/columns for rating 
grades B+ and B are omitted from the table”. 
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Table 5.5.1.1 
Comparative Matrices Based on Two Different Financial Periods 
Pre-Financial Crisis (pre-FC) and Post-Financial Crisis (post-FC) 
 
 
Matrix D, Pre-Financial Crisis 
Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
All Insurers, 111 Observations, 2006 - 2007 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ B+ NR5 
A++ 100.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A+ 0 100.00 0 0 0 0 0 
A 0 0 100.00 0 0 0 0 
A- 0 0 10.53 89.97 0 0 0 
B++ 0 0 0 100.00 0 0 0 
B+ 0 0 0 0 0 100.00 0 
NR5 0 0 25.00 0 0 0 75.00 
   Note: No companies fall into rating grade B during the observation period  
   (2006 to 2007).  Thus, rows/columns for rating grade B is omitted from the table. 
 
Matrix E, Post-Financial Crisis 
Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
All Insurers, 171 Observations, 2008 - 2010 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ NR5 
A++ 100.00 0 0 0 0 0 
A+ 0 68.18 31.82 0 0 0 
A 0 2.08 97.92 0 0 0 
A- 0 0 27.59 72.41 0 0 
B++ 0 0 0 0 100.00 0 
NR5 0 0 0 50.00 25.00 25.00 
   Note: No companies fall into rating grade B+ and B during the observation period  
(2008 to 2010).  Thus, rows/columns for rating grade B+ and B are omitted from   
the table. 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The full sample in this study contains eight rating grades (A++, A+, A, 
A-, B++, B+, B and NR5).  Instead of full eight rating grades, some of 
the matrices illustrate partial results.  It must be emphasized that all 
insurers in the sample have equal chances to be included in the 
analysis.  Hence, the omission is not deliberate but is due to the effect 
of the transition, that is not being observed for a particular rating 
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grade at the time of estimation.  The discussion will include another 
measurement of rating quality, which is the rating magnitude.  Rating 
magnitude is the degree of change from one letter rating to another.  
As an example, a rating change from A++ to A+ represents a 1-rating 
magnitude and a rating change from A to A++ represents a 2-rating 
magnitude (regardless of an upgrade or a downgrade).  It is useful to 
reflect the extent of the rating transition, irrespective of the 
movements.  It could reflect the magnitude of a rating upgrade or the 
magnitude of a rating downgrade (Hadad et al 2009) 
 
Matrix D in Table 5.5.5.1 estimates the transitions for seven rating 
grades.  Interestingly, four out of the seven grades reflect higher 
chance (prob=1.000) of remaining in their current positions.  Insurers 
with A- and NR5 grades have a positive outlook towards rating 
upgrades.  In addition, B++ rated insurers yield a better chance of 1-
rating magnitude upgrade.  It implies that B++ rated insurers show 
improvements in their financial condition, thus allowing them to be 
upgraded. 
 
The  NR5 rated insurers show remarkable rating achievement, where 
they have a 0.2500 chance of being upgraded up to a 5-rating 
magnitude.  NR5 grade is assigned to insurers who have obtained a 
rating in the past but did not formally maintain the rating assessment 
(A.M Best 2010).  Looking at the probability of the rating upgrade, 
insurers in the NR5 category have a good chance of obtaining an A 
grade, which is a secure grade under A.M. Best rating guidelines.   
 
Matrix E represents the transitions that occur after the financial crisis 
(post-financial crisis).  A significant difference is that the rating 
transitions after the crisis show greater variation or that it is less 
stable.  A++ and B++ remain unwavering at the current grade and the 
other grades depict fluctuations.  A+ rated insurers are at the most 
vulnerable position, with the largest possibility of downgrade 
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(prob=0.3182).  NR5 rated insurers’ scores a total of 0.7500 chance 
of rating upgrades, up to 4-rating magnitude.  
 
The findings conform to Carty and Fons (1994) that the higher-quality 
ratings have a higher likelihood of remaining unchanged than the 
lower-quality ratings.  In our study, A++ rated insurers reflect a 
definite chance of maintaining their current rating grade, irrespective 
of the periods.  A++ rating grade is assigned to insurers that have the 
superior ability to fulfill their ongoing insurance obligations.  In this 
case, A++ rated insurers manage to maintain their rating 
performances which imply that their financial performances are not 
affected by the financial crisis.  
 
Frydman and Schuermann (2008) claim that there is no possible 
justification for being rated under the NR category, and the grade is 
not a reflection of good or poor financial performance.  This study 
provides evidence that the NR5 rating grade does not signify poor 
financial performance.  The analysis shows that the NR5 have 
remarkable chances of rating upgrades, with the best achievement 
shown at 5-rating magnitude, and this has been proven repeatedly in 
all durations of analysis.  A.M Best (2010) assigns A+ rating grade to 
insurers that have the superior ability to meet their ongoing insurance 
obligations.  In addition, A+ rating is categorised in the same category 
as A++ rating grade, which is the “Superior” or the highest grade in 
A.M Best rating scale.  Theoretically, A+ rated insurers should be able 
to maintain their current rating positions.  Surprisingly, our analysis 
reflects that A+ rated insurers show the highest probability 
(prob=0.3182) of rating downgrades.   
 
Kisgen (2009) states that rating grades provide information to the 
market about firm’s credit quality. Subsequently, consumers and 
businesses might react negatively following the downgrade by cutting 
back on consumption and investment (Mȁhlmann 2011).A rating 
downgrade is not a favorable outcome to many insurers. Ultimately, a 
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rating downgrade influences insurer’s reputation in the market.  
Nevertheless, the significant rating downgrade can be associated with 
the impact of the financial crisis.  O’Brien (2010) mentions that 
insurers are indeed affected by the financial crisis, leading to the 
weakening of the financial performance of many insurers and 
reinsurers.  In addition, Baluch et al (2009) highlight that the financial 
crisis and recession will reduce the demand for general insurance to 
some extent, leading to drastic cost-cutting measures in order to 
preserve profitability. The study employs the comparative rating 
transition matrices in order to answer our second research question: 
Does rating performance differ from the pre-financial crisis and post-
financial crisis periods? 
 
The comparative analysis shows that there is a significant difference 
in the rating performance before and after the financial crisis.  Rating 
performance depicts a stable outlook before the crisis, as reflected in 
the definite chances of maintaining the current rating grade.  
Conversely, rating performance after the crisis shows less stability 
and more variations.  Insurers are susceptible to the risk of rating 
downgrades, irrespective of their strong financial basis prior to the 
financial crisis. 
 
5.5.2 Comparative Rating Transition Analysis: General Insurers 
 
The study attempts to illustrate the effect of the financial crisis on 
general insurers. The total sample for this comparative analysis yields 
282 observations.  Out of the total observations, 218 observations are 
derived from general insurers, which dominate the sample.  The 
observations encompass the motivation and justification to investigate 
the effect of the financial crisis on general insurers. 
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Table 5.5.2.1 
Comparative Matrices Based on Two Different Financial Periods- 
Pre-Financial Crisis (pre-FC) and Post-Financial Crisis (post-FC) 
 
Matrix F, Pre-Financial Crisis 
Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
General Insurers, 85 Observations, 2006 - 2007 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ NR5 
A++ 100.00 0 0 0 0 0 
A+ 0 100.00 0 0 0 0 
A 0 0 100.00 0 0 0 
A- 0 0 13.33 86.67 0 0 
B++ 0 0 0 100.00 0 0 
NR5 0 0 25.00 0 0 75.00 
Note: No companies fall into the rating category for grades B+ and B during the   
observation period (2006 to 2007).  Thus, rows/columns for rating grades B+ and 
B are omitted from the table 
 
Matrix G, Post-Financial Crisis 
Rating Transition Matrix (%) 
General Insurers, 133 Observations, 2008 - 2010 
Rating: To(%) 
From (%) A++ A+ A A- B++ NR5 
A++ 100.00 0 0 0 0 0 
A+ 0 76.92 23.08 0 0 0 
A 0 0 100.00 0 0 0 
A- 0 0 25.00 75.00 0 0 
B++ 0 0 0 0 100.00 0 
NR5 0 0 0 50.00 25.00 25.00 
Note: No companies fall into the rating category for grades B+ and B during the 
observation period (2008 to 2010).  Thus, rows/columns for rating grades B+ and 
B are omitted from the table. 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 5.5.2.1 depicts the rating transition matrices for general 
insurers for both pre-FC (Matrix F) and post-FC (Matrix G) periods.  A 
general observation highlights that there are only six rating grades 
involved in the transitions (A++, A+, A, A-, B++ and NR5).  The rating 
grades tend to reflect insurers in the secure financial positions 
(secure grades are from B+ to A++).  Thus, a general assumption is 
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that all insurers in the estimation have good financial performance, 
that they can fulfill their insurance obligations, as reflected in the 
secure grades.  
 
Matrix F illustrates the rating performance in the pre-FC period.  It is 
apparent that insurers with higher rating grades (A++, A+ and A) 
show definite chances of maintaining their current rating grades 
(prob=1.000).  In addition, B++ rated insurers also reflect a strong, 
positive outlook of definite rating upgrade.  Observations on all grades 
show the tendency towards rating upgrades, and no risk of rating 
downgrades.  However, previous studies discuss that ratings are slow 
to react to changes, and that rating changes are better reflected in the 
long-run (Loffler 2005, Ekins et al 2012 and Gu et al 2014).  The 
sample in the pre-FC considers rating data over the period of two 
years, 2006 to 2007.  Thus, a two-year time horizon can be deemed a 
short period of observation – characterised by stable and less 
extreme rating changes. 
 
On a different perspective, Matrix G depicts general insurers’ rating 
performance in the post-financial crisis period.  Since the attempt is to 
detect differences, the outcomes from the matrix have realised this 
intention.  A++ and A rated insurers have proven to remain persistent 
in their position, showing no variation in both periods.  B++ rated 
insurers also have a higher chance of maintaining their current rating 
grade.  However, they reflected a better rating performance in the 
pre-FC period, where they have a probability of 1.000 to be upgraded 
to 1-rating magnitude.   
 
Interestingly, general insurers that have been assigned A+ rating 
grade are clearly susceptible to rating downgrades.  Their transition 
scores 0.2308 chance of a downgrade up to 1-rating magnitude.  In 
this case, A+ rated general insurers will experience rating downgrade 
to the next rating class, which is A.  Even though the magnitude of 
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change is not large, the impact of a rating downgrade could damage 
the company’s reputation and trigger adverse market reactions, as 
evident in prior studies by  Steiner and Heinke (2001) and Eckles and 
Halek (2012). 
 
5.5.3 Comparative Rating Transition Analysis: General 
Conclusions 
 
By looking at the previous matrices, it is evident that rating 
movements during the pre-financial crisis period are less chaotic 
compared to the post-financial crisis period.  Most insurers in the 
sample have a high probability of maintaining their current rating 
grade (as reflected in matrices with prob=1.0000).  This is indeed a 
very stable outlook throughout the pre-FC period.  The finding 
corresponds to the previous work of Ekins and Calabria (2012), that 
ratings are relatively stable in the short-run since rating agencies do 
not impart new information on a frequent basis.  Subsequently, rating 
assessment is costly and voluntarily.  Thus, frequent rating 
assessment entails cost that could potentially raise the cost of 
financial instruments (i.e. the price of insurance). 
 
However, matrices in the post-financial crisis period reflect more 
chaotic movements.  The fluctuation in rating trends in the post-
financial crisis period is evidence which supports the objective.  There 
is a significant difference in the rating performance after the financial 
crisis.  Similar fluctuation trends are observed for all insurers and 
general insurers.  The similar findings in Matrix E (All insurers, post-
FC) and Matrix G (General insurers, post-FC) could be due to the 
data in the sample being heavily dominated by general insurers (218 
observations from general insurers, approximately 77% out of total 
observations).  Thus, general insurers’ rating performance influences 
the overall performance.   
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Another noteworthy discussion relates to the deteriorating rating 
performance of A+ rated insurers, as reflected in the transition 
matrices.  Despite being assigned with secure grades, general 
insurers have higher degree of rating downgrades.  In contrast, there 
are several extreme cases like an NR5 (not formally followed 
category) insurers being upgraded up to A- or even A rating grade.  
Since the rating process in voluntary (Pottier and Sommer 1999), the 
absence of a proper rating grade does not imply that these 
companies are experiencing financial vulnerabilities.  There could be 
several possible explanations for this.  Firstly, the fees are 
unaffordable.  Secondly, the company does not need an annual-
based rating process but only seeks a rating to comply with a 
particular regulatory requirement. Thirdly,  the company is simply not 
motivated to obtain a rating.  All explanations do not signify weaker 
financial performance. 
 
Direct comparisons might be unfair due to different time-lengths (2-
year and 3-year) and the number of observations.  However, one 
general observation during the pre-financial crisis period is that there 
is less variation in rating activities and a higher probability of 
remaining in the current rating position in the short-run.  This trend is 
similar to other studies; ratings are slow to react to changes (Bottini 
1993, Altman and Rijken 2004, Löffler 2005 and Ekins and Calabria 
2012).  On the other hand, the effect of the financial crisis is illustrated 
in the post-financial crisis rating performance.  There are more 
fluctuations in the rating activities and less stability.  Insurers become 
more vulnerable towards rating shift, and a negative outlook 
(downgrade) could project a distress signal about their financial 
condition.  The trend corresponds to other claims (Schich 2009 and 
Harrington 2009) that the financial crisis does affect insurer’s financial 
performance, and changes in the rating grades reflect the effect. 
 
The comparative analyses are conducted to investigate the difference 
in the rating performance between pre-financial crisis and post-
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financial crisis.  Thus, it could be said that the objectives have been 
achieved through the comparison drawn - significant differences in 
rating performance are observed in both periods. 
 
5.6 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
This study also performs regression analysis in order to investigate the key 
financial determinants associated with the financial strength rating (FSR).  
The aim is to determine the financial determinants which have a greater 
influence on FSR as shown in the rating transitions. From the rating 
analysis, it is concluded that: 
i. There is a higher probability of a rating change, which concentrates 
on rating upgrades.   
ii. General insurers are more likely to be rated than life insurers. 
iii. Rating performance differs between the pre-FC period and post-FC 
period. 
 
The regression analysis will be performed to answer these research 
questions: 
i. Which financial determinants have the greater influence on the FSR 
rating? 
ii. Does FSR performance differ between the pre-FC period and post-FC 
period? 
 
Subsequently, the regression analysis will be performed in order to test the 
following hypotheses: 
H1:  Insurers with lower leverages will have a higher probability of 
obtaining a higher rating grade. 
H2: Insurers with higher profits will have a higher probability of obtaining a 
higher rating grade. 
H3:  Insurers with higher liquidity will have a higher probability of obtaining 
a higher rating grade. 
H4:  Larger insurers will have a higher probability of obtaining a higher 
rating grade. 
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H5:  Insurers with higher amount of reinsurance held will have a higher 
probability of obtaining a higher rating grade. 
H6:  Insurers with greater growth in annual surplus will have a higher 
probability of obtaining a higher rating grade. 
H7:  General and composite insurers are more likely to be rated than life 
insurers. 
H8:  Stock insurers are more likely to be assigned a higher rating grade 
than mutual insurers. 
 
5.6.1 Summary of Data Used in Regression Model 
 
The same sample set that has been used in the rating transition 
analysis will be used in this regression analysis.  The original sample 
consists of 57 insurers that are further reduced to 49 insurers.  The 
reduction is mainly due to limited data availability where at the time of 
the data compilation, financial data for the year 2010 were mostly not 
available.  Hence, the sample size is reduced and the time horizon, 
i.e., from 2006 to 2009.  Altogether, the dataset comprises of 190 
observations over the four-year period.  For this analysis, Stata SE 
12.0 and SPSS v.19 are used.  The data are summarised in Table 
5.6.1.1. 
 
Table 5.6.1.1 summarises the type of company, its organisational 
forms and rating grades obtained by insurers during the period of our 
study.  Based on figures in the table, there are 49 companies that 
produce 190 observations over the 4-year period.  According to the 
business type, general insurers are the majority while there are only 
three composite insurers.  Insurers are also clustered according to 
their organisational form.  Almost all insurers in the sample are stock 
companies/insurers except two which are mutual insurers.   
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Table 5.6.1.1 
Summary Data for Sample 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Business Type:      
  General 39 39 39 35 152 
  Life 7 7 7 5 26 
  Composite insurer 3 3 3 3 12 
  49 49 49 43 190 
      Organisational Form:      
   Stock insurer 47 47 47 41 182 
   Mutual insurer 2 2 2 2 8 
 49 49 49 43 190 
      
Rating Obtained:      
(5)  A++ (Superior) 5 5 4 4 18 
(4)  A+   (Superior) 13 13 13 7 46 
   (3)  A     (Excellent) 11 13 17 22 63 
(2) A- (Excellent) 14 12 11 9 46 
(1) B++, B+(Very  
Good) 
2 3 1 0 6 
(0) B or lower 4 3 3 1 11 
 49 49 49 43 190 
   Source: Author’s computation 
 
The third part of Table 5.6.1.1 refers to rating grades obtained over 
the years for all insurers.  In terms of its frequency, most insurers are 
rated as A, followed by A+ and A-.  Rating grade A++ is classified as 
superior grade and as seen in Table A, not many insurers in the 
sample are assigned with this rating grade.  On the other extreme, 
there are also cases of insurers falling into the lower rating grades (B 
and lower).  However, the number of observations in this category is 
relatively small if compared with the other rating grades. 
 
In the regression analysis, the rating grades are converted into 
numerical values.  The numerical values assigned to each rating 
grade are shown in parentheses.  Higher numerical values indicate 
higher rating grades.  The conversion follows approaches that have 
been adopted by Becker and Kennedy (1992) and Katchova (2013). 
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5.6.2 Descriptive analysis 
The analysis begins by providing a descriptive analysis for the data 
set. Table 5.6.2.1 provides a summary of insurance companies 
according to their annual assigned rating grades.  Companies are 
segregated according to their business type in order to provide a 
more detailed overview of the companies in the sample.  There are 49 
insurers in the sample and a total of 190 observations. 
 
Table 5.6.2.1 
Summary of Annually-assigned Rating Grades by Type of Insurers 
Business 
Type 
Rating 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
General A++ 5 5 4 4 18 
  A+ 7 7 7 4 25 
  A 10 12 14 18 54 
  A- 12 10 10 8 40 
  B++, B+ 1 2 1 0 4 
  B, NR5 4 3 3 1 11 
 Total 39 39 39 35 152 
        
Life A+ 4 4 4 0 12 
  A 1 1 2 4 8 
  A- 2 2 1 1 6 
 Total 7 7 7 5 26 
        
Composite A+ 2 2 2 3 9 
  A 0 0 1 0 1 
  B++, B+ 1 1 0 0 2 
 Total 3 3 3 3 12 
 Source: Author’s computation 
  
As in Table 5.6.2.1, the sample is dominated by general insurers with 
35 or more companies each year.  The variation in rating grades is 
also more noticeable for general insurers than for the others.  These 
variations are reflected in the table by a wider spread in rating grades 
for various years.  For example, the general insurer sample consists 
of insurers rated in eight rating grades – from the best to a vulnerable 
as well as not rated.    On the contrary, there are less than ten life 
insurers per year in the data set but all are graded A- and above.  
Conversely, the rating grade variations among life insurers are less 
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apparent, with concentrations on the higher rating grades (A+, A and 
A-). 
 
5.6.3 Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Regression 
Analysis 
 
Table 5.6.3.1 defines all the variables used in the regression analysis.  
Altogether, there are eight explanatory (independent) variables (IV) 
used in this research.  The dependent variable, which is RATING, is 
an ordinal variable.  The rating grades are converted into numerical 
scales, where higher numerical values indicate better rating grades. 
 
Table 5.6.3.1 
Variables Used in the Estimation 
Variable(s)  Measured by: Expected 
Sign Dependent Variable:   
RATING Ordinal DV Ordinal variable categorised into the 
following: 
 
 (FSR) 0 = if the firm is assigned a Best rating 
of B or lower 
 
  1 = if the rating is B++ or B+  
  2 = if the rating is A-  
  3 = if the rating is A  
  4 = if the rating is A+  
  5 = if the rating is A++  
Explanatory Variables:   
LEV Leverage Accumulated reserve divided by total 
assets 
- 
PROFIT Profitability Net underwriting expenses and losses 
divided by net premium earned 
+ 
LIQUID Liquidity Current assets divided by current 
liabilities 
+ 
LNSIZE Size Natural log of gross premium written + 
REINS Reinsuranc
e 
Annual reinsurance ceded divided by 
net premiums written 
+ 
GROWTH Growth Change in surplus + 
TYPE Business 
Type 
Dummy variable 
0 = general (non-life) insurer; 1=life 
insurer 
+/- 
FORM Organisatio
nal 
Form 
Dummy variable 
0 = stock; 1 = mutual insurer 
+/- 
𝜺𝒊𝒕 Error Term   
 Source: Author’s compilation based on the empirical literature 
 
142 
 
Table 5.6.3.2 illustrates the means, standard deviations, skewness 
and kurtosis of the variables.  The skewness value provides an 
indication of the symmetry of the distribution while the kurtosis value 
deals with the “peakedness” of the distribution (Pallant 2007, p.56).  A 
perfectly normal distribution would yield a skewness and kurtosis 
value of 0.  However, according to Pallant (2007), this is rather an 
uncommon occurrence in the social sciences. 
 
Table 5.6.3.2 
Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Regression Analysis  
(2006 – 2009) 
 Obs
. 
Mean Std. Dev. Prob. 
(Skewness) 
Prob. 
(Kurtosis) 
-----------Joint----------- 
  Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Adj. 
chi2(2) 
Prob>chi2 
Leverage 190 0.5273 0.22756 0.0840 0.6790 3.20 0.2024 
Profitability 190 0.6107 2.19490 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 
Liquidity 190 29.3601 89.84503 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 
Size 190 12.4001 1.73384 0.0147 0.7246 5.91 0.0521 
Reinsurance 190 1.7855 8.64985 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 
Growth 190 10.2004 22.70227 0.0000 0.0000 70.70 0.0000 
Form 190 0.04 0.201 0.0000 0.0000 61.50 0.0000 
 Source: Author’s computation. 
 
Based on the statistical values in Table 5.6.3.2, all variables except 
leverage and size, have yielded skewness and kurtosis values of 
0.0000, which indicate perfectly normal distributions.  However, other 
relevant tests of normality will be attempted in order to support the 
assumptions, based on these skewness and kurtosis values. 
 
5.6.4 Normality Tests for Model’s Residuals 
In this study, the normality tests of model’s residuals are also 
attempted.  Following any modeling procedure, the validity of the 
model should be assessed. Residuals and diagnostic statistics allow 
the researcher to identify patterns that are either poorly fit by the 
model, have a strong influence upon the estimated parameters, or 
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which have a high leverage. It is helpful to interpret these diagnostics 
jointly to understand any potential problems with the model.  
Normality tests for model’s residuals can be done either graphically or 
numerically.  The former include drawing a kernel-density plot 
(kdensity), standardized normal probability plot (pnorm) and quantiles 
of variables against the normal distribution plot (qnorm).  The latter 
involve the computation of Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia and 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests.  Both graphical and numerical tests will be 
conducted in order to evaluate the normality of the model’s residuals. 
 
Figure 5.6.4.1 
Kernel-Density, pnorm and qnorm plot on Model’s Residuals 
  
 
Source: Author’s computation using Stata SE v.12 
 
 
The kernel-density graph, pnorm and qnorm plot are shown in Figure 
5.6.4.1. Looking at the kernel density plot, it could be concluded that 
the residuals distribution estimates do not exactly follow the normal 
distribution line.  The same pattern is depicted in the pnorm plot.  The 
pnorm plot is more sensitive to non-normality at both ends of the data.  
In addition, the qnorm plot also shows slight deviation from normal at 
Pnorm plot 
Qnorm plot 
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the lower and upper tail, as can also be seen in the kernel density 
plot.   
Table 5.6.4.1 
Summary of Normality Test for Model’s Residuals 
Shapiro-Wilk Test 
Variable Obs. W V z Prob>z 
r 
(for residuals) 
190 0.9742 3.677 2.988 0.0014 
      
Shapiro-Francia Test 
Variable Obs. W’ V’ z Prob>z 
r 190 0.9752 3.861 2.784 0.0027 
      
Skewness/Kurtosis Test 
    -------------joint------------ 
Variable Obs. Pr(skewness) Pr(kurtosis) adj. 
chi2(2) 
Prob>chi2 
r 190 0.9351 0.2403 1.40 0.4963 
      
**the chosen alpha level (p-critical) is 0.05 
         Source: Author’s computation. 
 
In order to further support the argument, normality tests for model’s 
residuals are also conducted by using the Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-
Francia and  Skewness/Kurtosis tests.  The outcomes of the tests are 
summarized in Table 5.6.4.1.   
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test yields a p-value of 0.0014 (W-value is 0.9742), 
while the Shapiro-Francia test yields a p-value of 0.0027.  The null 
hypothesis (H0) for this test is that the data are normally distributed. 
The prob<z  listed in the output is the p-value. If the p-value is less 
than the chosen alpha level (0.05), then the null hypothesis that the 
data are normally distributed is rejected. If the p-value is greater than 
0.05, then the null hypothesis is not rejected. In this case, both p-
values generated by the Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests are 
less than the alpha level, thus the H0 is rejected. 
 
With regards to these values, it could be concluded that model’s 
residuals for this sample does not come from a normal distribution.  
An additional issue with the Shapiro-Wilk's test is that the larger size 
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of data increases the chances of rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Additionally, for large amounts of data even very small deviations 
from normality can be detected, leading to rejection of the null 
hypothesis event though for practical purposes the data is more than 
normal enough (Hiemstra 2013). 
 
5.6.5 Test of Multicollinearity 
The study computes the correlation coefficients for all independent 
variables (IV) included in the model.  The tests are performed to 
check for multicollinearity problem.  Multicollinearity problem could 
exist when there are more than two IVs used in the model.  It could 
also be caused by improper use of dummy variables.  The regression 
model includes eight IVs that incorporate two dummy variables to 
represent the type of business and organizational form. Thus, several 
tests are performed to address this issue. Table 5.6.5.1 depicts a 
matrix of Pearson Spearman correlation coefficients, together with the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance Factors (1/VIF).   
 
Table 5.6.5.1 
Correlation-Coefficient, VIF and 1/VIF 
 VIFs 1/VIF RATING LEV PROFIT LIQUID LNSIZ
E 
REINS GROWTH TYPE FORM 
RATING   1.000         
LEV 1.64 0.609 0.208 1.000        
PROFIT 1.57 0.638 0.045 -0.118 1.000       
LIQUID 1.27 0.786 0.169 0.206 0.042 1.000      
LNSIZE 1.12 0.894 0.360 0.313 -0.279 -0.058 1.000     
REINS 1.10 0.913 -0.012 -0.122 0.036 -0.051 0.016 1.000    
GROWT
H 
1.02 0.979 -0.038 0.040 -0.009 -0.061 -0.026 -0.023 1.000   
TYPE 1.02 0.980 0.139 0.554 0.016 -0.009 0.320 -0.062 0.050 1.000  
FORM 1.01 0.988 -0.163 -0.062 -0.006 -0.054 -0.093 0.018 -0.037 -
0.098 
1.000 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Based on the output in Table 5.6.5.1, observation shows that all 
variables except REINS, GROWTH and FORM have positive 
correlations with RATING. Correlation coefficients seem to be below 
0.70 which indicates the absence of multicollinearity.  Low VIF values 
also reflect this.  Thus, it can be concluded that multicollinearity is 
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unlikely to be a problem for these variables.  This assumption is also 
supported by the VIF and Tolerance factors where the calculated 
VIFs are all less than 1.70 and tolerances are more than 0.600.  
These values correspond to the cut-off points for determining the 
existence of multicollinearity, where the VIF value higher than 10.00 
or tolerance value less than 0.100 (Pallant 2007, p.156) indicates 
multicollinearity. 
 
5.6.6 Test of Heteroscedasticity. 
Several diagnostic tests are also employed in order to test for 
heteroscedasticity.  Heteroscedasticity can be caused by 
subpopulation differences or other interaction effects.  It could also 
occur due to the violation of assumptions or model misspecification.  
However, assuming that other assumptions have been met except 
heteroscedasticy, then this problem will not affect the parameter 
estimates in the regression.   
 
This study uses Breusch-Pagan (Cook-Weisberg) test and White’s 
General test to address heteroscedasticity in our sample.  Table 
5.6.6.1 depicts the results from several tests.  All tests are performed 
to observe heteroscedascity in the model. William (2009) provides a 
guideline on how to interpret the results above.  He shows that 
heteroscedasticity is reflected by the test statistics.  
Heteroscedasticity is observed when the test statistic shows a 
significant value.  Based on the p-value scores in all tests, 
heteroscedasticity is observed in the model.   
 
Berry and Feldman (2000) suggest several alternatives to treat 
heteroscedasticity problem.  First of all, analysts can re-specify the 
model or transform variables, assuming that there is an omission of 
important variables.  Secondly, analysts can employ robust standard 
error calculations to solve the issue and to generate more consistent 
results.Robust standard error does not change the coefficient 
147 
 
estimates, but it will change the standard error and t-value.  If 
heteroscedasticity is present, larger variation will be observed.  In the 
regression analysis, it will employ the robust standard error 
computation in order to treat the heteroscedasticity problem. 
 
Table 5.6.6.1 
Summary of All Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity 
Ho = Constant variance 
Variables = Fitted value of RATING 
Chi2(1) = 11.54 
Prob> Chi2 = 0.007 *** 
 
White’s General (IM) test for Heteroscedasticity 
White’s Test for Ho : homocedastic 
              against  Ha : unrestricted heteroscedasticity 
Chi2(34) = 61.55 
Prob> Chi2 = 0.0026 *** 
 
Cameron &Trivedi’s Decomposition of IM-Test 
Source Chi2 df p.value 
Heteroscedasticity 61.55 34      0.0026 *** 
Skewness 9.36 7      0.2281 
Kurtosis 2.31 1      0.1281 
Total 73.22 42      0.0020 *** 
*** sig. at the 1% level          ** sig. at the 5% level*Sig. the 10% 
level 
 
  Source: Author’s computation. 
 
5.6.7 Ordered Probit Regression Models (OPM) 
The ordered probit regression model (OPM) is employed as an 
estimation method in this study.  The decision to use the OPM is 
based on the characteristic on the dependent variable, which is 
RATING. The dependent variable is derived from the numerical 
conversion of the A.M Best rating.  Thus, the dependent variable is an 
ordinal variable, with more than two categories.   
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Based on previous studies, ordinal variables are best estimated using 
OPM models (Gaver and Pottier 2005, Grunert et al 2005,  Florez-
Lopez 2007 and Kartasheva and Park 2012).  The study estimates 
several different models to identify significant differences in the 
outcomes.  The models are: 
i. OPM for all insurers (Model 1 – Table 5.6.7.1). 
ii. OPM for all insurer – Alternatives (Model 2 – Table 5.6.7.2) 
iii. OPM by type of insurers (Model 3 – Table 5.6.7.3) 
iv. OPM by periods of financial crisis (Model 4 – Table 5.6.7.4). 
 
In order to reflect the effect of using robust standard error, the study 
will provide comparative estimation results.  The OPM for all insurers 
(Model 1) will be estimated using standard error and robust standard 
error.  It is predicted that there will be variations in the outcomes, 
especially the t-values.  The variable “size” in Model 1 is measured 
using the natural logarithm of gross premium written, as suggested by 
Van Gestel et al (2007) which they deemed appropriate to reflect the 
size of an insurance company.  The analysis is extended to 
incorporate the effect of using cluster robust standard error 
estimation. 
 
On the other hand, Model 2 will be estimated using an alternative 
approaches to measure size, growth and organizational form.  In this 
instance, size is measured by using the natural logarithm of the total 
assets.  This measurement has been widely used in measuring size 
for banks and other financial institutions (Malik 2011, Ismail 2012 and 
Burca and Batrinca 2014).  Growth will be measured by using the 
changes in total assets (Weiss 1998 and Hardwick and Adams 1999).  
Subsequently, organizational form will be changed in order to 
evaluate the effect when insurers become publicly-traded companies 
(i.e an insurer is quoted on the stock market). Form is a dummy 
variable, thus it will be adjusted accordingly (0 = publicly-traded 
company and 1 = privately-traded company).   Model 2 is estimated 
as a comparative study, to establish whether there is a significant 
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difference in the estimation by using different sets of variables’ 
measurement. 
 
Model 3 is an extension of the first model, by narrowing down the 
scope of investigation based on type of insurance companies.  There 
are three categories of insurers in the dataset – general, life and 
composite insurers.  Individual estimations based on these types are 
attempted in order to identify any significant differences in rating 
performance among general, life and composite insurers.  
Subsequently, Model 3 will also identify what are the key financial 
determinants that affect rating performance for each and every 
insurer. 
 
Model 4 is attempted to identify differences in the financial strength 
rating performance between two particular periods, the pre-financial 
crisis and the post-financial crisis periods.  Subsequently, the 
hypotheses will be tested against the findings derived from the 
regression analysis. 
 
Results in Table 5.6.7.1 shows that the computation of the robust 
standard error produces differences in both the standard error and 
statistical value (p-value denoted in parentheses).  Allison (1995) 
highlights that robust standard error can be used to treat 
heteroscedasticity and it will also generate more consistent results.   
 
As in Williams (2009), robust standard error does not change the 
coefficient estimates but it changes the t-value.  Evidence can be 
seen in the analysis, as the pseudo R2 values for both models did not 
change at all.  The validity of the model is proven by the Prob>chi(2) 
values, which is 0.000.  In addition, cluster robust standard error 
estimation is also attempted in order to obtain more variations and 
possible improvements with the regression results.   
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Table 5.6.7.1 
Regression Result for Model 1 
All insurers, 190 observations, 2006 -2009 
 
Panel A: The Estimation Result 
Variable Regression 1 
(OPM) 
Regression 2  
(Robust) 
Regression 3  
(Cluster Robust) 
RATING Coeff. Sig. Std. 
Err. 
Coeff. Sig. Robust 
SE. 
Coeff.   Sig.    Cluster 
                           SE. 
 
LEV .4341 
[.326] 
 .4416 .4341 
[.359] 
 .4731 .4341                .7846 
[.580] 
PROFIT .0780 
[.033] 
** .0366 .0780  
[.000] 
*** .0179 .0780    ***         .0269 
[.004] 
LIQUID .0022 
[.015] 
** .0010 .0022 
[.074] 
* .0013 .0022                .0020 
[.261] 
LNSIZE .2396 
[.000] 
*** .0511 .2396 
[.000] 
*** .0589 .2396    **          .1070 
[.025] 
REINS -.0014 
[.884] 
 .0088 -.0014 
[.835] 
 .0062 -.0014               .0046 
[.782] 
GROWTH -.0015 
[.634] 
 .0034 -.0015 
[.530] 
 .0026 -.0015               .0028 
[.573] 
TYPE .1510 
[.577] 
 .2707 .1510 
[.483] 
 .2153 .1510                .3472 
[.664] 
FORM -.8030 
[.038] 
** .3867 -.8030 
[.000] 
*** .1298 -.8030   ***        .2161 
[.000] 
 LR Chi2(8)         41.13 
PseudoR2         0.0698 
Prob>chi(2)       0.0000 
Wald Chi2(8)         123.78 
PseudoR2              0.0698 
Prob>chi(2)            0.0000 
Wald Chi2(8)      59.09 
Pseudo R2         0.0698 
Prob>chi(2)        0.0000 
    
Panel B: Marginal Effects 
LEV -.0341  [.344] -.0341  [.387] -.0341  [.066] 
PROFIT -.0061  [.060]   * -.0061  [.004]   *** -.0061  [.004]   * 
LIQUID -.0020  [.041]   ** -.0020  [.087]   * -.0020  [.001]    
LNSIZE -.0189  [.002]   *** -.0189  [.004]   *** -.0189  [.012]   ** 
REINS .0001   [.884] .0001   [.835] .0001   [.001] 
GROWTH .0001   [.636] .0001   [.529] .0001   [.001] 
TYPE .0119   [.583] .0119   [.489] .0119   [.034] 
FORM .0631   [.036]   * .0631   [.068]   *** .0631   [.043]   *** 
    
 
Panel C: Predictive Probability (Marginal Effect) on variable “FORM” 
FORM:    
  0 (Stock) .3411  [.007]   *** .3411  [.003]   *** N/A 
 1(Mutual) .4721  [.095]   * .4721  [.041]   ** N/A 
*** sig. at the 1% level               **sig. at the 5% level              * sig. at the 10% level 
Source: Author’s estimation using Stata SE v.12 
 
Cameron and Miller (2011) suggest that since the panel data has 
repeated observations on the individuals, it could be clustered 
according to the individuals (in this data set, individuals refer to 
insurance companies).  The clustered robust estimation has been 
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attempted by many scholars, Liang and Zeger (1986) and Arellano 
(1987) on grouped data, where the clustering is on the individuals.  
However, Moulton (1990), Pepper (2002) and Bertrand et al (2004) 
argue that there is no universal guideline to specify the clusters.  
Thus, based on the data, it is decided that the cluster robust standard 
error estimation will be attempted by clustering it according to the 
individuals (insurance company). 
 
Panel A in Table 5.6.7.1 shows that profitability, liquidity, company 
size and organizational form are positively related to rating.  Similar 
findings are evident from the first two models. However, the 
significance level differs.  The estimation with robust standard error 
produces more consistent results with a stronger association with the 
dependent variables.   
 
From Regression 2 – profitability, size and organizational form are 
positively and statistically significant with the p-value of 0.0000.  In 
addition, liquidity also has a positive influence on rating, but at a lower 
significant value, at 10%.  Assuming that the rest of the variables 
remain constant, the findings conform to the hypotheses as follows: 
 
H2: Insurers with higher profits will have a higher probability of 
obtaining a higher rating grade. 
 
The finding shows that profitability is a statistically significant (p-value 
0.000, sig. at 1%) factor that influence the dependent variable.  Thus, 
H0 is rejected and it is established that profitability is a key 
determinant in influencing the rating grades.  This finding corresponds 
to the previous study by Adams et al (2003). 
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H3: Insurers with higher liquidity will have a higher probability of 
obtaining a higher rating grade. 
 
Liquidity is positively associated with ratings (p-value 0.074, sig. at 
10%).  This is in line with other studies (Almajali 2012 and Omondi 
and Muturi 2013).  Insurers that have higher liquidity base will be able 
to fulfill their financial obligations to policyholders, thus depicting good 
financial performance. 
 
H4: Larger insurers will have a higher probability of obtaining a higher 
rating grade. 
 
Previous studies defined company size based on the total assets.  
However, this study differs slightly by measuring it against its gross 
premium written as in Van Gestel (2007).  Interestingly, evidence from 
the regression is able to support the hypothesis – there is a 
statistically significant association between company size and rating 
grades (p-value 0.000, sig. at 1%).  In this instance, it is concluded 
that gross premium written can be used to measure company size.  
 
H8: Stock insurers are more likely to be assigned higher rating grade 
than the mutual insurers. 
 
Again, the study embarks on a different approach by following 
Kartasheva and Park (2012).  Instead of mutual insurers, the study 
hypothesized that stock insurers are more likely to be assigned higher 
rating. However, the finding shows a negative linkage between 
organisational form and rating grade (p-value 0.000, sig. at 1%).  
Thus, the finding contradicts the hypothesis.  The sample shows that 
mutual insurers are more likely to be assigned higher rating grades 
than stock insurers. 
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On the other hand, leverage, reinsurance, growth and business type 
depict a statistically insignificant association with rating.  It is inferred 
that these variables might not be the key factors that affect rating 
performance.  Subsequently, findings from this analysis provide 
answer to the research question on the financial determinants that 
influence rating.  It is determined that profitability, liquidity, company 
size and organisational forms are the key determinants that influence 
rating grades assigned to insurers. 
 
Regression 3 (Clustered Robust SE) shows a slight variation to the 
other models in terms of its standard error estimation values and 
significant outcomes.  In cluster robust estimation, profitability, size 
and organizational form remains as significant predictors of rating 
performance.  Outputs in Regression 3 reflect similar point estimates 
as in the other models, but the standard errors are 
different.  Clustered Robust SE serves to increase the confidence 
intervals since it allows for correlation between observations. Hence, 
the higher the clustering level, the larger the resulting SE and outputs 
become less significant. 
 
Panel B in Table 5.6.7.1 addresses the marginal effects issue.  
Marginal effects show the change in explained or dependent variable 
when the predictor or independent variable increases by one unit 
(Torres-Reyna 2014).  All values in parentheses referred to the robust 
standard error values.  The marginal effects (from the robust 
estimation) of all the significant variables that influence rating grade 
performance could be summarized as follow.  Assuming that other 
variables remain constant: 
 
i. One unit decrease in profitability will significantly decrease the 
probability of obtaining a higher rating grade by 6.1%. 
ii. One unit decrease in liquidity will significantly decrease the 
probability of obtaining a higher rating grade by 0.2%. 
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iii. One unit decrease in size of the company will significantly 
decrease the chance of obtaining a higher rating grade by 1.89%. 
iv. One unit increase in organizational form will significantly increase 
the chance of obtaining a higher rating grade by 6.31%. 
 
The marginal effects clearly show that profitability, liquidity and 
company size as the key determinants that affect rating performance.  
On the other hand, organizational form also matters.  However, 
organizational form is a dummy variable.  Thus, one unit increase 
(changes) in organizational form reflects the difference between being 
a stock insurer and a mutual insurer (the values for the dummy 
variable is 0 = stock insurer and 1 = mutual insurer). 
 
Variable “FORM” in the estimation is a dummy variable.  It is created 
to reflect whether the insurance company is a stock insurer (dummy 
value = 0) or a mutual insurer (dummy value = 1).  These dummy 
values are categorical variable and it should be included in the model 
as series of indicator variables.  It could be further tested by 
computing the predictive probability of rating performance at each 
organisational form, holding all other variables in the models at their 
means.  The predictive probability of this variable is shown in Panel C 
(Table 5.6.7.1).    
 
Based on the results (Panel C), the predicted probability of obtaining 
higher rating grade is approximately 0.03 for stock insurers and 0.15 
for mutual insurers.  Both forms show statistically significant influential 
factors of rating performance (sig. at 1%).  This could further support 
the arguments in the empirical assumption that there is no definite 
association between organizational form and rating performance 
(Pottier and Sommer 1997, Van Gestel et al 2007 and Kartasheva 
and Park 2012).  In this instance, organizational form is one of the key 
determinants that influence rating performance.   
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Table 5.6.7.2 
Regression Results for Model 2 (Alternatives) 
All insurers, 190 observations, 2006 -2009 
Panel A: The Estimation Results 
 Regression A 
Alternative to SIZE 
Regression B 
Alternative to 
GROWTH 
Regression C 
Alternative to FORM 
RATING Coefficient          Sig. Coefficient           Sig. Coefficient          Sig. 
LEV    .9090     [.469]      *    .4225     [.474]            .4195    [.462] 
PROFIT    .0326     [.016]     **    .0780     [.018]    ***     .0780    [.019]   *** 
LIQUID    .0016     [.001]    .0023     [.001]      *     .0024    [.001]      * 
LNSIZE#    .0201     [.041]    .2385     [.060]    ***     .2430    [.058]   *** 
REINS    .0010     [.008]  -.0012      [.006]    -.0015    [.006] 
GROWTH#    .0022     [.003]  -.0005      [.010]    -.0012    [.003] 
TYPE    .1939     [.226]  -.1375      [.217]    -.1164    [.208] 
FORM#    .9436     [.145]   ***  -.7938      [.127]   ***    -.0381    [.239]        
    
No. of Obs. 190 190 190 
WaldChi2(8) 109.58 127.64 29.61 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Pseudo R2 0.0325 0.0696 0.0625 
    
Panel B: Marginal Effects 
LEV    -.0926    [.059]       -.0333    [.040]    -.0339    [.040]      
PROFIT    -.0033    [.002]     **    -.0061    [.002]   ***    -.0063    [.002]   *** 
LIQUID    -.0002    [.001]    -.0002    [.001]      *    -.0002    [.001]      * 
LNSIZE#    -.0021    [.004]    -.0188    [.007]   ***    -.0197    [.006]     ** 
REINS     .0001    [.001]     .0001    [.001]     .0001    [.001] 
GROWTH#     .0002    [.001]     .0001    [.001]     .0001    [.001] 
TYPE     .0198    [.024]     .0108    [.017]     .0102    [.020] 
FORM#     .0961    [.016]   ***     .0625    [.014]    ***     .0031    [.020] 
    
*** sig. at the 1% level               **sig. at the 5% level              * sig. at the 10% level 
Source: Author’s estimation using Stata SE v.12 
 
Table 5.6.7.2 provides alternatives to variables size, growth and 
organizational form.  Regression A depicts the estimation output 
using a different approach to measure company size.  In Regression 
A, instead of using the gross premium written, company size is 
measured using the total assets.  Based on the output, variables 
leverage, profit and form are the key financial determinants that 
influence rating performance of an insurer.  However, comparing the 
variable “size” with the estimation output in Model 1 (coefficient = 
0.2405, sig. at 1%), the outcome for variable “size” in this regression 
becomes insignificant.  Thus, it could be assumed that due to the 
operating and accounting differences of insurance companies, using 
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total assets to measure its size might not be a feasible approach.  
This could further support author’s decision to measure size of an 
insurer based on its gross written premium.  The finding also provide 
evidence to support the idea by Van Gestel et al (2007) who claim 
that size is an important rating determinant and its measure should 
appropriately be reflective on the company operations.  In this 
instance, insurance companies’ operations are different than banks 
and other financial institution.  Thus, the appropriate measure of size 
should be the gross premium written. 
 
Regression B shows the output by using a different approach to 
evaluate growth.  In this instance, instead of using changes in 
surplus, growth is measured by using the changes in total assets.  
Weiss (1998) claims that changes in total assets could be used to 
measure growth.  The output shows that, even though the 
measurement has been changed, growth is still an insignificant 
determinant of rating performance. A similar result is obtained from 
the regression in Model 1.  Thus, it could be concluded that growth is 
not a key factor that influence rating changes.  This finding conforms 
to Cole et al (2011) who establish that the impact of growth on 
potential ratings is ambiguous. 
 
Regression C provides alternative to measure organizational form.  
Form is a dummy variable to indicate the structure of the insurance 
companies.  The dummy variable is denoted as 0 for stock insurer 
and 1 for mutual insurer.  In this Alternative Model, organizational 
form reflects whether an insurance company is a publicly-traded 
company or a privately traded company.  The dummy values are 
modified to represent 0 for publicly-traded companies and 1 for 
privately-traded companies.  After the adjustments, the output shows 
that organizational form loses its predictive ability to influence rating 
performance.  Thus, it could be assumed that being a public-listed 
insurer does not help to improve rating performance. 
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Interestingly, in all regressions except Regression C, the variable 
form remains as the most significant determinant that influences 
rating performance (sig. at 1%).  The managerial decision making in 
the insurance industry relies on the organizational forms (stock or 
mutual insurer).  In addition, risk-taking, investment and product-mix 
strategies differ according to their ownership structure, contracting 
interest and internal governance.  Mutual insurers exercise more 
caution in their operations as compared to stock insurers.  Both 
insurers tend to obtain rating in order to promote their good reputation 
to the public and to protect their market shares (Pottier 1997).  This 
might be a possible justification to explain the importance of 
organizational form in a rating performance. 
 
Table 5.6.7.3 
Regression Results for Model 3 – By Type of Insurer 
General Insurers only, 164 observation, 2006 - 2009 
Panel A: Regression Results 
Variable  
RATING Coefficient Robust Std. Err. P>|z| 
LEV  .4367 .4603       .343 
PROFIT  .0752 .0152       .000 *** 
LIQUID  .0020 .0012       .092 * 
LnSIZE  .2011 .0600       .001 *** 
REINS -.0011 .0060       .851 
GROWTH -.0020 .0025       .452 
FORM -.7729 .1300       .000 *** 
Wald Chi2(7)    
Pseudo R2   
Prob> chi(2)                                 
            122.06 
            0.0556 
            0.0000 
 
   
Panel B: Marginal Effects 
LEV -.0432                       .0482 .371 
PROFIT -.0074                       .0025 .003 *** 
LIQUID -.0002                       .0001 .104 
LnSIZE -.0198                       .0078 .011 ** 
REINS .0001                        .0006 .851 
GROWTH .0002                        .0002 .450 
FORM .1310                        .0268 .000 *** 
*** sig. at the 1% level          **sig. at the 5% level                * sig. at the 10% level 
        Source: Author’s computation using Stata SE v.12 
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The regression results for Model 3 are shown in Table 5.6.7.3.  Model 
3 is estimated based on type of insurers, which in the data set 
includes general (non-life), and life insurers.  Altogether, there are 
190 observations over the four years period.  Out of these 190 
observations, 164 observations are from general insurers.  The 
balance of 26 observations is derived from life insurers.  Due to 
limited number of observations for life insurers, the model could not 
be estimated appropriately.  Thus, the estimation reported in Table 
5.6.7.3 focuses only on general insurers. 
 
Based on the outcomes in Table 5.6.7.3 (Panel A), it could be 
concluded that variables profit, size and organizational forms have 
proven to be statistically significant (sig. at 1%) determinants to 
influence rating performance.  In addition, liquidity is also one of the 
determinants that affect rating performance (p-value 0.092, sig. at 
10%).  The model therefore proposes that the rating performance for 
general insurers is positively related to leverage, profitability, liquidity 
and size and negatively related to reinsurance, growth and 
organisational form. 
 
In terms of the marginal effects (refer to Panel B), a one unit decrease 
in profitability will reduce the chance of obtaining higher rating grade 
of 0.0074.  Similarly, a decrease in size would also reduce the chance 
of obtaining good grades of about 0.02.  On the other hand, an 
increase in the organizational form indicates better chance of 
obtaining higher rating grade of 0.14.  In other word, mutual insurers 
have better chances of obtaining higher rating grades.  This 
contradicts the findings from Kartasheva and Park (2012) that 
highlight that stock insurers are positively related to firm’s rating.  All 
findings from this regression are applicable to general insurers only. 
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Table 5.6.7.4 
Regression Result for Model 4: Comparative Analysis 
Between Pre-Financial Crisis and Post-Financial Crisis periods 
All Insurers, 190 Observations 
Variables Pre-Financial Crisis Post-Financial Crisis 
 2006 - 2007 2008-2009 
RATING Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
LEV -.2141 [.680]  .2760  [.645]  
PROFIT -.0420 [.110]  .1038  [.024] *** 
LIQUID .0037  [.002]  .0014  [.020]  
LNSIZE .2355  [.085] *** .2665  [.089] *** 
REINS -.0046 [.004]  .0032  [.014]  
GROWTH -.0001 [.003]  -.0021 [.004]  
TYPE  .1782  [.308]      .5610 [.296]       * 
FORM -.5260 [.172] *** -.1865 [.000] *** 
Total Obs. 98  92  
Wald Chi2 (8) 57.36  101.74  
Prob> Chi2   0.0000  0.0000  
Pseudo R2   0.0622  0.1188  
     
Panel B: Marginal Effects 
LEV .0221  [.068]  -.0503 [.390]  
PROFIT .0043  [.012]  -.0041 [.002] * 
LIQUID -.0004 [.001]  -.0501 [.001]  
LNSIZE -.0243 [.011] ** -.0105 [.006] * 
REINS .0005  [.001]  -.0001 [.001]  
GROWTH .0001  [.001]  .0001  [.001]  
TYPE .0166  [.026]    .0350  [.031]  
FORM .0793  [.006] ** .1408  [.043] *** 
         *** sig. at the 1% level               ** sig. at the 5% level                 *Sig. the 10% level        
     Source:  Author’s computation 
 
 
Table 5.6.7.4 depicts the comparative regression analysis between two 
different financial periods, namely the pre-financial crisis period and post- 
financial crisis period.   The regression analyses are estimated using the 
robust standard error basis.  This analysis attempts to answer the research 
question – does the financial strength rating performance differ between 
these two periods of observation?  In addition, researcher would also like to 
identify the significant factors that cause the difference.  Many scholars have 
established studies on the existence of adverse effects caused by the 
financial crisis (Baluch 2009).  Additionally, Schich (2009) and Harrington 
(2009) predict greater probability of rating downgrades as the impact of the 
recent financial crisis.  Thus, this study investigates if similar conclusions 
can be observed in the sample. 
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The regression results provide evidence that rating performance differs 
between the two periods (pre-FC and post-FC).  Further analysis shows that 
the determinants that could influence rating grades also differ significantly.  
In the pre-FC period, company size and organizational form have 
established a statistically-significant relationship with rating grades.  
However, organizational form depicts a negative association with rating 
grades.  Company size shows positive linkage to rating performance.  Thus, 
it could be concluded that in the pre-FC period, rating performance is 
positively correlated to company size and negatively correlated to 
organizational form.  
 
Interestingly, profitability loses its influential power during the pre-FC period.  
A possible justification might be due to the period of observation which 
includes year 2007 in the pre-FC pool.  Based on the literature, the onset of 
financial crisis is mid-2007.  Thus, the variable profitability becomes an 
insignificant factor to influence rating performance.  It might be due to the 
impact of the financial crisis which is already apparent in 2007 and weakens 
insurer’s overall performance (Guinn et al 2008, Schich 2009 and Harrington 
2009).   
 
Conversely, results in the post-FC show a variation.  In line with the 
empirical studies that emphasized on the importance of profitability in 
financial performance, profitability becomes significant (p-value 0.000, sig.at 
1%) after the crisis.  Alternatively, profitability remains as one of the key 
determinants that influence rating performance and ensure survival of an 
insurance company.  A similar trend shows that company size and 
organizational form remain as the important factors to influence rating grade 
in both periods.  Company size is positively linked to rating grade (p-value 
0.003, sig.at 1%) while organizational form is negatively linked to rating 
grade (p-value 0.000, sig. at 1%).   
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Interestingly, in the post-FC period, business type also becomes one of the 
significant factors that influence rating grade (p-value 0.058, sig.at 10%).  
This might be due to the fact that general insurers tends to be more 
vulnerable to rating fluctuations during the crisis, while life insurers depict 
rating stability over the short run (Munich Re. 2014). 
 
Marginal effects shown in Panel B reflect slight variations between the two 
periods.  During the pre-FC period: 
i. a one unit decrease in company size will reduce the chance of 
obtaining higher rating grade by 2.43%. 
ii. a one unit increase in organizational form will increase the chance of 
obtaining higher rating grade of 7.9%. 
 
However, during the post-FC period: 
i. a one unit decrease in profitability will reduce the chance of obtaining 
higher rating grade by 0.4%. 
ii. a one unit decrease in company size will reduce the chance of 
obtaining higher rating grade by 1%. 
iii. a one unit increase in organizational form will increase the chance of 
obtaining higher rating grade of 14%. 
 
Apparently, organizational form remains as the most significant factor that 
influence rating performance.  In this instance, a mutual insurer has better 
chances of obtaining higher rating grades, as opposed to stock insurers. 
 
Thus, the findings manage to answer the research questions, which are: 
i. There is a significant difference in performance between the pre-
financial crisis period and post-financial crisis period.   
ii. The financial determinants that affect rating grade also differ.  Size 
and organizational form depict a statistically significant association 
with rating grade in the pre-FC period.  On the other extreme, 
profitability, size, business type and organisational form become the 
significant factors that influence rating grade in the post-FC period. 
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It is noteworthy to highlight that one of the findings contradict the empirical 
theory that serves as the basis of the hypotheses’ developments.  The 
researcher hypothesized that stock insurers are more likely to obtain a 
higher rating grade than mutual insurers (H7).  However, the finding reflects 
the opposite – there is a negative association between organization form 
and rating performance.  In this instance, mutual insurers are more likely to 
obtain a higher rating grade than stock insurers (p-value 0.000, sig. at 1%).  
Nonetheless, the association between organisational form and rating has 
never been established in previous studies.  This could be an indication that 
mutual insurers are still in a stronger financial position relative to stock 
insurers after the crisis.   
 
On the other hand, leverage, liquidity, reinsurance and growth are 
statistically insignificant in explaining rating performance.  Thus, we have to 
accept the null hypotheses that these factors do not influence rating grades. 
Alternatively, the performance of UK insurance companies is not 
determined, or not influenced by these factors.   
 
Perhaps a notable finding is related to the impact of growth on potential 
ratings.  Cole et al (2011) establish that the impact is ambiguous.  A strong 
growth position might reduce uncertainty and help to convey favorable 
financial position.  The study investigates the impact of growth on rating 
performance but it could not ascertain any association between growth and 
rating performance.  The findings show that growth is not a significant factor 
to explain rating changes. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter discusses relevant conclusions that can be derived from our 
analysis.  The significant research findings and major contributions will be 
summarized.  The implications and limitations of the study will also be 
addressed.  In addition, this chapter will also include recommendations for 
future research. 
 
6.1 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS. 
These conclusions are based on the theoretical foundation and empirical 
analyses that have been conducted in this study.  The conclusions are 
presented as follows: 
 
6.1.1 Rating Transition Analyses 
 On the reflection of a rating grade: 
A.M Best rating grades are assigned to insurers based on their 
financial ability to fulfill ongoing insurance obligations.  In this 
instance, ongoing insurance obligations refer to claim payments to 
policyholders as, and when, required. This could be associated with 
the nature of insurance business.  Insurance is a contract of 
uncertainty.  The timing and magnitude of loss are unknown until it 
occurs.  Thus, insurers must be in a financially-able position at all 
time, to fulfill their obligations under the contract.  The financial ability 
to do so is reflected in the rating grades assigned to the insurers. 
 
Rating grades are good indicators of insurer’s financial performance 
(Wang and Carson 2014).  Insurers who obtain higher rating grades 
can convey positive financial outlook to the market and the public.  
They will have more opportunity to secure new business growth and 
lower market cost of capital.   In return, customers or policyholders 
will have more assurance about the reputation of the company in 
fulfilling their financial obligations irrespective of the economic 
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outlook.  Thus, it is imperative for insurers to reflect good rating 
grades in order to protect their reputations. 
 
On the impact of a rating change: 
There are pros and cons following a rating change.  A rating upgrade 
signifies a positive outlook on the insurer’s financial performance.  
The market will react positively following a rating upgrade, providing 
more business opportunities and higher profitability in the long-run.  
Conversely, a rating downgrade poses threats to insurers.  Rating 
downgrade implies deterioration in insurer’s financial strength.  
Insurers might be experiencing financial difficulties, losses due to 
catastrophic risks or mismanagement issues.  These deficiencies will 
be considered in the rating assessment (A.M Best 2010) that will 
eventually impair the rating outlook of an insurer.  Thus, rating 
downgrades is not a favorable market indicator.  In addition, negative 
rating outlook (rating downgrade) triggers a negative reaction from the 
market (Eckles and Halek, 2012).  
 
On the trends in rating movement: 
The findings imply that insurers have a higher possibility of rating 
upgrades.  In addition, insurers with higher rating grades depict rating 
stability over the long run (Carty and Fons 1994).  In this instance, 
they have better chances of maintaining their current rating positions, 
signaling a stable financial performance.   
 
A notably contradictory finding shows that insurers with good rating 
grades are still susceptible to rating fluctuations.  This is evident in 
cases of A+ rated insurers.  Despite being rated in the superior 
category, these insurers reported higher possibility of rating 
downgrades.  The chances of a rating downgrade of the 
announcement that indicates a rating downgrade is indeed an 
unfavorable event in the market.  It reflects a negative outlook of the 
overall company performance.  In return, this will influence customers’ 
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perception towards the insurer and restrict new business 
opportunities. 
 
Interestingly, insurers in the lower rating categories depict positive 
rating outlooks.  They have a greater probability of being upgraded to 
a higher rating category, which is a favourable outcome.  In addition, 
the sample includes a special rating category, namely NR5.  These 
rating grades are assigned to insurers in the A.M Best database, on 
the basis that they have applied and obtained rating grades from the 
agencies, but they did not formally maintain regular rating 
assessment exercise.  Frydman and Schuermann (2008) state that 
the NR-grade itself does not reflect “good’ or “bad” rating 
performance.  In this study, NR5-rated insurers show remarkable 
chances of rating upgrades.  Thus it is concluded that NR-rated 
insurers do not signify poor financial performance. 
 
6.1.2 Regression Analyses 
 On the determinants of financial strength rating: 
The theoretical model hypothesises eight variables that could be the 
significant determinants of rating performance.  These include 
leverage, profitability, liquidity, company size, reinsurance, growth, 
type of business and organizational form. 
 
The findings affirm that the key financial determinants of financial 
performance, as reflected in the rating grades are influenced by 
profitability (Adams et. al 2003), liquidity (Almajali 2012 and Omondi 
and Muturi 2013), company size (Ahmed 2011 and Charumathi 2013) 
and organizational form (Kartasheva and Park 2012).  All these 
variables reflect a positive and statistically significant association with 
rating grades.  Conversely, leverage, reinsurance, growth and type of 
business depict no statistical association with rating grades.  The 
findings attest to this, hence it fails to reject the null hypotheses.   
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This study uses a different approach to define LNSIZE (company 
size) in the model.  Instead of using the total assets, it uses gross 
premium written as the basis for measuring company size (LNSIZE).  
Van Gestel et al (2007) argues that gross premium written is more 
applicable in an insurance setting while total assets more applicable 
to banks and corporations.  The finding from this study conform that 
gross premium written can be used as the basis to measure company 
size.  In fact, there is a statistically significant trend for LNSIZE in all 
regression models irrespective of the observation period or 
differences in model specifications.  Perhaps, this finding is the main 
contribution to the existing literature, on the definition and 
measurement of significant variables that influence the financial 
performance of insurance companies. 
 
6.1.3 Comparative Analysis 
 On the impact of the financial crisis: 
The findings show that insurers are not immune to the effect of the 
recent global financial crisis.  This conclusion is based on the 
comparative analyses that have been attempted, to reflect on this 
consequence.   
 
From the comparative rating transition matrices, the study detects 
more variations in rating movements in the post-financial crisis period.  
In addition, general insurers reflect less stable rating outlooks 
compared to life and general insurers.  Fluctuations in the rating 
movement are more noticeable, and general insurers that have been 
assigned rating grade “A+” are threatened by higher chances of rating 
downgrades.  This finding contradicts the underlying theory that 
emphasized insurers with higher rating grades depict rating stability 
and are less susceptible to rating downgrades (Carty and Fons 1994). 
 
From the regression analysis, it demonstrates that organizational form 
(FORM) is the most statistically significant determinant of rating 
performance.  However, it shows a negative association with rating 
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performance.  The findings reflect that mutual insurers are more likely 
to be assigned higher rating grades than stock insurers.  In this 
instance, mutual insurers depict better financial strength during the 
financial crisis event.  This is a good signal to the market, focusing on 
the financial stability and capacity to fulfill obligations even during the 
crisis period. 
 
In addition, company size (LNSIZE) is also one of the statistically 
significant determinants of rating performance.  The variable remains 
steadfast in both periods and shows remarkable stability.  Large 
companies are found to have a competitive advantage over small 
firms as large firms have extensive resources and have better 
position and capacity to compete in the market (Omondi and Muturi 
2013).   
 
In the pre-financial crisis period, the financial determinants that affect 
FSR are profitability, size and organizational form.  However, in the 
post-financial crisis period, only size and organizational form remains 
as significant factors that influence FSR.  Thus, it is assumed that 
insurers’s profitability are affected during the financial crisis.  
 
6.1.4 Insurers’ Financial Performance 
On the performance of general insurers: 
The focus of this study is to evaluate the performance of general 
insurers.  The motivation behind this selection is due to the nature of 
the general insurance business, which is known to transact short-term 
businesses.  Ultimately, the general insurers are exposed to higher 
risk, and the market itself is highly fluctuated and volatile.  Another 
downside to the general insurers is that they have more short-term 
obligations to fulfill, and this could lead to a higher tendency of 
experiencing financial problems in the short-run.  The findings affirm 
that the general insurance market is highly fluctuated and volatile.  
This is manifested in the fluctuations in rating transitions matrices and 
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wider variations across rating grades, as opposed to life and 
composite insurers.   
 
On the performance of life and composite insurers: 
Life and composite insurers show more stable rating trends compared 
to general insurers. A similar outcome shows that insurers with lower 
rating grades have a better possibility to be upgraded in the next 
rating assessment exercise.  On the contrary, life and composite 
insurers have lesser rating variations with concentration on the higher 
rating grades [i.e.: B+ and above].  This could be a positive signal to 
the market that these insurers have strong or good financial 
performance as reflected by the rating grades.   
 
However, the analyses in the study are restricted to a small sample 
size.  Life insurers and composite insurers represent only about 30% 
of the total sample.  Thus, this is not an ultimate conclusion on the 
issue of life and composite insurers’ performance. 
 
 
6.2 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE STUDY 
This study contributes to the current body of knowledge in the field of 
financial performance of insurance companies as follows: 
i. It analyses the rating trends of insurance companies in the UK in 
order to predict rating movements (upgrade or downgrade).  The 
trends are reflected in rating transition matrices, which include the 
degree of possible change (in percentage) and the direction of 
change (whether an insurer has the probability of a rating upgrade or 
a rating downgrade). To the best of author’s knowledge, rating 
transition analysis has not been attempted on UK insurer before this. 
 
ii. It investigates and determines the key financial determinants that 
influence rating grades assigned to insurers.  In this case, rating 
grades are significantly influenced by profitability, liquidity, company 
size and organisational form. 
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iii. It confirms the underlying theoretical foundation on the most 
appropriate measure of company size.  In an insurance application, 
company size is reflected better by using the gross premium written 
instead on the total assets. 
 
iv. It fills the gap in the literature by extending previous research to 
incorporate a different population (instead of US), a longer period of 
observations and different measurement for the variables. 
 
v. It analyses the impact of the recent financial crisis on insurance 
companies.  The impact is reflected by comparing insurers’ financial 
performance in two different periods – the pre-financial crisis and the 
post financial crisis.   The comparative analysis is performed on both, 
the rating transition analyses and the regression analyses.  Again, a 
comparative analysis on this subject has not been attempted by 
others since the financial crisis is a recent phenomenon that affects 
the insurance industry. 
 
6.3 A COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION ON THE FINDINGS 
This section will briefly compare the findings obtained from this study with 
findings obtained by other researchers.  Similarity and differences will be 
highlighted accordingly. 
 
On the rating transition analyses: 
Compared to bond ratings, there is still lack of studies on insurance rating 
transitions (Wang and Carson 2014).  This study attempts to extend the 
work of Wang (2010) and others by concentrating on insurance companies 
in the United Kingdom (UK).  To the best of author’s knowledge, there has 
been less discussion on insurer’s rating changes in the UK compared to the 
US. Thus, this study seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating 
rating trends and forecasting rating transitions of the UK insurers.    The 
analyses demonstrate significant degree of rating changes, which is 
reflected by the rating fluctuations in the matrices.  
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Theoretically, insurers with higher (better) rating grades depict rating stability 
over the long-run (Jafry and Schuermann 2004).  Their study focus on credit 
rating history of S&P rated US firms.  They concluded that these insurers 
have better chances of maintaining their current rating position, which 
reflects stability in their financial performance.  The same idea is 
hypothesized by Wang and Carson (2014) on an US based study.  
Interestingly, findings from this study show that insurers in the lower rating 
categories depict positive rating outlooks with higher probability of rating 
upgrades. In addition, a notable contradicting finding shows that insurers 
with good rating grades are still susceptible to rating fluctuations.   
 
Evidence form the analysis shows that A+ rated insurers reported higher 
degree of rating downgrades.  This is a negative outlook on the financial 
performance of the insurer which could influence customers’ perception 
towards the insurer and restrict new business opportunities.  Similar to 
Kartasheva and Park (2012), general insurers in the sample are more likely 
to be rated and depict higher rating grade variations over the years.   
 
On a global perspective, Hadad et al (2009) study the rating migration of 
financial corporations in Indonesia.  They conclude that the creditworthiness 
and rating grades of financial companies improve over time.  However, the 
findings from this study depict rating fluctuations over time, and that general 
insurers have the most fluctuations in the rating trends.  This might be due to 
the impact of the financial crisis, which is illustrated in the rating fluctuations. 
 
As a general conclusion, findings derived from this study differ from the 
previous studies.  The differences might be due to different insurance 
industry are subject to difference regulation and supervision.  The UK 
insurance industry is subject to dual-regulation, which is aimed to protect 
both the players and the customers in the industry.  In addition, findings from 
this study also depict rating fluctuations over years.  The inclusion of 
financial crisis periods in the data set might affect the rating trends, as 
reflected by the fluctuations. 
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On the regression analyses: 
Previous studies such as Pottier and Sommer (1999) and Gaver and Pottier 
(2005) focused on US insurers.  In these studies, company size is defined 
insurance based on the total assets.  However, Van Gestel et al (2007) 
argue that the total assets are more appropriate in evaluating the banking 
sector while gross premium written is more relevant in assessing the 
insurance sector. Hence, this study adopts a different basis of measuring 
company size, which is the gross premium written as suggested by Van 
Gestel et al (2007).    
 
Kartasheva and Park (2012) focus their study on US insurers that are 
exposed to catastrophic risk.  In their study, they hypothesized that stock 
insurers are more likely to be assigned higher rating grades.  Similar 
hypothesis is adopted in this study.  However, the findings failed to support 
this notion, where there is a negative linkage between organizational form 
and rating grade.   It signifies that mutual insurers are still superior in terms 
of their financial performance and these insurers have higher tendencies to 
obtain higher rating grades compared to stock insurers.   
 
This study extends the work of Gaver and Pottier (2005) by expanding the 
time horizon.  Gaver and Pottier studied 80 publicly-traded US general 
insurers for one year, which is 1997.  This study manages to shift the focus 
group by incorporating UK insurers over a 4-year period.  By expanding the 
time horizon, findings from this study are able to reflect that rating trends 
fluctuate over the long run.  In addition, general insurers are exposed to a 
larger degree of rating fluctuations, as opposed to life insurers.  
 
On a global perspective, findings from this study conforms to Almajali (2012) 
and Omondi and Muturi (2013).  From these studies, it is concluded that 
profitability and company size remain as key determinants that influence 
financial performance.  A study on the Romanian insurance industry 
conducted by Burca and Batrinca (2014) also conforms to these findings.   
However, these studies also use total assets as proxy to company size.   
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Hence, this study seeks to contribute new findings to the literature, by using 
a different approach to measure company size.  Interestingly, even though 
with a different measurement basis, the result from the regression is able to 
support the hypothesis, that there is a statistically significant association 
between company size and rating grades.  Thus, it could be concluded that 
gross premium written can be utilised and is appropriate to measure 
company size.    
 
On the other hand, leverage, reinsurance and growth depict a statistically 
insignificant association with rating grades.  It could be inferred that these 
variables might not be the key determinants that affect rating performance of 
an insurer. 
 
6.4 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FROM THE STUDY 
The first implication of this study is related to the company size.  Since 
company size is significant for determining rating performance, insurance 
companies should put more efforts to strengthen their company size and to 
seek alternatives that could help to increase size.  In this study, size is 
defined on a gross premium written basis.  As such, gross premium written 
relates to the number of insurance contracts that have been sold to 
consumers, both private and commercial insurance buyers.  Thus, gross 
premium written increases as the volume of insurance purchases increases.  
A key issue is how do insurers expand their businesses in order to increase 
the gross premium written?  
 
The study recommends that insurers should expand their businesses in 
order to achieve an optimum size and to enjoy economies of scale.  An 
optimum size will ultimately strengthen financial performance.  Large 
insurance companies are in a better position to create robust supporting 
infrastructures to enhance business operations.  Some of the expansion 
strategies are to reform risk management standard, upgrade information 
management systems and improve their technical and management 
expertise.  In addition, business expansion should also consider introducing 
innovative and more diversified products targeted at both local and 
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international markets.  Product diversification is a good strategy to tap into 
existing, and new markets.  These actions are essential to ensure business 
sustainability and competitiveness in the insurance industry. 
 
The second implication is that general insurers are more susceptible to the 
risk of financial instability.  The nature of their short-term business increases 
fluctuations and volatility in the market.  General insurers are more 
susceptible to risk, due to the short-term financial obligations.  Thus, they 
have to establish strong financial capacity in order to fulfil their obligations to 
policyholders.  General insurers have to adopt proactive strategies to 
stabilise rating fluctuations, with concentration on strengthening their capital, 
profitability and liquidity bases.  These are the key determinants that could 
influence the overall financial performance on an insurance company. 
 
The third implication is that rating is slow to react to changes. Thus, any 
discrepancies or financial distress will not be reflected in the rating trends 
over a short period of observation.  In other words, rating trends in the short-
run remain stable, without any volatile changes.  Since rating is slow to 
change, this could be an advantage to the insurer.  In this case, 
understanding the determinants that affect rating changes is a beneficial 
effort.  By understanding the mechanics of rating changes, insurer could 
react immediately to rectify and improve their financial conditions.  In 
addition, insurers might be able to devise appropriate strategies to 
strengthen their financial performance, ensure rating stability or to attain 
rating upgrade.  Consequently, better financial performance relates to higher 
rating grades which are more favorable than rating downgrades. 
 
The fourth implication is the analyses strategies in this study provide useful 
tools to evaluate the financial performance of insurance companies.  
Insurers can attempt to generate the rating transition matrices in order to 
predict their rating trends.  Subsequently, insurers can also adopt the 
regression model to identify the most significant determinants that affect 
their FSR performance.  These analyses can serve as the initial or internal 
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assessment that could be done by each and every insurance company in 
order to detect financial problems at its inception.   
 
6.5 CRITIQUE OF THE RATING AGENCIES – CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST 
The principal rating agencies in the industry have two important functions in 
the capital market.  First, they play a valuation role by disseminating rating 
information to the market participants.  Second, the agencies facilitate 
financial regulation and monitoring, since the rating grades that they 
published are efficient and reliable credit quality benchmark (Frost 2006). 
 
Rating agencies actions are primarily influenced by the incentive to protect 
their reputation as the delegated monitoring agencies.  The conflict of 
interest arises out of the agencies’ financial incentives to accommodate the 
preference of the obligors (rated companies) since the agencies are chosen 
and compensated (fee) by the obligors (Covitz and Harrison 2003).  The 
incentives contradict the agencies’ primary objectives which are to be an 
independent body and to be objective in the rating assessment process.  
Subsequently, the conflict of interest is also triggered by the agencies’ 
economic interest in basing a credit rating on anything other than an 
obligor’s creditworthiness (IOSCO 2003).  The actual conflict of interest 
could distort agencies’ objectivity and influences the rating process.   
 
Prior to the 1970s, financial incentives for rating agencies are structured as 
paid subscription fee basis.  However, this incentive structure loses its 
reliability, becomes obsolete and is replaced by fee/charges imposed on the 
obligors.  Obligors are willing to pay high rating fees since they would benefit 
from positive rating outlooks (rating upgrade) (Cantor and Packer, 1994).  It 
has been debated that rating agencies reliance on fees might encourage 
them to issue more favorable ratings and to be less diligent in probing for 
negative information (SEC 2005). 
 
The recent criticisms on rating agencies are about the timeliness to change 
the rating grades and the stringent assessment practices (Frost 2006 and 
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White 2010).  In addition, Frost (2006) highlights three key issues relevant to 
rating agencies, which are timeliness, stability and accuracy.  Cases of 
major financial institution failures such as Enron (in 2001), Worldcom (in 
2002) and Lehman Brothers (2008) further demonstrated that rating 
agencies are slow to react to changes.  In addition, one could question the 
tardiness of the rating agencies in adjusting the credit rating of the obligors. 
 
Covitz and Harrison (2003) claim that if a conflict of interest strongly 
influenced the rating agency assessment, the agencies will react slower to 
negative outlooks (potential rating downgrade), especially if it is associated 
with their larger clients.  Egan-Jones (2002) argues that rating agency's 
reliance on financial incentives leads to many unmanageable conflicts of 
interest, thus hampering their objectivity and accuracy of the rating 
assessment.  Frost (2006) summarises three key issues relevant to rating 
agencies, which are timeliness, stability and accuracy. 
Harrington (2011) claims that said ratings agencies suffer from a conflict of 
interest since these agencies are paid by the firms that applied for a rating 
assessment.  In addition, he said that the conflict of interest exists in all 
levels of employment, from entry-level analyst to the chairman and chief 
executive officer of the rating agency.  As a former senior president at 
Moody’s, Harrington claims that Moody's uses a long-standing culture of 
"intimidation and harassment" to persuade its analysts to ensure that the 
rating’s issued will be able to satisfy the client’s requirement. A similar 
conflict of interest exists in other rating agency practices.  Hence, the US 
financial regulator - the securities and exchange commission (SEC), is 
deliberating new rules to reform the agencies in order to solve the conflict of 
interest issues. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) was implemented in July 2010.  The Act is introduced as a corrective 
measure after the global financial crisis. Among its various provisions, Dodd-
Frank defines a series of broad reforms to the Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) 
market. Dodd-Frank’s CRA provisions significantly increase CRAs’ liability 
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for issuing inaccurate ratings, and make it easier for the SEC to impose 
sanctions and bring claims against CRAs for material misstatements and 
fraud.  However, CRAs respond to the increased regulatory pressure by 
issuing lower, less informative corporate bond ratings to protect their 
reputation.  Small (2014) claims the Dodd-Frank Act has led to a loss of 
information in the market for corporate credit ratings. Hence, regulators and 
policymakers continue to debate the best way to restructure the credit rating 
industry and the conflict of interest issue. 
6.6 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
The major limitations of this study are the sample size and access to data.   
Our study requires two datasets in the analysis, which are the rating data 
and the financial data.  These data, however, are not completely available to 
the public.  Thus, this study derives small sample size, restricted to 
companies with complete and available data during the period of 
observation.  A possible justification for this limitation is that the rating 
assessment is a voluntary practice and is costly.  Thus, it is not necessary 
for insurers to obtain a rating or to maintain the rating assessment on a 
frequent basis.  The same issue has been raised in many studies (Hadad et. 
al 2009, Ismail 2013 and Burca and Batrinca 2014). 
 
The rating transition matrices are based on the cohort method.  It is a 
discrete estimation approach that has been used by many credit managers 
to predict future changes in ratings (Xing et al 2012).  However, the analysis 
can be expanded to adopt a continuous estimation approach.  The 
continuous approach requires access to continuous-time information on 
rating transitions, and the exact dates of rating changes.  The results from 
the continuous estimation approach should reflect better and updated 
information on rating movements.  However, continuous-time rating data are 
costly, which is a constraint in this study. 
 
Furthermore, the rating transition matrices only reflect rating transitions 
(movement from one rating grade to another, an upgrade or a downgrade) 
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but it does not justify the reasons for the transitions.  Thus, future research 
should attempt investigate the justifications of a rating change, as reflected 
in the transition matrices.  The justification could be incorporated in the RTM 
analyses, hence it will provide precise findings and better understanding 
about the fundamental theory of rating transitions. 
 
Eight firm-specific factors are included in the regression analysis.  The 
inclusion of these variables relies heavily on the available financial 
information, drawn from the database.  The variables also focus on financial 
indices that have been proven to be significant determinants of the financial 
performance of the insurance companies.  The study adheres to the variable 
guidelines proposed by Van Gestel et al (2007) on the most appropriate 
variables to measure rating performance, which is applicable to all types of 
insurers.  However, the inclusion of non-financial determinants, or qualitative 
factors will produce more accurate estimations in evaluating financial 
performance.  Such data (qualitative factors) were not available in this study, 
which is another limitation and should be addressed in future research. 
 
The opportunity to investigate this research theme is boundless.  It might be 
feasible to investigate the impact of listed insurance companies on insurer’s 
financial performance.  In addition, the inclusion of qualitative variables in 
the analyses will produce more accurate estimations and better evaluation in 
assessing insurer’s financial performance. 
 
Further investigations could also be done to study the impact of the recent 
global financial crisis on insurance companies.  Instead of focusing on the 
UK insurance industry, future studies should focus on other industries such 
as the European countries or Asian insurance markets.  It is also 
recommended to conduct a comparative analyses based on geographical 
basis.  Thus, better conclusions could be derived about the financial 
resilience of an insurance company, relative to the others.  Alternatively, 
insurer performance could also be compared by looking at the rating grades 
assigned by different rating agencies and type of insurance business. 
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The rapid evolution of the industry worldwide provides an indefinite avenue 
for research.  The recent global financial turmoil had caused large losses in 
the industry and the latest regulatory reforms change the industry.  All these 
evolutions and threats necessitate further investigations and should be the 
focus in future researches. 
 
6.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Financial performance is not a new theme in scholarly research.  The topic 
has been discussed by many, perhaps as early as 1967 (Denenberg 1967).  
Nevertheless, the opportunities to investigate this topic are unlimited.  In 
addition, insurance companies are principal players in dynamic financial 
markets and the evaluation of the performance and creditworthiness has 
become more important nowadays.   
 
The well-being of insurance companies is of importance to various 
stakeholders such as policyholders, policymakers, investors and managers.  
However, research on insurance companies is much more limited and does 
not offer a very clear result about feature selection, models, methods and 
accuracy results (Florez-Lopez 2007 and Doumpos et al 2012). 
 
This study has proposed several appropriate models to analyse financial 
performance of insurance companies.  The analysis is based on the rating 
grades assigned to insurers.  The rating grades are analysed using non-
Markov model and rating transition matrices, while the key determinants that 
affect the rating grades are determined using ordered probit regression 
models.   
 
The findings from the empirical analyses managed to answer all research 
questions and are summarized as follow: 
i. There is a higher probability of rating upgrades than rating 
downgrades as reflected in the rating transition matrices (answering 
research question 1) 
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ii. There is an outstanding difference in the rating performance between 
the pre-financial and post-financial crisis periods (answering research 
question 2). 
iii. It is determined that profitability, liquidity, company size and 
organizational form are the key determinants that influence FSR 
performance (answering research question 3). 
iv. There is a significant difference in performance between the pre-
financial and post-financial crisis periods (answering research 
question 4). 
 
Despite all limitations, evidence and findings derived from this study provide 
useful insights into the determinants of the financial performance of the 
insurance companies in the UK.  The followings are concluded: 
i. Rating changes are influenced by profitability, liquidity, size of the 
company and organisational form.   
ii. In a stable economic outlook, stock insurers tend to achieve 
higher rating grades than mutual insurers.  However, in an 
unstable environment, the financial performance of mutual 
insurers remains strong, as reflected in higher rating grades.   
iii. Size of a company is one of the most significant factor that affects 
financial performance.  In addition, this study affirms that using 
gross premium written as the basis for measurement does not 
violate the theoretical foundation.   
iv. The financial performance of general insurers fluctuates and less 
stable compared to the life and general insurers.  Their 
performance is mostly affected by the recent financial crisis.  
Subsequently, their rating performance also demonstrates a 
similar trend, indicating that the general insurance market is a 
volatile market. 
v. The combination of multiple approaches to evaluate financial 
performance provide more accurate justification of the subject 
matter and can be applied by all insurers as internal assessment 
of their own financial performance. 
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APPENDIX A – Company Identification 
 087400  Amtrust Europe Limited  
087492  Aviva Annuity UK Limited  
087222  Ansvar Insurance Company Limited  
077102  Arch Insurance Company (Europe) Limited  
084806  Aspen Insurance UK Limited  
085250  Aviva Insurance UK Limited  
085047  Aviva International Insurance Limited  
086137  Aviva Life & Pensions UK Limited  
086954  Brit Insurance Limited  
077622  Catlin Insurance Company (UK) Ltd.  
085266  CGNU Life Assurance Limited  
085630  Chubb Insurance Company of Europe SE  
087873  Commercial Union Life Assurance Company  
086286  Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc  
087327  Electrical Contractors' Insurance Co Ltd  
083234  Endurance Worldwide Insurance Limited  
086628  Faraday Reinsurance Co Limited  
086695  First Title Insurance plc  
086513  FM Insurance Company Limited  
086483  General Reinsurance UK Limited 
087366  Globe Insurance Company Limited 
078730  Hartford Financial Prod Int'l Ltd 
085551  Hannover Life Reassurance (UK) Limited 
086160  Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC 
078652  InterGlobal Insurance Company Limited 
086912  Hiscox Insurance Company Ltd 
086999  HSB Engineering Insurance Limited 
086486  International Ins Co of Hannover Limited 
078390  Lancashire Insurance Company (UK) Ltd 
084279  Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd 
087425  Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe Limited 
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085202  Lloyd's of London 
085106  London Assurance 
087438  London General Insurance Company Ltd 
084203  London General Life Company Limited 
090092  Stewart Title Limited 
085108  Sun Insurance Office Limited 
086222  Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc 
086497  Sunderland Marine Mutual Ins Co Ltd 
087376  Travelers Casualty & Surety Co of Europe 
088986  Torus Insurance (UK) Limited 
084975  TT Club Mutual Insurance Limited 
085363  Travelers Insurance Company Limited 
087660  USAA Limited 
083829  W R Berkley Insurance (Europe) Ltd 
087674  XL Insurance Company Limited 
078187  Newline Insurance Company Limited 
087802  Pinnacle Insurance plc 
086126  QBE Insurance (Europe) Limited 
086257  Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Plc 
085187  Royal & Sun Alliance Reinsurance Limited 
089074  SCOR Insurance (UK) Limited 
085448  SCOR UK Company Ltd 
085619  Skandia Life Assurance Company Limited 
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APPENDIX B  
Stata.do file: RTM All Insurers 
 
log using rtmall.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\rtmall.dta", clear 
*DECLARING THE PANEL DATA SET USING XTSET 
xtset ratee year 
*TABULATING THE DATA USING XTTAB 
xttab rating 
*GENERATING 8-YEAR RATING TRANSITION MATRIX USING XTTRANS 
xttrans rating 
*SCREENING DATA FOR 5-YEAR ANALYSIS  
keep if year==2006|year==2007|year==2008|year==2009|year==2010 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE 5-YEAR 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
xttrans rating 
*SCREENING DATA FOR 3-YEAR ANALYSIS  
keep if year==2008|year==2009|year==2010 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE 5-YEAR 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
xttrans rating 
log close 
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APPENDIX C  
Stata.do file: RTM by Type 
log using rtmtype.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\rtmall.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR 5-YEAR ANALYSIS 
SPECIFIC TO GENERAL INSURERS (Bustype==1) 
keep if year==2006|year==2007|year==2008|year==2009|year==2010 
keep if bustype==1 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE 5-YEAR 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR GENERAL INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
xttrans rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using rtmtype.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\rtmall.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR 5-YEAR ANALYSIS 
SPECIFIC TO LIFE INSURERS (Bustype==2) 
keep if year==2006|year==2007|year==2008|year==2009|year==2010 
keep if bustype==2 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE 5-YEAR 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR LIFE INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
xttrans rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using rtmtype.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\rtmall.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR 5-YEAR ANALYSIS 
SPECIFIC TO COMPOSITE INSURERS (Bustype==3) 
keep if year==2006|year==2007|year==2008|year==2009|year==2010 
keep if bustype==3 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE 5-YEAR 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR LIFE INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
xttrans rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
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APPENDIX D  
Stata.do file: RTM Comparative 
log using rtmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\ratingfc.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO PRE-FC (Fc==1), GENERAL INSURERS 
(Bustype==1) 
keep if fc==1 
keep if bustype==1 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE PRE-FC 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR GENERAL INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using rtmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\ratingfc.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO PRE-FC (Fc==1), LIFE INSURERS (Bustype==2) 
keep if fc==1 
keep if bustype==2 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE PRE-FC 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR LIFE INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using rtmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\ratingfc.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO PRE-FC (Fc==1), COMPOSITE INSURERS 
(Bustype==3) 
keep if fc==1 
keep if bustype==3 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE PRE-FC 
RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR COMPOSITE  INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
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log using rtmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\ratingfc.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO POST-FC (Fc==2), GENERAL INSURERS 
(Bustype==1) 
keep if fc==2 
keep if bustype==1 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE POST-
FC RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR GENERAL INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using rtmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\ratingfc.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO POST-FC (Fc==2), LIFE INSURERS 
(Bustype==2) 
keep if fc==2 
keep if bustype==2 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE POST-
FC RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR LIFE INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using rtmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\ratingfc.dta", clear 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES SCREEN THE DATA FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO POST-FC (Fc==2), COMPOSITE INSURERS 
(Bustype==3) 
keep if fc==2 
keep if bustype==3 
*THE NEXT FEW LINES DECLARE, TABULATE AND GENERATE POST-
FC RATING TRANSITION MATRIX FOR COMPOSITE INSURERS 
xtset ratee year 
xttab rating 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
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APPENDIX E  
Stata.do file: Heteroscedasticity Tests 
 
log using hettest.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\opmfsr.dta", clear 
*REGGRESSING THE MODEL USING REG 
reg rating lev profit liquid lnsize reins growth type form 
*PERFORMING BREUSH-PAGAN TEST 
estat hettest 
*PERFORMING WHITE’S GENERAL TEST FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
quietly reg rating lev profit liquid lnsize reins growth type form 
estat imtest, white 
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APPENDIX F  
Stata.do file: OPM All Insurers with Robust Standard Error 
log using opmfsr.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\opmfsr.dta", clear 
*DECLARING (XTSET), DESCRIBING (XTDES) AND SUMMARISING 
DATA (XTSUM) 
xtset coid year 
xtdes 
xtsum 
*REGRESING THE MODEL USING OPM (OPROBIT) 
oprobit rating lev profit liquid lnsize reins growth type form 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using opmfsr.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\opmfsr.dta", clear 
*DECLARING (XTSET), DESCRIBING (XTDES) AND SUMMARISING 
DATA (XTSUM) 
xtset coid year 
xtdes 
xtsum 
*REGRESING THE MODEL USING OPM (OPROBIT) ROBUST 
ESTIMATION (VCE) 
oprobit rating lev profit liquid lnsize reins growth type form, vce(robust) 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
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APPENDIX G  
Stata.do file: OPM All Insurers Comparative 
log using opmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\opmfc.dta", clear 
*DECLARING (XTSET), DESCRIBING (XTDES) AND SUMMARISING 
DATA (XTSUM) 
xtset coid year 
xtdes 
xtsum 
*SCREENING DATA FOR PRE-FC ANALYSIS (Fc==1) 
keep if fc==1 
xtset coid year 
xtdes 
xtsum 
*REGRESING THE MODEL USING OPM (OPROBIT) ROBUST 
ESTIMATION (VCE) FOR PRE-FC ANALYSIS 
oprobit rating lev profit liquid lnsize reins growth type form, vce(robust) 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
log using opmfc.log, replace 
use "C:\Users\User\Documents\opmfc.dta", clear 
*DECLARING (XTSET), DESCRIBING (XTDES) AND SUMMARISING 
DATA (XTSUM) 
xtset coid year 
xtdes 
xtsum 
*SCREENING DATA FOR POST-FC ANALYSIS (Fc==2) 
keep if fc==2 
xtset coid year 
xtdes 
xtsum 
*REGRESING THE MODEL USING OPM (OPROBIT) ROBUST 
ESTIMATION (VCE) FOR POST-FC ANALYSIS 
oprobit rating lev profit liquid lnsize reins growth type form, vce(robust) 
log close 
clear all 
capture log close 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
